In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative

Sample (2015) argues that scientists ought not to believe that their theories are true because they cannot fulfill the epistemic obligation to take the diachronic perspective on their theories. I reply that Sample’s argument imposes an inordinately heavy epistemic obligation on scientists, and that it spells doom not only for scientific theories but also for observational beliefs and philosophical ideas that Samples endorses. I also delineate what I take to be a reasonable epistemic obligation for scientists. In sum, philosophers ought to impose on scientists only an epistemic standard that they are willing to impose on themselves

Many worlds and modality in the interpretation of quantum mechanics: an algebraic approach

Many worlds interpretations (MWI) of quantum mechanics avoid the measurement problem by considering every term in the quantum superposition as actual. A seemingly opposed solution is proposed by modal interpretations (MI) which state that quantum mechanics does not provide an account of what `actually is the case', but rather deals with what `might be the case', i.e. with possibilities. In this paper we provide an algebraic framework which allows us to analyze in depth the modal aspects of MWI. Within our general formal scheme we also provide a formal comparison between MWI and MI, in particular, we provide a formal understanding of why --even though both interpretations share the same formal structure-- MI fall pray of Kochen-Specker (KS) type contradictions while MWI escape them.Comment: submitted to the Journal of Mathematical Physic

Correlations, deviations and expectations: the Extended Principle of the Common Cause

The Principle of the Common Cause is usually understood to provide causal explanations for probabilistic correlations obtaining between causally unrelated events. In this study, an extended interpretation of the principle is proposed, according to which common causes should be invoked to explain positive correlations whose values depart from the ones that one would expect to obtain in accordance to her probabilistic expectations. In addition, a probabilistic model for common causes is tailored which satisfies the generalized version of the principle, at the same time including the standard conjunctive-fork model as a special case

Real World Interpretations of Quantum Theory

I propose a new class of interpretations, {\it real world interpretations}, of the quantum theory of closed systems. These interpretations postulate a preferred factorization of Hilbert space and preferred projective measurements on one factor. They give a mathematical characterisation of the different possible worlds arising in an evolving closed quantum system, in which each possible world corresponds to a (generally mixed) evolving quantum state. In a realistic model, the states corresponding to different worlds should be expected to tend towards orthogonality as different possible quasiclassical structures emerge or as measurement-like interactions produce different classical outcomes. However, as the worlds have a precise mathematical definition, real world interpretations need no definition of quasiclassicality, measurement, or other concepts whose imprecision is problematic in other interpretational approaches. It is natural to postulate that precisely one world is chosen randomly, using the natural probability distribution, as the world realised in Nature, and that this world's mathematical characterisation is a complete description of reality.Comment: Minor revisions. To appear in Foundations of Physic

Jump-like unravelings for non-Markovian open quantum systems

Non-Markovian evolution of an open quantum system can be `unraveled' into pure state trajectories generated by a non-Markovian stochastic (diffusive) Schr\"odinger equation, as introduced by Di\'osi, Gisin, and Strunz. Recently we have shown that such equations can be derived using the modal (hidden variable) interpretation of quantum mechanics. In this paper we generalize this theory to treat jump-like unravelings. To illustrate the jump-like behavior we consider a simple system: A classically driven (at Rabi frequency $\Omega$) two-level atom coupled linearly to a three mode optical bath, with a central frequency equal to the frequency of the atom, $\omega_0$, and the two side bands have frequencies $\omega_0\pm\Omega$. In the large $\Omega$ limit we observed that the jump-like behavior is similar to that observed in this system with a Markovian (broad band) bath. This is expected as in the Markovian limit the fluorescence spectrum for a strongly driven two level atom takes the form of a Mollow triplet. However the length of time for which the Markovian-like behaviour persists depends upon {\em which} jump-like unraveling is used.Comment: 11 pages, 5 figure

Topos-Theoretic Extension of a Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

This paper deals with topos-theoretic truth-value valuations of quantum propositions. Concretely, a mathematical framework of a specific type of modal approach is extended to the topos theory, and further, structures of the obtained truth-value valuations are investigated. What is taken up is the modal approach based on a determinate lattice \Dcal(e,R), which is a sublattice of the lattice \Lcal of all quantum propositions and is determined by a quantum state $e$ and a preferred determinate observable $R$. Topos-theoretic extension is made in the functor category \Sets^{\CcalR} of which base category \CcalR is determined by $R$. Each true atom, which determines truth values, true or false, of all propositions in \Dcal(e,R), generates also a multi-valued valuation function of which domain and range are \Lcal and a Heyting algebra given by the subobject classifier in \Sets^{\CcalR}, respectively. All true propositions in \Dcal(e,R) are assigned the top element of the Heyting algebra by the valuation function. False propositions including the null proposition are, however, assigned values larger than the bottom element. This defect can be removed by use of a subobject semi-classifier. Furthermore, in order to treat all possible determinate observables in a unified framework, another valuations are constructed in the functor category \Sets^{\Ccal}. Here, the base category \Ccal includes all \CcalR's as subcategories. Although \Sets^{\Ccal} has a structure apparently different from \Sets^{\CcalR}, a subobject semi-classifier of \Sets^{\Ccal} gives valuations completely equivalent to those in \Sets^{\CcalR}'s.Comment: LaTeX2

Avoiding deontic explosion by contextually restricting aggregation

In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called P2.1(r), that is based on Goble's logic SDLaPe-a bimodal extension of Goble's logic P that invalidates aggregation for all prima facie obligations. The logic P2.1(r) has several advantages with respect to SDLaPe. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation "as much as possible". It thus leads to a richer consequence set than SDLaPe. The logic P2.1(r) avoids Goble's criticisms against other non-adjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the 'toy examples' from the literature as well as more complex ones

A geometric proof of the Kochen-Specker no-go theorem

We give a short geometric proof of the Kochen-Specker no-go theorem for non-contextual hidden variables models. Note added to this version: I understand from Jan-Aake Larsson that the construction we give here actually contains the original Kochen-Specker construction as well as many others (Bell, Conway and Kochen, Schuette, perhaps also Peres).Comment: This paper appeared some years ago, before the author was aware of quant-ph. It is relevant to recent developments concerning Kochen-Specker theorem

Explanation in mathematical conversations:An empirical investigation

Analysis of online mathematics forums can help reveal how explanation is used by mathematicians; we contend that this use of explanation may help to provide an informal conceptualization of simplicity. We extracted six conjectures from recent philosophical work on the occurrence and characteristics of explanation in mathematics. We then tested these conjectures against a corpus derived from online mathematical discussions. To this end, we employed two techniques, one based on indicator terms, the other on a random sample of comments lacking such indicators. Our findings suggest that explanation is widespread in mathematical practice and that it occurs not only in proofs but also in other mathematical contexts. Our work also provides further evidence for the utility of empirical methods in addressing philosophical problems

Problems with Using Evolutionary Theory in Philosophy

Does science move toward truths? Are present scientific theories (approximately) true? Should we invoke truths to explain the success of science? Do our cognitive faculties track truths? Some philosophers say yes, while others say no, to these questions. Interestingly, both groups use the same scientific theory, viz., evolutionary theory, to defend their positions. I argue that it begs the question for the former group to do so because their positive answers imply that evolutionary theory is warranted, whereas it is self-defeating for the latter group to do so because their negative answers imply that evolutionary theory is unwarranted