The reform process of the railway sector in Europe: A disaggregated regulatory approach

The railroad package of 2001 focusing on access regulation is in the process of a reform. Particularly, the European Commission intends to remove the obstacles to fair competition that have been identified since 2001. In this context, the paper points out the relevance of the disaggregated regulatory approach. It is necessary to differentiate between infrastructure components which are monopolistic bottlenecks (e.g. railway tracks) and competitive components (e. g. service functions like ticketing). Competition on the markets for railway transport services requires non-discriminatory access to the railway infrastructures. As well the horizontal interoperability between national railway networks is a prerequisite that full competition on European markets for railway services can evolve. Train access charges should provide incentives for the different track companies to participate in collaborations offering international cross-border based track capacities, whereas a regulatory prescription of international track corridors conflicts with the competence to allocate the track capacities of the different track companies. Finally, the complex question of the interplay between discrimination and the deficit problem is addressed in order to present solutions to avoid crosssubsidization between track infrastructure and markets for transport services and to guarantee the efficient usage of public funds. --

Stepping stones and access holidays: the fallacies of regulatory micro-management

Good intentions are no substitute for sound economic regulation. Using the ‘in-vestment ladder’ as the stick and access holidays as the carrot is hardly an ef-fective way to generate competition. On the contrary, this approach creates a regulatory spiral. What regulators plead for today is in effect an obligatory shar-ing regime for nearly all network elements. However, this splitting up of net-works into their elements by ad hoc regulatory interventions is destroying con-sumer welfare. Instead, rule-based regulation of network-specific market power should be implemented by means of a disaggregated regulatory mandate, limit-ing incentive regulation to essential facilities as a whole. --

Regulation of new markets in telecommunications? Market dynamics and shrinking monopolistic bottlenecks

This paper aims at localizing network-specific market power in new markets. Three kinds of transmission qualities on service markets can be differentiated according to the products provided: narrowband services like PSTN/ISDN or GSM, semi high-speed broadband services like broadband internet access up to 6 Mbps download and VDSL services up to 50 Mbps. As long as, due to the absence of alternative network infrastructures, a monopolistic bottleneck in local infrastructure networks exists the question arises what the remaining bottleneck components are for these different markets. In this paper the shrinking-bottleneck hypothesis will be demonstrated. --

Regulation of New Markets in Telecommunications: Market Dynamics and Shrinking Monopolistic Bottlenecks

This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.This paper focuses on localising network-specific market power in new markets. Three levels of transmission quality in service markets can be differentiated according to the products provided: narrowband services like PSTN/ISDN or GSM, semi high-speed broadband services, like broadband internet access up to 6 Mbps download, and VDSL services up to 50 Mbps. As long as a monopolistic bottleneck exists in local infrastructure networks due to the absence of alternative network infrastructures, the question arises what the remaining bottleneck components are for these different markets. In this paper, the shrinking bottleneck hypothesis will be demonstrated.Peer Reviewe