Mechanisms in ecology

New mechanistic philosophy has not examined explanations in ecology although they are based extensively on describing mechanisms responsible for phenomena under scrutiny. This chapter uses the example of research on the shrub Lonicera maackii (Amur honeysuckle) to scrutinize individual-level mechanisms that are generally accepted and used in ecology and confronts them with the minimal account of mechanisms. Individual-level mechanisms are for a phenomenon, are hierarchical, and absent entities play a role in their functioning. They are distinguished by the role played by properties in determining activities and organization. The chapter also considers the experimental methods for discovery of individual-level mechanisms, the possibility of group-level mechanisms in ecology, and suggests further research problems

The Mechanistic Approach of \u27The Theory of Island Biogeography\u27 and its Current Relevance

Philosophers of science have examined The Theory of Island Biogeography by Robert MacArthur and E. O. Wilson (1967) mainly due to its important contribution to modeling in ecology, but they have not examined it as a representative case of ecological explanation. In this paper, I scrutinize the type of explanation used in this paradigmatic work of ecology. I describe the philosophy of science of MacArthur and Wilson and show that it is mechanistic. Based on this account and in light of contributions to the mechanistic conception of explanation due to Craver (2007), and Bechtel and Richardson (1993), I argue that MacArthur and Wilson use a mechanistic approach to explain the species-area relationship. In light of this examination, I formulate a normative account of mechanistic explanation in ecology. Furthermore, I argue that it offers a basis for methodological unification of ecology and solves a dispute on the nature of ecology. Lastly, I show that proposals for a new paradigm of biogeography appear to maintain the norms of mechanistic explanation implicit in The Theory of Island Biogeography

Ecological Explanation between Manipulation and Mechanism Description

James Woodward offers a conception of explanation and mechanism in terms of interventionist counterfactuals. Based on a case from ecology, I show that ecologists’ approach to that case satisfiesWoodward’s conditions for explanation and mechanism, but his conception does not fully capture what ecologists view as explanatory. The new mechanistic philosophy likewise aims to describe central aspects of mechanisms, but I show that it is not sufficient to account for ecological mechanisms. I argue that in ecology explanation involves identification of invariant and insensitive causal relationships and descriptions of the mechanistic characteristics that make these relations possible

Ecological Laws and Their Promise of Explanations

Marcel Weber (1999) argued that the principle of competitive exclusion is a law of ecology that could explain phenomena (1) by direct application, or (2) by describing default states. Since he did not offer an account of explanation by direct application of laws, I offer an interpretation of explanation by direct application of laws based on a proposal by Elgin and Sober (2002). I show that in both cases it is the descriptions of mechanisms that explain phenomena, and not the laws. Lev Ginzburg and Mark Colyvan (2004) argued Malthus’ Law of Exponential Growth is the first law of ecology, and that its role explanations is to describe default states. I argue the role of the descriptor of default states is not necessary for ecological explanations, and the descriptions of underlying mechanisms offer the required explanations. Additionally, I examine the possibility not considered by Ginzburg and Colyvan that Malthus’ law could explain the phenomena of exponential growth by direct application. I also show that this explanation is inferior to the descriptions of underlying mechanisms

Conceptions of Mechanisms and Insensitivity of Causation

Conceptions of mechanisms due to Glennan (1996; 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) have developed in opposition to the nomological approach to explanation. It is less emphasized, however, that these conceptions have also developed as alternatives to the causal perspective on explanation. In this paper, I argue that despite their distancing from the topic of causation, the mechanistic conceptions need to incorporate in their definitions of mechanisms the notion of insensitivity of causal relations that was examined by Woodward (2006)

