Confidential Boosting with Random Linear Classifiers for Outsourced User-generated Data

User-generated data is crucial to predictive modeling in many applications. With a web/mobile/wearable interface, a data owner can continuously record data generated by distributed users and build various predictive models from the data to improve their operations, services, and revenue. Due to the large size and evolving nature of users data, data owners may rely on public cloud service providers (Cloud) for storage and computation scalability. Exposing sensitive user-generated data and advanced analytic models to Cloud raises privacy concerns. We present a confidential learning framework, SecureBoost, for data owners that want to learn predictive models from aggregated user-generated data but offload the storage and computational burden to Cloud without having to worry about protecting the sensitive data. SecureBoost allows users to submit encrypted or randomly masked data to designated Cloud directly. Our framework utilizes random linear classifiers (RLCs) as the base classifiers in the boosting framework to dramatically simplify the design of the proposed confidential boosting protocols, yet still preserve the model quality. A Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) is used to assist the Cloud's processing, reducing the complexity of the protocol constructions. We present two constructions of SecureBoost: HE+GC and SecSh+GC, using combinations of homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, and random masking to achieve both security and efficiency. For a boosted model, Cloud learns only the RLCs and the CSP learns only the weights of the RLCs. Finally, the data owner collects the two parts to get the complete model. We conduct extensive experiments to understand the quality of the RLC-based boosting and the cost distribution of the constructions. Our results show that SecureBoost can efficiently learn high-quality boosting models from protected user-generated data

Theoretical analysis of the focusing of acoustic waves by two-dimensional sonic crystals

Motivated by a recent experiment on acoustic lenses, we perform numerical calculations based on a multiple scattering technique to investigate the focusing of acoustic waves with sonic crystals formed by rigid cylinders in air. The focusing effects for crystals of various shapes are examined. The dependance of the focusing length on the filling factor is also studied. It is observed that both the shape and filling factor play a crucial role in controlling the focusing. Furthermore, the robustness of the focusing against disorders is studied. The results show that the sensitivity of the focusing behavior depends on the strength of positional disorders. The theoretical results compare favorably with the experimental observations, reported by Cervera, et al. (Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 023902 (2002)).Comment: 8 figure

Robust Non-Interactive Multiparty Computation Against Constant-Size Collusion

Non-Interactive Multiparty Computations (Beimel et al., Crypto 2014) is a very powerful notion equivalent (under some corruption model) to garbled circuits, Private Simultaneous Messages protocols, and obfuscation. We present robust solutions to the problem of Non-Interactive Multiparty Computation in the computational and information-theoretic models. Our results include the first efficient and robust protocols to compute any function in $NC^1$ for constant-size collusions, in the information-theoretic setting and in the computational setting, to compute any function in $P$ for constant-size collusions, assuming the existence of one-way functions. Our constructions start from a Private Simultaneous Messages construction (Feige, Killian Naor, STOC 1994 and Ishai, Kushilevitz, ISTCS 1997) and transform it into a Non-Interactive Multiparty Computation for constant-size collusions. We also present a new Non-Interactive Multiparty Computation protocol for symmetric functions with significantly better communication complexity compared to the only known one of Beimel et al

Reexamination of Quantum Bit Commitment: the Possible and the Impossible

Bit commitment protocols whose security is based on the laws of quantum mechanics alone are generally held to be impossible. In this paper we give a strengthened and explicit proof of this result. We extend its scope to a much larger variety of protocols, which may have an arbitrary number of rounds, in which both classical and quantum information is exchanged, and which may include aborts and resets. Moreover, we do not consider the receiver to be bound to a fixed "honest" strategy, so that "anonymous state protocols", which were recently suggested as a possible way to beat the known no-go results are also covered. We show that any concealing protocol allows the sender to find a cheating strategy, which is universal in the sense that it works against any strategy of the receiver. Moreover, if the concealing property holds only approximately, the cheat goes undetected with a high probability, which we explicitly estimate. The proof uses an explicit formalization of general two party protocols, which is applicable to more general situations, and a new estimate about the continuity of the Stinespring dilation of a general quantum channel. The result also provides a natural characterization of protocols that fall outside the standard setting of unlimited available technology, and thus may allow secure bit commitment. We present a new such protocol whose security, perhaps surprisingly, relies on decoherence in the receiver's lab.Comment: v1: 26 pages, 4 eps figures. v2: 31 pages, 5 eps figures; replaced with published version; title changed to comply with puzzling Phys. Rev. regulations; impossibility proof extended to protocols with infinitely many rounds or a continuous communication tree; security proof of decoherence monster protocol expanded; presentation clarifie

