Globalization, Factor Endowments,and Scale-Invariant Growth

The paper develops a two-country dynamic general-equilibrium model of growth without scale effects to explore the effects of globalization on long-run growth and wages. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and sequential global innovation contests in which challengers devote resources to R&D and technology leaders undertake rent-protection activities (RPAs) to prolong the expected duration of temporary monopoly power by frustrating the R&D effort of challengers. Globalization (i.e., a move from autarky to an integrated trading equilibrium) for two countries with identical relative factor abundance and possible differences in size does not affect the long-run growth rate of either country. However, the country that is abundant in the factor used intensively in the production of R&D services grows faster in autarky. Moreover, factor prices (adjusted for quality) and national long-run growth rates converge and are eventually equalized. Depending on international per-capita differences in factor abundance, the model also generates intra-sectoral trade, vertical and horizontal multinationals, and international outsourcing of services (R&D investment or RPAs). The growth effects of globalization between countries with different relative factor endowments are larger for smaller countries.Economic growth, scale effects, R&D, rent-protecting activities, innovation, wages

Globalization, Factor Endowments and Scale-Invariant Growth

The paper develops a two-country dynamic general-equilibrium model of growth without scale effects to explore the effects of globalization on long-run growth and wages. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and sequential global innovation contests in which challengers devote resources to R&D and technology leaders undertake rent-protection activities (RPAs) to prolong the expected duration of temporary monopoly power by frustrating the R&D effort of challengers. Globalization (i.e., a move from autarky to an integrated trading equilibrium) for two countries with identical relative factor abundance and possible differences in size does not affect the long-run growth rate of either country. However, the country that is abundant in the factor used intensively in the production of R&D services grows faster in autarky. Moreover, factor prices (adjusted for quality) and national long-run growth rates converge and are eventually equalized. Depending on international per-capita differences in factor abundance, the model also generates intra-sectoral trade, vertical and horizontal multinationals, and international outsourcing of services (R&D investment or RPAs). The growth effects of globalization between countries with different relative factor endowments are larger for smaller countries.Economic growth, scale effects, R&D, rent-protecting activities, innovation, wages.

Trade and insecure resources

We construct a model of conflict and trade to study the consequences of interstate disputes over contested resources (land, oil, water or other resources) for arming, welfare and trade flows. Different trade regimes imply different costs of such disputes in terms of arming. Depending on world prices, free trade can intensify arming to such an extent that the additional security costs it brings swamp the traditional gains from trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or all rival states. Free trade, though, is always an equilibrium, and sometimes is a dominant one with features of a prisoner's dilemma outcome. Furthermore, contestation of resources can reverse a country's apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict. And, where such conflict is present, comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of trade patterns

Globalization and Domestic Conflict

We examine how globalization affects trade patterns and welfare when conflict prevails domestically. We do so in a simple model of trade, in which a natural resource like oil is contested by competing groups using real resources (“gunsâ€). Thus, conflict is viewed as ultimately stemming from imperfect property-rights enforcement. When comparing autarky with free trade in such a setting, the gains from trade have to be weighed against the possibly higher resource costs of conflict. We find that importers of the contested resource gain unambiguously. By contrast, exporters of the contested resource lose under free trade, unless the world price of the resource is sufficiently high. Regardless of what price obtains in the world market, countries tend to over-export the contested resource relative to what we would observe if there were no conflict; for some range of prices, the presence of conflict even reverses the country’s comparative advantage. For an even wider range of prices, an increase in the international price of the contested resource reduces welfare, an instance of the “natural resource curse.â€Globalization; Trade openness; Property rights; Enforcement; Insecurity; Civil wars

International Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly Determined

We augment the canonical neoclassical model of trade to allow for interstate disputes over land, oil, water, or other resources. The costs of such disputes in terms of arming depend on the trade regime in place. Under either autarky or free trade, the larger country (in terms of factor endowments) need not to be more powerful. Yet, under free trade, there is a stronger tendency for arming incentives to be equalized and thus for a “leveling of the playing field.” Depending on world prices, free trade can intensify arming incentives to such an extent that the additional security costs swamp the traditional gains from trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or both rival states. Furthermore, contestation of resources can reverse a country’s apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict. And, where such conflict is present, comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of trade patterns.trade openness, property rights, interstate disputes, conflict, security policies

Globalization and Domestic Conflict

We examine how globalization affects trade patterns and welfare when conflict prevails domestically. We do so in a simple model of trade, in which a natural resource like oil is contested by competing groups using real resources (”guns”). Thus, conflict is viewed as ultimately stemming from imperfect property-rights enforcement. When comparing autarky with free trade in such a setting, the gains from trade have to be weighed against the possibly higher resource costs of conflict. We find that importers of the contested resource gain unambiguously. By contrast, countries exporting the contested resource will lose under free trade, unless the international price of the resource is sufficiently high. Regardless of what price obtains in international markets, countries tend to over-export the contested resource relative to what we would observe if there were no conflict; for some range of prices, the presence of conflict even inverts the country's comparative advantage. We find further that an increase in the international price of the contested resource over an even wider range reduces welfare, an instance of the "natural resource curse".globalization, trade openness, property rights, enforcement, insecurity, conflict

Arming in the global economy: The importance of trade with enemies and friends

We analyze how trade openness matters for interstate conflict over productive resources. Our analysis features a terms-of-trade channel that makes security policies trade-regime dependent. Specifically, trade between two adversaries reduces each one's incentive to arm given the opponent's arming. If these countries have a sufficiently similar mix of initial resource endowments, greater trade openness brings with it a reduction in resources diverted to conflict and thus wasted, as well as the familiar gains from trade. Although a move to trade can otherwise induce greater arming by one country and thus need not be welfare improving for both, aggregate arming falls. By contrast, when the two adversaries do not trade with each other but instead trade with a third (friendly) country, a move from autarky to trade intensifies conflict between the two adversaries, inducing greater arming. With data from the years surrounding the end of the Cold War, we exploit the contrasting implications of trade costs between enemies versus trade costs between friends to provide some suggestive evidence in support of the theory

International Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly Determined

We augment the canonical neoclassical model of trade to allow for interstate disputes over land, oil, water, or other resources. The costs of such disputes in terms of arming depend on the trade regime in place. Under either autarky or free trade, the larger country (in terms of factor endowments) need not to be more powerful. Yet, under free trade, there is a stronger tendency for arming incentives to be equalized and thus for a " leveling of the playing field." Depending on world prices, free trade can intensify arming incentives to such an extent that the additional security costs swamp the traditional gains from trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or both rival states. Furthermore, contestation of resources can reverse a country's apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict. And, where such conflict is present, comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of trade patterns.Trade openness; Property rights; Interstate disputes; Conflict; Security policies

Globalization and Insecurity: Reviewing Some Basic Issues

We argue that the costs of domestic and transnational insecurity are large and economically significant and that they may vary with the trade regime of a country. Then, in evaluating trade regimes, the gains from trade need to be weighed against the change in the security costs they induce. Within a simple model of trade, small countries that import a contested resource unambiguously gain from free trade. However, exporters of a contested resource incur additional security costs that are higher than the gains from trade compared to autarky, as long as the international price of the contested resource is not too high. We conclude with a discussion of how domestic and transnational governance could reduce insecurity.Globalization; Trade openness; Property rights; Enforcement; Insecurity