Questionable Use of the Mathematical Concept of Equivalence by Psychologists

Psychologists have applied the mathematical concept of an equivalence relation to such topics as concept formation and foundations of language. This line of research is not without controversies, and most researchers have only intuitive understanding of this mathematical concept. In this article, accessible explanations are provided on fundamental issues that have implications for empirical research

On the Sustainability of Partial Tax Harmonization among Asymmetric Countries

This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries asymmetric in repect to their capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., any group of asymmetric countries), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the capital endowment of the median country relative to those of the large and small countries. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country to the average capital endowment of the large and small countries, the less likely is the tax harmonization including the median country to prevail and the more likely is the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country to prevail

Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting

This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition subgroup is smaller and the number of existing regions in the entire economy is larger. We also show that under linear utility, partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the preference for a local public good is stronger. The main driving force for these results is the response of the intensity of tax competition. The increased (decreased) intensity of tax competition makes partial tax coordination more (less) sustainable.partial tax coordination, repeated game, tax competition