One-round strong oblivious signature-based envelope

Oblivious Signature-Based Envelope (OSBE) has been widely employed for anonymity-orient and privacy-preserving applications. The conventional OSBE execution relies on a secure communication channel to protect against eavesdroppers. In TCC 2012, Blazy, Pointcheval and Vergnaud proposed a framework of OSBE (BPV-OSBE) without requiring any secure channel by clarifying and enhancing the OSBE security notions. They showed how to generically build an OSBE scheme satisfying the new strong security in the standard model with a common-reference string. Their framework requires 2-round interactions and relies on the smooth projective hash function (SPHF) over special languages, i.e., languages from encryption of signatures. In this work, we investigate the study on the strong OSBE and make the following contributions. First, we propose a generic construction of one-round yet strong OSBE system. Compared to the 2-round BPV-OSBE, our one-round construction is more appealing, as its noninteractive setting accommodates more application scenarios in the real word. Moreover, our framework relies on the regular (identity-based) SPHF, which can be instantiated from extensive languages and hence is more general. Second, we also present an efficient instantiation, which is secure under the standard model from classical assumptions, DDH and DBDH, to illustrate the feasibility of our one-round framework. We remark that our construction is the first one-round OSBE with strong securit

Efficient public-key cryptography with bounded leakage and tamper resilience

We revisit the question of constructing public-key encryption and signature schemes with security in the presence of bounded leakage and tampering memory attacks. For signatures we obtain the first construction in the standard model; for public-key encryption we obtain the first construction free of pairing (avoiding non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs). Our constructions are based on generic building blocks, and, as we show, also admit efficient instantiations under fairly standard number-theoretic assumptions. The model of bounded tamper resistance was recently put forward by Damgård et al. (Asiacrypt 2013) as an attractive path to achieve security against arbitrary memory tampering attacks without making hardware assumptions (such as the existence of a protected self-destruct or key-update mechanism), the only restriction being on the number of allowed tampering attempts (which is a parameter of the scheme). This allows to circumvent known impossibility results for unrestricted tampering (Gennaro et al., TCC 2010), while still being able to capture realistic tampering attack

Catalytic reactivity of face centered cubic PdZn_α for the steam reforming of methanol

Addition of Zn to Pd changes its catalytic behavior for steam reforming of methanol. Previous work shows that improved catalytic behavior (high selectivity to CO2) is achieved by the intermetallic, tetragonal L10 phase PdZnβ1, where the Pd:Zn ratio is near 1:1. The Pd–Zn phase diagram shows a number of other phases, but their steady-state reactivity has not been determined due to the difficulty of precisely controlling composition and phase in supported catalysts. Hence, the role of Zn on Pd has generally been studied only on model single crystals where Zn was deposited on Pd(1 1 1) with techniques such as TPD and TPR of methanol or CO. The role of small amounts of Zn on the steady-state reactivity of Pd–Zn remains unknown. Therefore, in this work, we have synthesized unsupported powders of phase pure PdZnα, a solid solution of Zn in fcc Pd, using a spray pyrolysis technique. The surface composition and chemical state were studied using Ambient Pressure-XPS (AP-XPS) and were found to match the bulk composition and remain so during methanol steam reforming (MSR) (Ptot = 0.25 mbar). Unlike the PdZnβ11 phase, we find that PdZnα is 100% selective to CO during methanol steam reforming with TOF at 250 °C of 0.12 s−1. Steady-state ambient pressure micro-reactor experiments and vacuum TPD of methanol and CO show that the α phase behaves much like Pd, but Zn addition to Pd improves TOF since it weakens the Pd–CO bond, eliminating the poisoning of Pd by CO during MSR over Pd. The measured selectivity for fcc PdZnα therefore confirms that adding small amounts of Zn to Pd is not enough to modify the selectivity during MSR and that the PdZnβ1 tetragonal structure is essential for CO2 formation during MSR