Online alternativa: održivost, pravednost i odlazak na filozofske konferencije

The recent global pandemic has led to a shift to online conferences in philosophy. In this paper we argue that online conferences, more than a temporary replacement, should be considered a sustainable alternative to in-person conferences well into the future. We present three arguments for more online conferences, including their reduced impact on the environment, their enhanced accessibility for groups that are minorities in philosophy, and their lower financial burdens, especially important given likely future reductions in university budgets. We also present results from two surveys of participants who attended one large and three small online philosophy conferences this year. We show that participants were in general very satisfied with presentations and discussions at the conferences, and that they reported greater accessibility. This indicates that online conferences can serve as a good alternative to in-person conferences. We also find that networking was less satisfactory in online conferences, indicating a point for improvement and further research. In general, we conclude that philosophers should continue to organize online conferences after the pandemic. We also provide some advice for those wishing to organize online conferences.Nedavna globalna pandemija dovela je do prelaska na online konferencije u filozofiji. U ovom radu tvrdimo da bi se online konferencije, više od privremene zamjene, trebalo smatrati održivom alternativom konferencijama uživo i u budućnosti. Predstavljamo tri argumenta za održavanje više internetskih konferencija, među njima navodimo njihov smanjeni utjecaj na okoliš, poboljšanu dostupnost manjinskim skupinama u filozofiji te njihovu smanjenu financijsku opterećenost, posebno važnu s obzirom na vjerojatna buduća smanjenja proračuna kojima upravljaju sveučilišta. Također predstavljamo rezultate dviju anketa sudionika koji su ove godine prisustvovali na jednoj velikoj i tri male online konferencije iz filozofije. Pokazujemo da su sudionici općenito bili vrlo zadovoljni prezentacijama i raspravama na konferencijama te da su izvijestili o većoj dostupnosti. To ukazuje da online konferencije mogu poslužiti kao dobra alternativa konferencijama uživo. Također smo otkrili da je umrežavanje bilo manje zadovoljavajuće na online konferencijama, što ukazuje na potrebu za poboljšanjem i daljnjim istraživanjima. Općenito zaključujemo da bi filozofi trebali nastaviti organizirati online konferencije nakon pandemije. Također pružamo nekoliko savjeta onima koji žele organizirati online konferencije

Causal and Mechanistic Explanations, and a Lesson from Ecology

Jani Raerinne and Lindley Darden argue that causal claims are not sufficiently explanatory, and causal talk should be replaced with mechanistic talk. I examine several examples from ecological research, two of which rely on causal models and structural equation modeling, to show that the assertions of Raerinne and of Darden have to be reconsidered

Teaching Philosophy in Relationship to Textbooks from Other Disciplines

I propose an approach to teaching philosophy that links philosophical works to the non-philosophical textbooks of students enrolled in a philosophy course. I illustrate my approach using the case of teaching philosophy of science, but it can be applied for teaching other philosophy courses. My proposal illustrates how disciplinary boundaries can be crossed to provide a holistic education for the common good. At the beginning of the course, the professor of philosophy of science shows to students an example of a description of scientific method from a science textbook. Such descriptions are often presented by means of tidy schemas and are simplified explanation of the actual scientific practice. Students are invited to find similar descriptions in one of their science textbooks. As students read philosophy of science literature that examines key notions, such as models, theory, assumptions, hypotheses, values, research programs, paradigms, etc., they are asked to explain how theses notions relate to and enrich the description of the scientific method given at the beginning of the course. At the end of the semester, the initial description is enriched and the tidy schema becomes a complex representation that better describes the complexity of the actual scientific practice. The advantage of my proposal is that it allows philosophy to complement the non-philosophical subject matter and helps students to gain a richer understanding of their subject matter, and helps them to appreciate the utility of cross boundary investigations and of a holistic education

\u27Flash Talk\u27 Session

This session features brief presentations followed by community discussion: Courtney Belt — Diversifying Community Connections Viorel Pâslaru — Teaching Philosophy in Relationship to Textbooks from Other Disciplines Liz Grauel and Erik Ziedses des Plantes — Co-Curricular Collisions: Expanding Student Research Competencies with Collaborative Library Instructio