8,486 research outputs found

    Review of: Sharon M. Friedman et al. eds., Communicating Uncertainty

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    A review of the book Communicating Uncertainty: Media Coverage of New and Controversial Science (Sharon M. Friedman, Sharon Dunwoody & Carol L. Rogers, eds.; Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 1999). Preface, introduction. ISBN 0-8058-2728-5 [261 pp. $32.50. Paperback, 10 Industrial Avenue, Mahwah, NJ 07430-2262]


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    A brief article on faith as a psychological attitude

    On an ā€œUnintelligibleā€ Idea: Donald Davidsonā€™s Case Against Experiential Foundationalism

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    Donald Davidsonā€™s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ā€˜unintelligibleā€™. In this essay, I assess Davidsonā€™s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept

    Was Jesus Mad, Bad, or God?... Or Merely Mistaken?

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    Reprinted in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, Volume 1: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, Oxford 2009, ed. Michael Rea. A popular argument for the divinity of Jesus goes like this. Jesus claimed to be divine, but if his claim was false, then either he was insane (mad) or lying (bad), both of which are very unlikely; so, he was divine. I present two objections to this argument. The first, the dwindling probabilities objection, contends that even if we make generous probability assignments to the relevant pieces of evidence for Jesusā€™ divinity, the probability calculus tell us to suspend judgement on the matter. The second, and more telling objection in my opinion, the merely mistaken objection, contends that it is no less plausible to suppose that Jesus was neither mad nor bad but merely mistaken than that he was divine

    Educating for Good Work: From Research to Practice

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    Launched in 1995, the GoodWork Project is a long-term, multi-site effort to understand the nature of good work across the professional landscape and to promote its achievement by relevant groups of students and professionals. In this essay, the authors review the goals and methods of the initial research project and its most salient findings. They describe the GoodWork Toolkit, a versatile instrument that consists of actual dilemmas faced by professionals, along with exercises designed to make the issues salient to those who use the Toolkit. Introduced as well is a system of classification of the dilemmas, in terms of their applicability across the professional landscape; and a review of the range of educational settings in which GoodWork materials have been utilized

    Approaches to Faith, Guest Editorial Preface

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    Springer. We find in contemporary culture starkly contrasting estimates of the value of faith. On the one hand, for many people, faith is a virtue or positive human value, something associated with understanding, hope, and love, something to be inculcated, maintained, and cherished. On the other hand, for many people, faith is a vice, something associated with dogmatism, arrogance, and close-mindedness, something to be avoided at all costs. The papers included in this special (double) issue on approaches to faith explore questions about faith in a variety of settings through a diverse range of examples, both secular and religious. The attempt to deepen our understanding of faith in the context of ordinary human relationships (e.g., between parents and children, friends, generals and their armies, business partners, citizens and the state), a commitment to ideals, or the pursuit of significant goals is clearly of general philosophical interest, as is the examination of potential connections between faith and topics such as trust or reliance

    The Puzzle of Humility and Disparity

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    Suppose that you are engaging with someone who is your oppressor, or someone who espouses a heinous view like Nazism or a ridiculous view like flat-earthism. In contexts like these, there is a disparity between you and your interlocutor, a dramatic normative difference across which you are in the right and they are in the wrong. As theorists of humility, we find these contexts puzzling. Humility seems like the *last* thing oppressed people need and the *last* thing we need in dealing with those whose views are heinous or ridiculous. Responding to such people via humility seems uncalled for, even inappropriate. But how could this be, given that humility is a *virtue*? The purpose of the paper is to explore this puzzle. We explain what the puzzle is and then attempt to draw some lessons from it: first, the lesson that the importance of humility is limited in several ways, and second, the lesson that humility nonetheless has several important roles to play, even for people who are in the right in contexts of disparity
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