Distinguishing the opponents in the prisoner dilemma in well-mixed populations

Here we study the effects of adopting different strategies against different opponent instead of adopting the same strategy against all of them in the prisoner dilemma structured in well-mixed populations. We consider an evolutionary process in which strategies that provide reproductive success are imitated and players replace one of their worst interactions by the new one. We set individuals in a well-mixed population so that network reciprocity effect is excluded and we analyze both synchronous and asynchronous updates. As a consequence of the replacement rule, we show that mutual cooperation is never destroyed and the initial fraction of mutual cooperation is a lower bound for the level of cooperation. We show by simulation and mean-field analysis that for synchronous update cooperation dominates while for asynchronous update only cooperations associated to the initial mutual cooperations are maintained. As a side effect of the replacement rule, an "implicit punishment" mechanism comes up in a way that exploitations are always neutralized providing evolutionary stability for cooperation

Weibull-type limiting distribution for replicative systems

The Weibull function is widely used to describe skew distributions observed in nature. However, the origin of this ubiquity is not always obvious to explain. In the present paper, we consider the well-known Galton-Watson branching process describing simple replicative systems. The shape of the resulting distribution, about which little has been known, is found essentially indistinguishable from the Weibull form in a wide range of the branching parameter; this can be seen from the exact series expansion for the cumulative distribution, which takes a universal form. We also find that the branching process can be mapped into a process of aggregation of clusters. In the branching and aggregation process, the number of events considered for branching and aggregation grows cumulatively in time, whereas, for the binomial distribution, an independent event occurs at each time with a given success probability.Comment: 6 pages and 5 figure

Altruistic Contents of Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma

We examine the classical contents of quantum games. It is shown that a quantum strategy can be interpreted as a classical strategies with effective density-dependent game matrices composed of transposed matrix elements. In particular, successful quantum strategies in dilemma games are interpreted in terms of a symmetrized game matrix that corresponds to an altruistic game plan.Comment: Revised according to publisher's request: 4 pgs, 2 fgs, ReVTeX4. For more info, go to http://www.mech.kochi-tech.ac.jp/cheon

On the micro mechanics of one-dimensional normal compression

Discrete-element modelling has been used to investigate the micro mechanics of one-dimensional compression. One-dimensional compression is modelled in three dimensions using an oedometer and a large number of particles, and without the use of agglomerates. The fracture of a particle is governed by the octahedral shear stress within the particle due to the multiple contacts and a Weibull distribution of strengths. Different fracture mechanisms are considered, and the influence of the distribution of fragments produced for each fracture on the global particle size distribution and the slope of the normal compression line is investigated. Using the discrete-element method, compression is related to the evolution of a fractal distribution of particles. The compression index is found to be solely a function of the strengths of the particles as a function of size

Nucleation of cracks in a brittle sheet

We use molecular dynamics to study the nucleation of cracks in a two dimensional material without pre-existing cracks. We study models with zero and non-zero shear modulus. In both situations the time required for crack formation obeys an Arrhenius law, from which the energy barrier and pre-factor are extracted for different system sizes. For large systems, the characteristic time of rupture is found to decrease with system size, in agreement with classical Weibull theory. In the case of zero shear modulus, the energy opposing rupture is identified with the breakage of a single atomic layer. In the case of non-zero shear modulus, thermally activated fracture can only be studied within a reasonable time at very high strains. In this case the energy barrier involves the stretching of bonds within several layers, accounting for a much higher barrier compared to the zero shear modulus case. This barrier is understood within adiabatic simulations

Noise-guided evolution within cyclical interactions

We study a stochastic predator-prey model on a square lattice, where each of the six species has two superior and two inferior partners. The invasion probabilities between species depend on the predator-prey pair and are supplemented by Gaussian noise. Conditions are identified that warrant the largest impact of noise on the evolutionary process, and the results of Monte Carlo simulations are qualitatively reproduced by a four-point cluster dynamical mean-field approximation. The observed noise-guided evolution is deeply routed in short-range spatial correlations, which is supported by simulations on other host lattice topologies. Our findings are conceptually related to the coherence resonance phenomenon in dynamical systems via the mechanism of threshold duality. We also show that the introduced concept of noise-guided evolution via the exploitation of threshold duality is not limited to predator-prey cyclical interactions, but may apply to models of evolutionary game theory as well, thus indicating its applicability in several different fields of research.Comment: to be published in New J. Phy

Coevolution of dynamical states and interactions in dynamic networks

We explore the coupled dynamics of the internal states of a set of interacting elements and the network of interactions among them. Interactions are modeled by a spatial game and the network of interaction links evolves adapting to the outcome of the game. As an example we consider a model of cooperation, where the adaptation is shown to facilitate the formation of a hierarchical interaction network that sustains a highly cooperative stationary state. The resulting network has the characteristics of a small world network when a mechanism of local neighbor selection is introduced in the adaptive network dynamics. The highly connected nodes in the hierarchical structure of the network play a leading role in the stability of the network. Perturbations acting on the state of these special nodes trigger global avalanches leading to complete network reorganization.Comment: 4 pages, 5 figures, for related material visit http:www.imedea.uib.es/physdept

Aspiring to the fittest and promotion of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter $w$, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new strategy. For positive $w$ players with high payoffs will be considered more likely, while for negative $w$ the opposite holds. Setting $w$ equal to zero returns the frequently adopted random selection of the opponent. We find that increasing the probability of adopting the strategy from the fittest player within reach, i.e. setting $w$ positive, promotes the evolution of cooperation. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction network. Since the evolution to widespread defection is tightly associated with cooperators having a lower fitness than defectors, the fact that positive values of $w$ facilitate cooperation is quite surprising. We show that the results can be explained by means of a negative feedback effect that increases the vulnerability of defectors although initially increasing their survivability. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of $w$ effectively alters the interaction network and thus also the impact of uncertainty by strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Restricted connections among distinguished players support cooperation

We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where a fraction of players $\mu$ can spread their strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching capability. In addition, players characterized with the larger teaching capability are allowed to temporarily link with distant opponents of the same kind with probability $p$, thus introducing shortcut connections among the distinguished. We show that these additional temporary connections are able to sustain cooperation throughout the whole range of the temptation to defect. Remarkably, we observe that as the temptation to defect increases the optimal $\mu$ decreases, and moreover, only minute values of $p$ warrant the best promotion of cooperation. Our study thus indicates that influential individuals must be few and sparsely connected in order for cooperation to thrive in a defection prone environment.Comment: 6 two-column pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

On Phase Transitions to Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Game theory formalizes certain interactions between physical particles or between living beings in biology, sociology, and economics, and quantifies the outcomes by payoffs. The prisoner's dilemma (PD) describes situations in which it is profitable if everybody cooperates rather than defects (free-rides or cheats), but as cooperation is risky and defection is tempting, the expected outcome is defection. Nevertheless, some biological and social mechanisms can support cooperation by effectively transforming the payoffs. Here, we study the related phase transitions, which can be of first order (discontinous) or of second order (continuous), implying a variety of different routes to cooperation. After classifying the transitions into cases of equilibrium displacement, equilibrium selection, and equilibrium creation, we show that a transition to cooperation may take place even if the stationary states and the eigenvalues of the replicator equation for the PD stay unchanged. Our example is based on adaptive group pressure, which makes the payoffs dependent on the endogeneous dynamics in the population. The resulting bistability can invert the expected outcome in favor of cooperation.Comment: For related work see http://www.soms.ethz.ch