81 research outputs found
Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities
This paper considers a model of two interconnected networks with different qualities. There are call externalities in the sense that consumers value calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two part tariffs. We show that call externalities create private incentives for each competitor to charge low access prices. This result moderates the risk of tacit collusion when competitors can freely negotiate their access charges. We also analyze the case of a merger between the two networks and give conditions under which the merger can be welfare improving.call externalities; interconnection; mergers; telecommunications
An Economist's Guide to Local Loop Unbundling
This guide provides a critical review of the economics literature on the desirability and the effects of unbundling the local loop. Firstly, we discuss recent contributions, which aim to quantify the effect of unbundling regulations on the development of broadband services. Secondly, we review the literature on the potential impact of unbundling on investment and innovation incentives. Finally, we conclude this paper by offering some suggestions for further research.Unbundling; broadband diffusion; investment and innovation
An Economist's Guide to Local Loop Unbundling
This guide provides a critical review of the economics literature on the desirability and the effects of unbundling the local loop. Firstly, we discuss recent contributions, which aim to quantify the effect of unbundling regulations on the development of broadband services. Secondly, we review the literature on the potential impact of unbundling on investment and innovation incentives. Finally, we conclude this paper by offering some suggestions for further research.Unbundling; broadband diffusion; investment and innovation
Internet access and investment incentives for broadband service providers
This paper studies a model of the Internet broadband market as a platform in order to show how di€erent pricing schemes from the so-called "net neutrality " can increase economic e¹ ciency by allowing more investment of access providers and enhancing consumers surplus and social welfare. We show that departing from the "net neutrality", where at rates are used, introducing termination fees can increase incentives to invest for the ISP and enhance social surplus. Keywords : Network neutrality, Flat rates, Termination fees.
Internet access and investment incentives for broadband service providers
This paper studies a model of the Internet broadband market as a platform in order to show how different pricing schemes from the so-called net neutrality may increased economic efficiency by allowing more investment of access providers and enhancing consumers surplus and social welfare. --Network neutrality,Flat rates,Termination fees
Collusion Sustainability with Multimarket Contacts: Revisiting HHI Tests
Our paper focuses on the relationship between market concentration and collusion sustainability in a framework of multimarket contacts. We consider two independent and symmetric markets in which a subset of firms are active in both markets. When firms are able to transfer market power from one market to another, firms have strong incentives to collude even in a highly competitive market. This result is relevant for competition policy since assessing market concentration using HHI index could be misleading in some situations.
Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities
Working Paper du GATE 2003-08This paper considers a model of two interconnected networks with different qualities. There are call externalities in the sense that consumers value calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two part tariffs. We show that call externalities create private incentives for each competitor to charge low access prices. This result moderates the risk of tacit collusion when competitors can freely negotiate their access charges. We also analyze the case of a merger between the two networks and give conditions under which the merger can be welfare improving.Cet article examine un modĂšle de deux rĂ©seaux de qualitĂ©s diffĂ©rentes interconnectĂ©s. Il existe des externalitĂ©s d'appels dans le sens oĂč les consommateurs valorisent les appels qu'ils Ă©mettent et Ă©galement ceux qu'ils recoivent. Les rĂ©seaux se font concurrence en tarif binĂŽme. Nous montrons que les externalitĂ©s d'appels crĂ©ent des incitations privĂ©es pour chaque rĂ©seau Ă facturer l'accĂšs Ă son rĂ©seau Ă un prix bas. Ce rĂ©sultat modĂšre le risque de collusion tacite lorsque les opĂ©rateurs preuvent nĂ©gocier librement les prix d'accĂšs qu'ils se facturent. Nous Ă©tudions Ă©galement le cas d'une fusion entre les deux opĂ©rateurs et donnons les conditions sous lesquelles la fusion amĂ©liore le bien-ĂȘtre
Bundling and Collusion in Communications Markets
This paper deals with competition in communications markets between an
incumbent and an entrant. We analyze the effect of bundling strategy by
a firm who enters an incumbent market. This market dimension has
profound implications on the sustainability of collusion in an
infinitely repeated game framework. We show that the bundling strategy
of the entrant might hinder collusion. Futhermore, we consider a setting
in which the entrant uses a one-way access that the incumbent possesses.
In such situation, we show that when the entrant bundles its products, a
low access charge for call termination on the incumbent network might
increase the feasibility of collusion. This result has an important
policy implication
AccÚs stratégique des tiers au stockage et concurrence dans le secteur gazier
Cet article Ă©tudie les aspects stratĂ©giques liĂ©s Ă lâaccĂšs des tiers au stockage (ATS) dans le secteur gazier. On montre que dans certaines configurations de marchĂ©, lâATS peut ĂȘtre utilisĂ© stratĂ©giquement par des producteurs de gaz prĂ©sents en aval qui se comportent alors comme des acheteurs sur le marchĂ© intermĂ©diaire. Lâobjectif de ces achats stratĂ©giques est de distordre la formation du prix sur le marchĂ© intermĂ©diaire et ainsi dâaccroĂźtre le coĂ»t du rival. Cette stratĂ©gie du producteur peut rĂ©duire lâefficacitĂ© collective de lâindustrie gaziĂšre. Nous montrons quâil est possible de rĂ©duire cette distorsion en autorisant lâintĂ©gration du stockage Ă un distributeur indĂ©pendant.This article studies strategic aspects connected to third party access to storage facilities (TPAS) in the gas sector. We show that in some market settings, TPAS can be used strategically by vertically integrated gas producers who behave as buyers in the intermediate market. The aim of these strategic purchases is to change the price formation in the intermediate market and in doing so increase rivalâs costs. Such a strategy can reduce social efficiency in the industry. Finally, we show that this distortion could be reduced allowing the vertical integration of storage facilities to the independent downstream company
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