72,533 research outputs found

    Caps & Capes - Thanksgiving 1961

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    Caps & Capes - Fall 1961

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    Observation of a diffractive contribution to dijet production in proton-proton collisions at s=7\sqrt{s} = 7 TeV

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    The differential cross section measurement for dijet production at proton-proton collisions at s=7\sqrt{s}=7 TeV is presented as a function of an approximation for the fractional momentum loss of the scattered proton (ξ~\tilde{\xi}), an useful observable to distinguish model predictions of diffractive and nondiffractive components. The data was collected by the CMS detector at low instantaneous luminosity runs at LHC, corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 2.7nb12.7 {\rm nb}^{-1}. This is the first observation of single diffractive dijets at LHC.Comment: on behalf of the CMS Collaboratio

    Caps & Capes - Volume III Issue I

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    The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation

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    One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal - is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage that cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, (1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, (2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and (3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court

    The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation

    Get PDF
    One of the central concerns about American policy-making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model, how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage - which cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, 1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, 2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and 3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.
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