Information Flow, Social Interactions and the Fluctuations of Prices in Financial Markets

We model how excess demand or excess supply can be generated in the presence of a social network of interactions, where agents are subject to external information and individual incentives. In this context we study price fluctuations in financial markets under equilibrium. In particular, we isolate the role of these different factors in the determination of price fluctuations and describe non trivial sensitivities to changes in equilibrium due to the existence of social interactions. We characterize equilibrium and distinguish between stable and unstable equilibrium. Crashes or bubbles are seen as out-of-equilibrium situations, preceeded by unstable equilibrium. Fluctuations under unstable equilibrium are shown to be abnormal and particulary large. Also, we show how fluctuations of the external information flows affect the fluctuations of the return process. In all cases we explain the well-known phenomena that prices do not fluctuate upwards in the same way as they fluctuate downwards. This asymmetry of price fluctuations is due to asymmetries in the price elasticity of demand and supply curves at the level defining equilibriumsocial network, excess demand, excess supply, price fluctuations

Super-replicating Bounds on European Option Prices when the Underlying Asset is Illiquid

We derive super-replicating bounds on European option prices when the underlying asset is illiquid. Illiquidity is taken as the impossibility of transacting the underlying asset at some points in time, generating market incompleteness. We conclude that option price bounds follow a Black-Scholes partial differential equation where the volatility term is adjusted to reflect different levels of illiquidity.

Consuming durable goods when stock markets jump: a strategic asset allocation approach

Agents derive their utilities from consumption over time. In this paper we consider an agent that invests in thefinancial market and in consumption goods. The agent has an infinite time horizon and a utility that depends on consumption at each point in time, consuming both a durable good and a perishable good. There are costs for transacting the durable good. We show that an agent who does not consider the impact of jumps in the return process of risky assets will make suboptimal decisions, not only regarding the fraction of wealth invested in the stock market, but also with respect to the timing for trading on the durable good.Optimal asset allocation, durable consumption good, transaction costs.

Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board

We provide evidence that the presence of bankers in the board of directors reduce information asymmetry between credit markets and firms. We show that the impact of the presence of bankers on leverage is driven by firms with low level of debt. This effect is amplified the more connected the bankers are to the corporate world. Additionally the results are more pronounced for less transparent firms. Our findings suggest that the connectedness of bankers play a key role in reducing information asymmetry.N/

The Exact Value for European Options on a Stock Paying a Discrete Dividend

In the context of a Black-Scholes economy and with a no-arbitrage argument, we derive arbitrarily accurate lower and upper bounds for the value of European options on a stock paying a discrete dividend. Setting the option price error below the smallest monetary unity, both bounds coincide, and we obtain the exact value of the option.Comment: 14 pages,3 figure

Referenda outcomes and the influence of polls: A social network feedback process

This paper proposes a model to explain the differences between outcomes of referenda and the voting trends suggested by polls. Two main effects are at stake. First, the evolution of the voters' attitudes is conditional on the public information made available to them. Second, the predisposition toward abstention among individuals within each voting group may be different. Our model describes how these two aspects of decision making may interact, showing how publicly available information may amplify the distinct tendency toward abstention between both groups and thus affect the outcome of the referendum

Market Illiquidity and the Bid-Ask Spread of Derivatives

This paper analyzes the impact of illiquidity of a stock on the pricing of derivatives. In particular, it is shown how illiquidity generates a bid-ask spread in an option on this stock, even in the absence of other imperfections, such as transaction costs and asymmetry of information. Moreover, the spread is shown to be asymmetric with respect to the option price under perfect liquidity. This fact explains the appearance of a smile effect when the implied volatility is estimated from the mid-quote.N/

Testing the Markov Property with Ultra-High Frequency Financial Data

This paper develops a framework to nonparametrically test whether discretevalued irregularly-spaced financial transactions data follow a Markov process. For that purpose, we consider a specific optional sampling in which a continuous-time Markov process is observed only when it crosses some discrete level. This framework is convenient for it accommodates not only the irregular spacing of transactions data, but also price discreteness. Under such an observation rule, the current price duration is independent of previous price durations given the current price realization. A simple nonparametric test then follows by examining whether this conditional independence property holds. Finally, we investigate whether or not bid-ask spreads follow Markov processes using transactions data from the New York Stock Exchange. The motivation lies on the fact that asymmetric information models of market microstructures predict that the Markov property does not hold for the bid-ask spread. The results are mixed in the sense that the Markov assumption is rejected for three out of the five stocks we have analyzed.N/

Equilibrium Bid-Ask Spread of European Derivatives in Dry Markets

In the framework of incomplete markets, due to the non-existence of trade at some points in time, and using a partial equilibrium analysis, we show how the bid-ask spread of an European derivative is generated. We also find conditons for the existence of the spread. These conditions concern the market structure of the maret-makers, which can be a oligolopoly with price competition or a monopoly, as well as the riskaversion of the demand and supply of the market.N/