Report on the NGS3 Working Group on Safeguards by Design For Aqueous Reprocessing Plants

The objective of the Working Group on SBD for Aqueous Reprocessing Facilities was to provide recommendations, for facility operators and designers, which would aid in the coordination and integration of nuclear material accountancy and the safeguards requirements of all concerned parties - operators, state/regional authorities, and the IAEA. The recommendations, which are to be provided to the IAEA, are intended to assist in optimizing facility design and operating parameters to ensure the safeguardability of the facility while minimizing impact on the operations. The one day Working Group session addressed a wide range of design and operating topics

Supplemental Report on Nuclear Safeguards Considerations for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

Recent reports by Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for the low enriched uranium (LEU) fueled Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in used fuel. These reports fail to account effectively for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) 'provisional' guidelines for termination of safeguards on 'measured discards.' The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel may not be judged sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of {sup 232}U and {sup 236}U in the used fuel at the target burn-up of {approx}91 GWD/MT exceed specification limits for reprocessed uranium (ASTM C787) and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the {sup 236}U content to fall within specification thus making the PBMR used fuel less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBMR specific activity of reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A{sub 2} values for effective dose limit if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light water reactor spent fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product ({sup 99}Tc) and any possible plutonium contamination that may be present from attempted covert reprocessing. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBMR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of reprocessing, but a more significant consideration is that reprocessing technologies for coated particle fuels encased in graphitized-carbon have not progressed beyond laboratory-scale demonstrations although key equipment that has been tested in the past (such as graphite burners and electrolytic disintegration/dissolution devices) are not listed on either the 'Trigger List' or the 'Dual Use List' for mandatory export controls. Finally, if gross burn-up determined from fission product gamma ray inspection of a discharged pebble cannot be correlated acceptably with predicted plutonium content of the pebble, development and testing may be required on detector concepts for more directly measuring the plutonium content in a discharged pebble to ensure that its placement in the spent fuel storage tanks is for an acceptable 'measured discard' of diluted plutonium

Supplemental Report on Nuclear Safeguards Considerations for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

Recent reports by Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for the low enriched uranium (LEU) fueled Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in used fuel. These reports fail to account effectively for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) 'provisional' guidelines for termination of safeguards on 'measured discards.' The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel may not be judged sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of {sup 232}U and {sup 236}U in the used fuel at the target burn-up of {approx}91 GWD/MT exceed specification limits for reprocessed uranium (ASTM C787) and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the {sup 236}U content to fall within specification thus making the PBMR used fuel less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBMR specific activity of reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A{sub 2} values for effective dose limit if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light water reactor spent fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product ({sup 99}Tc) and any possible plutonium contamination that may be present from attempted covert reprocessing. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBMR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of reprocessing, but a more significant consideration is that reprocessing technologies for coated particle fuels encased in graphitized-carbon have not progressed beyond laboratory-scale demonstrations although key equipment that has been tested in the past (such as graphite burners and electrolytic disintegration/dissolution devices) are not listed on either the 'Trigger List' or the 'Dual Use List' for mandatory export controls. Finally, if gross burn-up determined from fission product gamma ray inspection of a discharged pebble cannot be correlated acceptably with predicted plutonium content of the pebble, development and testing may be required on detector concepts for more directly measuring the plutonium content in a discharged pebble to ensure that its placement in the spent fuel storage tanks is for an acceptable 'measured discard' of diluted plutonium

Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing ‘nuclear security’ risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as “the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,” with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: • Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, • Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, • Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of ‘nuclear security’ considerations as “full and equal” partners in the design process, • Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and • Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards into the design of nuclear facilities. This paper describes the work that has been completed in the development of a Safeguards by Design process for a project, illustrated by flow diagrams based upon the project phases described in U.S. Department of Energy Order 413.3A, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. The institutionalization of the Safeguards by Design process directly supports the goals of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and also aligns with goals and objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Other benefits from institutionalizing this Safeguards by Design process are discussed within this paper

Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities

This second report in a series of three reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication processes to be deployed at AFCF – specifically, the ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication line and the metallic (pyroprocessing) line. The most common TRU fuel has been fuel composed of mixed plutonium and uranium dioxide, referred to as “MOX”. However, under the Advanced Fuel Cycle projects custom-made fuels with higher contents of neptunium, americium, and curium may also be produced to evaluate if these “minor actinides” can be effectively burned and transmuted through irradiation in the ABR. A third and final report in this series will evaluate and review the advanced safeguards approach options for the ABR. In reviewing and developing the advanced safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel fabrication processes envisioned for AFCF, the existing international (IAEA) safeguards approach at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) and the conceptual approach planned for the new J-MOX facility in Japan have been considered as a starting point of reference. The pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication process at EBR-II near Idaho Falls also provided insight for safeguarding the additional metallic pyroprocessing fuel fabrication line planned for AFCF

Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors

Processed pseudogenes acquired somatically during cancer development

Cancer evolves by mutation, with somatic reactivation of retrotransposons being one such mutational process. Germline retrotransposition can cause processed pseudogenes, but whether this occurs somatically has not been evaluated. Here we screen sequencing data from 660 cancer samples for somatically acquired pseudogenes. We find 42 events in 17 samples, especially non-small cell lung cancer (5/27) and colorectal cancer (2/11). Genomic features mirror those of germline LINE element retrotranspositions, with frequent target-site duplications (67%), consensus TTTTAA sites at insertion points, inverted rearrangements (21%), 5′ truncation (74%) and polyA tails (88%). Transcriptional consequences include expression of pseudogenes from UTRs or introns of target genes. In addition, a somatic pseudogene that integrated into the promoter and first exon of the tumour suppressor gene, MGA, abrogated expression from that allele. Thus, formation of processed pseudogenes represents a new class of mutation occurring during cancer development, with potentially diverse functional consequences depending on genomic context

Mitochondrial physiology

As the knowledge base and importance of mitochondrial physiology to evolution, health and disease expands, the necessity for harmonizing the terminology concerning mitochondrial respiratory states and rates has become increasingly apparent. The chemiosmotic theory establishes the mechanism of energy transformation and coupling in oxidative phosphorylation. The unifying concept of the protonmotive force provides the framework for developing a consistent theoretical foundation of mitochondrial physiology and bioenergetics. We follow the latest SI guidelines and those of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) on terminology in physical chemistry, extended by considerations of open systems and thermodynamics of irreversible processes. The concept-driven constructive terminology incorporates the meaning of each quantity and aligns concepts and symbols with the nomenclature of classical bioenergetics. We endeavour to provide a balanced view of mitochondrial respiratory control and a critical discussion on reporting data of mitochondrial respiration in terms of metabolic flows and fluxes. Uniform standards for evaluation of respiratory states and rates will ultimately contribute to reproducibility between laboratories and thus support the development of data repositories of mitochondrial respiratory function in species, tissues, and cells. Clarity of concept and consistency of nomenclature facilitate effective transdisciplinary communication, education, and ultimately further discovery

Mitochondrial physiology

As the knowledge base and importance of mitochondrial physiology to evolution, health and disease expands, the necessity for harmonizing the terminology concerning mitochondrial respiratory states and rates has become increasingly apparent. The chemiosmotic theory establishes the mechanism of energy transformation and coupling in oxidative phosphorylation. The unifying concept of the protonmotive force provides the framework for developing a consistent theoretical foundation of mitochondrial physiology and bioenergetics. We follow the latest SI guidelines and those of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) on terminology in physical chemistry, extended by considerations of open systems and thermodynamics of irreversible processes. The concept-driven constructive terminology incorporates the meaning of each quantity and aligns concepts and symbols with the nomenclature of classical bioenergetics. We endeavour to provide a balanced view of mitochondrial respiratory control and a critical discussion on reporting data of mitochondrial respiration in terms of metabolic flows and fluxes. Uniform standards for evaluation of respiratory states and rates will ultimately contribute to reproducibility between laboratories and thus support the development of data repositories of mitochondrial respiratory function in species, tissues, and cells. Clarity of concept and consistency of nomenclature facilitate effective transdisciplinary communication, education, and ultimately further discovery

Pitfalls in assessing stromal tumor infiltrating lymphocytes (sTILs) in breast cancer

Abstract: Stromal tumor-infiltrating lymphocytes (sTILs) are important prognostic and predictive biomarkers in triple-negative (TNBC) and HER2-positive breast cancer. Incorporating sTILs into clinical practice necessitates reproducible assessment. Previously developed standardized scoring guidelines have been widely embraced by the clinical and research communities. We evaluated sources of variability in sTIL assessment by pathologists in three previous sTIL ring studies. We identify common challenges and evaluate impact of discrepancies on outcome estimates in early TNBC using a newly-developed prognostic tool. Discordant sTIL assessment is driven by heterogeneity in lymphocyte distribution. Additional factors include: technical slide-related issues; scoring outside the tumor boundary; tumors with minimal assessable stroma; including lymphocytes associated with other structures; and including other inflammatory cells. Small variations in sTIL assessment modestly alter risk estimation in early TNBC but have the potential to affect treatment selection if cutpoints are employed. Scoring and averaging multiple areas, as well as use of reference images, improve consistency of sTIL evaluation. Moreover, to assist in avoiding the pitfalls identified in this analysis, we developed an educational resource available at www.tilsinbreastcancer.org/pitfalls