3,344 research outputs found

    Independent Confirmation of the Pioneer 10 Anomalous Acceleration

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    I perform an independent analysis of radio Doppler tracking data from the Pioneer 10 spacecraft for the time period 1987-1994. All of the tracking data were taken from public archive sources, and the analysis tools were developed independently by myself. I confirm that an apparent anomalous acceleration is acting on the Pioneer 10 spacecraft, which is not accounted for by present physical models of spacecraft navigation. My best fit value for the acceleration, including corrections for systematic biases and uncertainties, is (8.60 +/- 1.34) x 10^{-8} cm s^{-2}, directed towards the Sun. This value compares favorably to previous results. I examine the robustness of my result to various perturbations of the analysis method, and find agreement to within +/- 5%. The anomalous acceleration is reasonably constant with time, with a characteristic variation time scale of > 70 yr. Such a variation timescale is still too short to rule out on-board thermal radiation effects, based on this particular Pioneer 10 data set.Comment: RevTeX, 29 pages, 5 figures, submitted to Phys Rev

    Partisan cycles and pre-electoral uncertainty

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    Rational partisan theory of political business cycles suggests differences in inflation under left-wing and right-wing governments. It also suggests temporary post-electoral booms after election of left-wing governments and temporary recessions after election of right-wing ones. However, the core hypothesis that post-electoral booms and recessions depend upon the degree of pre-electoral uncertainty has rarely been tested. Using pre-electoral polling data, we provide empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis of the existence of rational partisan cycles. We also show that - in line with most previous empirical studies - there is little evidence for partisan cycles under adaptive expectations. --partisan theory,political business cycles

    One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats

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    The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially depends on the effectiveness of monitoring bureaucrat’s behavior. The benefits of interjurisdictional competition only occur if there is a supervisory body such as a free press, which is often lacking in less-developed countries. Using cross-country data, we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking different degrees of the freedom of the press into account. Our main finding is that decentralization counteracts corruption in countries with high degrees of press freedom, whereas countries without effective monitoring suffer from decentralization. Our policy implication is that a free press is a necessary pre-condition for successful decentralization programs.decentralization, corruption, freedom of press

    Aid, Growth and Devolution

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    This paper examines whether the federal structure of aid-receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness. Following the decentralization theorem, the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness, since local decision-makers are better informed about local needs. At the same time, decentralization has reverse effects, e.g., through coordination problems, excessive regulation, administrative costs and local capture. Using panel data for up to 60 countries, we find that aid is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries. Our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how both anti-poverty instruments - financial assistance and decentralization - work together.foreign aid, growth, decentralization

    Decentralization and Foreign Aid Effectiveness: Do Aid Modality and Federal Design Matter in Poverty Alleviation?

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    This paper empirically studies the impact of decentralization on foreign aid effectiveness. For this purpose, we examine a commonly used empirical growth model, considering aid modality as well as different measures of political and fiscal decentralization. Our panel estimations reveal that fiscal decentralization negatively impacts aid effectiveness, while measures of political decentralization have no significant effect or even a positive one. This result is robust for grants and overall ODA, while the growth impact of other aid types is not generally conditional on decentralization. We therefore conclude that donor countries should carefully consider how both anti-poverty instruments - foreign assistance and decentralization - work together.foreign aid, growth, decentralization

    Aid, growth and decentralization

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    This paper examines whether the federal structure of aid-receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness. Following the decentralization theorem, the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness, since local decision-makers are better informed about local needs. At the same time, decentralization has reverse effects, e.g., through coordination problems, excessive regulation, administrative costs and local capture. Using panel data for up to 59 countries, we find that aid is less effective or even harmful in decentralized countries. Our results imply that donor countries should carefully consider how both anti-poverty instruments financial assistance and decentralization work together. --Foreign Aid,Growth,Decentralization

    One size fits all? Decentralization, corruption, and the monitoring of bureaucrats

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    The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially depends on the possibility to monitor bureaucrat's behavior. The benefits of interjurisdictional competition only occur if there is a supervisory body such as a free press, which is often lacking in less-developed countries. Using crosscountry data, we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking different degrees of the freedom of the press into account. Our main finding is that decentralization counteracts corruption in countries with high degrees of press freedom, whereas countries with low monitoring possibilities suffer from decentralization. Our policy implication is, therefore, that a free press is a necessary pre-condition for successful decentralization programs. --decentralization,corruption,freedom of press

    The Role of Political Institutions for the Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence

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    This paper empirically studies the impact of the quality of political institutions on the link between central bank independence and inflation. Making use of data on the evolution of central bank independence over time and controlling for possible nonlinearities, we employ interaction models to identify the conditions under which more central bank independence will enhance a country’s inflation performance. Examining a cross-section of up to 69 countries, we are able to show that granting a central bank more autonomy does not necessarily lead to better inflation performance. To lower inflation by increasing independence, two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) The change in independence must be sufficiently large, and (2) the quality of the political institutions must be sufficiently high.central bank independence, inflation, institutional quality, monetary policy
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