Advertising spending patterns and competitor impact

In most industries, brand managers do not advertise continuously. Instead, advertising is switched on and off systematically, a phenomenon often referred to as pulsing. Moreover, spending levels vary considerably across periods when brands do advertise. Surprisingly, this variety in advertising spending patterns as observed in practice, as well as competitor impact on these patterns and their sales outcomes, have received relatively little empirical attention. In this paper we focus on two core aspects of observed advertising patterns: incidence and magnitude. Insights are based on the analysis of advertising spending for 370 CPG brands in 71 product categories over a four-year period. We also collected feedback from practitioners dealing with advertising across a wide range of firms. We first empirically establish that pulsing is the dominant form of advertising scheduling. Observed patterns, in turn, are largely driven by television and print advertising. Next, we show that, after accounting for a wide range of other possible drivers, advertising in-sync with competitors is more common than out-of-sync. However, the results suggest that competitive reasoning plays only a relatively minor role in advertising decisions. Finally, we show that, across a wide range of real-world scenarios, investing in top-of-mind awareness through maintenance advertising insulates brands from competitors' actions and boosts sales

Empirical Models of Manufacturer-Retailer Interaction: A Review and Agenda for Future Research

The nature of the interaction between manufacturers and retailers has received a great deal of empirical attention in the last 15 years. One major line of empirical research examines the balance of power between them and ranges from reduced form models quantifying aggregate profit and other related trends for manufacturers and retailers to structural models that test alternative forms of manufacturer-retailer pricing interaction. A second line of research addresses the sources of leverage for each party, e.g., trade promotions and their pass-through, customer information from loyalty programs, manufacturer advertising, productassortment in general, and private label assortment in particular. The purpose of this article is to synthesize what has been learnt about the nature of the interaction between manufacturers and retailers and the effectiveness of each party’s sources of leverage and to highlight gaps in our knowledge that future research should attempt to fill