The Politics of Growth Models

This article develops a framework for studying the politics of growth models. These, the authors posit, are sustained by ‘growth coalitions’ based in key sectors. Their members are first and foremost firms and employer associations, but fractions of labor are also included, if their interests do not impair the model’s functionality. There is no guarantee that a growth coalition and a winning electoral coalition coincide. In normal times, a growth coalition effectively insulates itself from political competition, and mainstream political parties converge on key growth model policies. In moments of crisis, however, the coalition shrinks, favoring the emergence of challengers that fundamentally contest the status quo. The way governing parties respond to electoral pressures can also play an important role in the recalibration of growth models. The authors illustrate the argument by examining the politics of ‘export-led growth’ in Germany, ‘construction-led growth’ in Spain, and ‘balanced growth’ in Sweden.1 Introduction 2 The comparative capitalisms debate 3 Sectoral interests in macroeconomic policy 4 Social class and power resources 5 Parties and electoral politics 6 The politics of export-led growth in Germany 7 The politics of construction-led growth in Spain 8 The politics of growth-model recalibration in Sweden 9 Concluding remarks Reference

The politics of fiscal policy during economic downturns, 1981-2010

This article investigates fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession in historical perspective. We explore general trends in the frequency, size and composition of fiscal stimulus as well as the impact of government partisanship on fiscal policy outputs during the four international recessions of 1980-81, 1990-91, 2001-02 and 2008-09. Encompassing 17-23 OECD countries, our analysis calls into question the idea of a general retreat from fiscal policy activism since the early 1980s. The propensity of governments to respond to economic downturns by engaging in fiscal stimulus has increased over time and we do not observe any secular trend in the size of stimulus measures. At the same time, OECD governments have relied more on tax cuts to stimulate demand in the two recessions of the 2000s than they did in the early 1980s or early 1990s. Regarding government partisanship, we do not find any significant direct partisan effects on either the size or the composition of fiscal stimulus for any of the four recession episodes. However, the size of the welfare state conditioned the impact of government partisanship in the two recessions of the 2000s, with Left-leaning governments distinctly more prone to engage in discretionary fiscal stimulus and/or spending increases in large welfare states, but not in small welfare states

On the determinants of political polarization

In this article, we aim to identify the main determinants of political polarization using Bayesian Model Averaging to overcome the problem of model uncertainty. We find that the level of trust within a country and the degree of income inequality are the most robust determinants of political polarization

Comparative Capitalism without Capitalism, and Production without Workers: The Limits and Possibilities of Contemporary Institutional Analysis

The aim of this paper is to consider the extent to which the comparative capitalism literature fully reflects the available empirical evidence in its attempts to model different versions of capitalism and, in particular, whether it adequately captures the roles of diverse stakeholders within the capitalist system. In doing so, particular attention is accorded to the varieties of capitalism literature, business systems theory and regulation theory. In addition, there is reflection in the paper on whether any strand of the literature is able to deal effectively with the recent economic crisis and systemic change. It is argued that more attention needs to be devoted to exploring the structural causes of change and the marginalization of the interests of key social groupings, most notably workers, from the process of institutional redesign