117 research outputs found
Precise Complexity of the Core in Dichotomous and Additive Hedonic Games
Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set
of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences
over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively
separable preferences, it is -complete to decide whether a core- or
strict-core-stable partition exists, extending a result of Woeginger (2013).
Our result holds even if valuations are symmetric and non-zero only for a
constant number of other agents. We also establish -completeness of
deciding non-emptiness of the strict core for hedonic games with dichotomous
preferences. Such results establish that the core is much less tractable than
solution concepts such as individual stability.Comment: ADT-2017, 15 pages in LNCS styl
Scheduling with step-improving processing times
2005-2006 > Academic research: refereed > Publication in refereed journalAccepted ManuscriptPublishe
An EPTAS for Scheduling on Unrelated Machines of Few Different Types
In the classical problem of scheduling on unrelated parallel machines, a set
of jobs has to be assigned to a set of machines. The jobs have a processing
time depending on the machine and the goal is to minimize the makespan, that is
the maximum machine load. It is well known that this problem is NP-hard and
does not allow polynomial time approximation algorithms with approximation
guarantees smaller than unless PNP. We consider the case that there
are only a constant number of machine types. Two machines have the same
type if all jobs have the same processing time for them. This variant of the
problem is strongly NP-hard already for . We present an efficient
polynomial time approximation scheme (EPTAS) for the problem, that is, for any
an assignment with makespan of length at most
times the optimum can be found in polynomial time in the
input length and the exponent is independent of . In particular
we achieve a running time of , where
denotes the input length. Furthermore, we study three other problem
variants and present an EPTAS for each of them: The Santa Claus problem, where
the minimum machine load has to be maximized; the case of scheduling on
unrelated parallel machines with a constant number of uniform types, where
machines of the same type behave like uniformly related machines; and the
multidimensional vector scheduling variant of the problem where both the
dimension and the number of machine types are constant. For the Santa Claus
problem we achieve the same running time. The results are achieved, using mixed
integer linear programming and rounding techniques
On the Computational Complexity of Vertex Integrity and Component Order Connectivity
The Weighted Vertex Integrity (wVI) problem takes as input an -vertex
graph , a weight function , and an integer . The
task is to decide if there exists a set such that the weight
of plus the weight of a heaviest component of is at most . Among
other results, we prove that:
(1) wVI is NP-complete on co-comparability graphs, even if each vertex has
weight ;
(2) wVI can be solved in time;
(3) wVI admits a kernel with at most vertices.
Result (1) refutes a conjecture by Ray and Deogun and answers an open
question by Ray et al. It also complements a result by Kratsch et al., stating
that the unweighted version of the problem can be solved in polynomial time on
co-comparability graphs of bounded dimension, provided that an intersection
model of the input graph is given as part of the input.
An instance of the Weighted Component Order Connectivity (wCOC) problem
consists of an -vertex graph , a weight function ,
and two integers and , and the task is to decide if there exists a set
such that the weight of is at most and the weight of
a heaviest component of is at most . In some sense, the wCOC problem
can be seen as a refined version of the wVI problem. We prove, among other
results, that:
(4) wCOC can be solved in time on interval graphs,
while the unweighted version can be solved in time on this graph
class;
(5) wCOC is W[1]-hard on split graphs when parameterized by or by ;
(6) wCOC can be solved in time;
(7) wCOC admits a kernel with at most vertices.
We also show that result (6) is essentially tight by proving that wCOC cannot
be solved in time, unless the ETH fails.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper already appeared in the
conference proceedings of ISAAC 201
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable Hedonic Games and Fractional Hedonic Games
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received
considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents
based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature
characterizes the existence and structure of stable outcomes (i.e., partitions
in coalitions), assuming that preferences are given. However, there is little
discussion on this assumption. In fact, agents receive different utilities if
they belong to different partitions, and thus it is natural for them to declare
their preferences strategically in order to maximize their benefit. In this
paper we consider strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable hedonic
games and fractional hedonic games, that is, partitioning methods without
payments such that utility maximizing agents have no incentive to lie about
their true preferences. We focus on social welfare maximization and provide
several lower and upper bounds on the performance achievable by strategyproof
mechanisms for general and specific additive functions. In most of the cases we
provide tight or asymptotically tight results. All our mechanisms are simple
and can be computed in polynomial time. Moreover, all the lower bounds are
unconditional, that is, they do not rely on any computational or complexity
assumptions
A general framework for handling commitment in online throughput maximization
We study a fundamental online job admission problem where jobs with deadlines
arrive online over time at their release dates, and the task is to determine a
preemptive single-server schedule which maximizes the number of jobs that
complete on time. To circumvent known impossibility results, we make a standard
slackness assumption by which the feasible time window for scheduling a job is
at least times its processing time, for some .
We quantify the impact that different provider commitment requirements have on
the performance of online algorithms. Our main contribution is one universal
algorithmic framework for online job admission both with and without
commitments. Without commitment, our algorithm with a competitive ratio of
is the best possible (deterministic) for this problem. For
commitment models, we give the first non-trivial performance bounds. If the
commitment decisions must be made before a job's slack becomes less than a
-fraction of its size, we prove a competitive ratio of
, for .
When a provider must commit upon starting a job, our bound is
. Finally, we observe that for scheduling with commitment
the restriction to the `unweighted' throughput model is essential; if jobs have
individual weights, we rule out competitive deterministic algorithms
Recognizing Members of the Tournament Equilibrium Set is NP-hard
A recurring theme in the mathematical social sciences is how to select the
"most desirable" elements given a binary dominance relation on a set of
alternatives. Schwartz's tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) ranks among the most
intriguing, but also among the most enigmatic, tournament solutions that have
been proposed so far in this context. Due to its unwieldy recursive definition,
little is known about TEQ. In particular, its monotonicity remains an open
problem up to date. Yet, if TEQ were to satisfy monotonicity, it would be a
very attractive tournament solution concept refining both the Banks set and
Dutta's minimal covering set. We show that the problem of deciding whether a
given alternative is contained in TEQ is NP-hard.Comment: 9 pages, 3 figure
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