Analysis of property-preservation capabilities of the ROX and ESh hash domain extenders

Two of the most recent and powerful multi-property preserving (MPP) hash domain extension transforms are the Ramdom-Oracle-XOR (ROX) transform and the Enveloped Shoup (ESh) transform. The former was proposed by Andreeva et al. at ASIACRYPT 2007 and the latter was proposed by Bellare and Ristenpart at ICALP 2007. In the existing literature, ten notions of security for hash functions have been considered in analysis of MPP capabilities of domain extension transforms, namely CR, Sec, aSec, eSec (TCR), Pre, aPre, ePre, MAC, PRF, PRO. Andreeva et al. showed that ROX is able to preserve seven properties; namely collision resistance (CR), three flavors of second preimage resistance (Sec, aSec, eSec) and three variants of preimage resistance (Pre, aPre, ePre). Bellare and Ristenpart showed that ESh is capable of preserving five important security notions; namely CR, message authentication code (MAC), pseudorandom function (PRF), pseudorandom oracle (PRO), and target collision resistance (TCR). Nonetheless, there is no further study on these two MPP hash domain extension transforms with regard to the other properties. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. Firstly, we show that ROX does not preserve two other widely-used and important security notions, namely MAC and PRO. We also show a positive result about ROX, namely that it also preserves PRF. Secondly, we show that ESh does not preserve other four properties, namely Sec, aSec, Pre, and aPre. On the positive side we show that ESh can preserve ePre property. Our results in this paper provide a full picture of the MPP capabilities of both ROX and ESh transforms by completing the property-preservation analysis of these transforms in regard to all ten security notions of interest, namely CR, Sec, aSec, eSec (TCR), Pre, aPre, ePre, MAC, PRF, PRO

Circuit-Private Multi-Key FHE

Multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MFHE) schemes allow polynomially many users without trusted setup assumptions to send their data (encrypted under different FHE keys chosen by users independently of each other) to an honest-but-curious server that can compute the output of an arbitrary polynomial-time computable function on this joint data and issue it back to all participating users for decryption. One of the main open problems left in MFHE was dealing with malicious users without trusted setup assumptions. We show how this can be done, generalizing previous results of circuit-private FHE. Just like standard circuit-private FHE, our security model shows that even if both ciphertexts and public keys of individual users are not well-formed, no information is revealed regarding the server computation--- other than that gained from the output on some well-formed inputs of all users. MFHE schemes have direct applications to server-assisted multiparty computation (MPC), called on-the-fly MPC, introduced by López-Alt et al. (STOC \u2712), where the number of users is not known in advance. In this setting, a poly-time server wants to evaluate a circuit $C$ on data uploaded by multiple clients and encrypted under different keys. Circuit privacy requires that users\u27 work is independent of $|C|$ held by the server, while each client learns nothing about $C$ other than its output. We present a framework for transforming MFHE schemes with no circuit privacy into maliciously circuit-private schemes. We then construct 3-round on-the-fly MPC with circuit privacy against malicious clients in the plain model

Round Optimal Secure Multiparty Computation from Minimal Assumptions

We construct a four round secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocol in the plain model that achieves security against any dishonest majority. The security of our protocol relies only on the existence of four round oblivious transfer. This culminates the long line of research on constructing round-efficient MPC from minimal assumptions (at least w.r.t. black-box simulation)