13 research outputs found

    Reviewing the Case of Online Interpersonal Trust

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    The aim of this paper is to better qualify the problem of online trust. The problem of online trust is that of evaluating whether online environments have the proper design to enable trust. This paper tries to better qualify this problem by showing that there is no unique answer, but only conditional considerations that depend on the conception of trust assumed and the features that are included in the environments themselves. In fact, the major issue concerning traditional debates surrounding online trust is that those debates focus on specific definitions of trust and specific online environments. Ordinarily, a definition of trust is assumed and then environmental conditions necessary for trust are evaluated with respect to such specific definition. However, this modus operandi fails to appreciate that trust is a rich concept, with a multitude of meanings and that there is still no strict consensus on which meaning shall be taken as the proper one. Moreover, the fact that online environments are constantly evolving and that new design features might be implemented in them is completely ignored. In this paper, the richness of the philosophical discussions about trust is brought into the analysis of online trust. I first provide a set of conditions that depend on the definition of trust that can be assumed and then discuss those conditions with respect to the design of online environments in order to determine whether they can enable (and under which circumstances) trust

    Using Justified True Beliefs to Explore Formal Ignorance

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    The possibility of better understanding belief and knowledge modalities through justifications is not a novel one, however, the machinery of justifications has never been employed to explore the nature of ignorance from a formal perspective. By including justification terms into a modal logic for belief a major project (among others) can be pursued: different cognitive attitudes can be formalized that imply ignorance, therefore highlighting even better the possible culprits of the emergence of the phenomenon of being ignorant. This would allow the possibility of developing strategies that could be employed in different scenarios to tackle ignorance, thus adapting interventions to the specific situations in which ignorance arises

    From belief to trust: A quantitative framework based on modal logic

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    In this work, we provide a logical characterization of trust, which is based on a modal logic expressing a computational notion of trust quantitatively dependent on the beliefs possessed by the agent. The proposed framework encompasses decidability results and equivalence laws emphasizing the properties of trust. The overall aim is to obtain a formal notion of trust that could be employed for further developments of formal languages related to decision-making procedures and soft-security mechanisms in online, digital environments. Such formal counterpart of trust should support agents, either human or artificial, in devising secure decision strategies based on partial and/or indirect information

    A Trust Logic for Pre-Trust Computations

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    Computational trust is the digital counterpart of the human notion of trust as applied in social systems. Its main purpose is to improve the reliability of interactions in online communities and of knowledge transfer in information management systems. Trust models are formal frameworks in which the notion of computational trust is described rigorously and where its dynamics are explained precisely. In this paper we will consider and extend a computational trust model, i.e., JØsang's Subjective Logic: we will show how this model is well-suited to describe the dynamics of computational trust, but lacks effective tools to compute initial trust values to feed in the model. To overcome some of the issues with subjective logic, we will introduce a logical language which can be employed to describe and reason about trust. The core ideas behind the logical language will turn out to be useful in computing initial trust values to feed into subjective logic. The aim of the paper is, therefore, that of providing an improvement on subjective logic

    A Trust Logic for the Varieties of Trust

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    In his paper Varieties of Trust, Eric Uslaner presents a conceptual analysis of trust with the aim of capturing the multiple dimensions that can characterize various notions of trust. While Uslaner's analysis is theoretically very useful to better understand the phenomenon of trust, his account is rarely considered when formal conceptions of trust are built. This is often due to the fact that formal frameworks concentrate on specific aspects of phenomena rather than general features and, thus, there is little space for omni-comprehensive considerations about concepts. However, building formal languages that can describe trust generally are extremely important, since they can provide basic accounts employable as starting points for further investigations on trust. This paper addresses exactly this issue by providing a logical language expressive enough to describe all the varieties of trust derivable from Uslaner's conceptual analysis. Specifically, Uslaner's analysis is transformed into a conceptual map of trust, by strengthening his analysis with further reflections on the nature of trust. Then, a logical language for trust is introduced and it is shown how the validity classes of such language can characterize all the varieties of trust derivable from the conceptual map previously built

    Reasoning About Ignorance and Beliefs

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    When building artificial agents that have to make decisions, understanding what follows from what they know or believe is mandatory, but it is also important to understand what happens when those agents ignore some facts, where ignoring a fact is interpreted to stand for not knowing/not being aware of something. This becomes especially relevant when such agents ignore their ignorance, since this hinders their ability of seeking the information they are missing. Given this fact, it might prove useful to clarify in which circumstances ignorance is present and what might cause an agent to ignore that he/she is ignoring. This paper is an attempt at exploring those facts. In the paper, the relationship between ignorance and beliefs is analysed. In particular, three doxastic effects are discussed, showing that they can be seen as a cause of ignorance. The effects are formalized in a bi-modal formal language for knowledge and belief and it is shown how ignorance follows directly from those effects. Moreover, it is shown that negative introspection is the culprit of the passage between simply ignoring a fact and ignoring someone’s ignorance about that fact. Those results could prove useful when artificial agents are designed, since modellers would be aware of which conditions are mandatory to avoid deep forms of ignorance; this means that those artificial agents would be able to infer which information they are ignoring and they could employ this fact to seek it and fill the gaps in their knowledge/belief base

    Melissus as an Analytic Metaphysicist

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    The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the logical structure of Melissus philosophy, building on Laks Most’s translation and Barnes’ seminal work on the Samian. This will allow us to shed some light on the subtle argumentations of Melissus. On top of that, we frame Melissus’ metaphysics employing modern logical instruments. On one side, this reformulation makes clear a few assumptions hidden in the deductions made by the Samian; on the other side, our paper shows that contemporary analytic metaphysics has forerunners dating back 2500 years
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