140 research outputs found
Checking Interaction-Based Declassification Policies for Android Using Symbolic Execution
Mobile apps can access a wide variety of secure information, such as contacts
and location. However, current mobile platforms include only coarse access
control mechanisms to protect such data. In this paper, we introduce
interaction-based declassification policies, in which the user's interactions
with the app constrain the release of sensitive information. Our policies are
defined extensionally, so as to be independent of the app's implementation,
based on sequences of security-relevant events that occur in app runs. Policies
use LTL formulae to precisely specify which secret inputs, read at which times,
may be released. We formalize a semantic security condition, interaction-based
noninterference, to define our policies precisely. Finally, we describe a
prototype tool that uses symbolic execution to check interaction-based
declassification policies for Android, and we show that it enforces policies
correctly on a set of apps.Comment: This research was supported in part by NSF grants CNS-1064997 and
1421373, AFOSR grants FA9550-12-1-0334 and FA9550-14-1-0334, a partnership
between UMIACS and the Laboratory for Telecommunication Sciences, and the
National Security Agenc
Quantifying Timing Leaks and Cost Optimisation
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker
is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the
probability of the values of low variables. We then show how to measure the
security of a program with respect to this notion via a computable estimate of
the timing leakage and use this estimate for cost optimisation.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figures, 4 tables. A shorter version is included in the
proceedings of ICICS'08 - 10th International Conference on Information and
Communications Security, 20-22 October, 2008 Birmingham, U
Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment- Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-73
Securing communication in large scale distributed systems is an open problem. When multiple principals exchange sensitive information over a network, security and privacy issues arise immediately. For instance, in an online auction system we may want to ensure that no bidder knows the bids of any other bidder before the auction is closed. Such systems are typically interactive/reactive and communication is mostly asynchronous, lossy or unordered. Language-based security provides language mechanisms for enforcing end-to-end security. However, with few exceptions, previous research has mainly focused on relational or synchronous models, which are generally not suitable for distributed systems. This paper proposes a general knowledge-based account of possibilistic security from a language perspective and shows how existing trace-based conditions fit in. A syntactic characterization of these conditions, given by an epistemic temporal logic, shows that existing model checking tools can be used to enforce security.QC 20131219</p
Very static enforcement of dynamic policies
Security policies are naturally dynamic. Reflecting this, there has been a growing interest in studying information-flow properties which change during program execution, including concepts such as declassification, revocation, and role-change.
A static verification of a dynamic information flow policy, from a semantic perspective, should only need to concern itself with two things: 1) the dependencies between data in a program, and 2) whether those dependencies are consistent with the intended flow policies as they change over time. In this paper we provide a formal ground for this intuition. We present a straightforward extension to the principal flow-sensitive type system introduced by Hunt and Sands (POPL’06, ESOP’11) to infer both end-to-end dependencies and dependencies at intermediate points in a program. This allows typings to be applied to verification of both static and dynamic policies. Our extension preserves the principal type system’s distinguishing feature, that type inference is independent of the policy to be enforced: a single, generic dependency analysis (typing) can be used to verify many different dynamic policies of a given program, thus achieving a clean separation between (1) and (2).
We also make contributions to the foundations of dynamic information flow. Arguably, the most compelling semantic definitions for dynamic security conditions in the literature are phrased in the so-called knowledge-based style. We contribute a new definition of knowledge-based progress insensitive security for dynamic policies. We show that the new definition avoids anomalies of previous definitions and enjoys a simple and useful characterisation as a two-run style property
The PER model of abstract non-interference
Abstract. In this paper, we study the relationship between two models of secure information flow: the PER model (which uses equivalence relations) and the abstract non-interference model (which uses upper closure operators). We embed the lattice of equivalence relations into the lattice of closures, re-interpreting abstract non-interference over the lattice of equivalence relations. For narrow abstract non-interference, we show non-interference it is strictly less general. The relational presentation of abstract non-interference leads to a simplified construction of the most concrete harmless attacker. Moreover, the PER model of abstract noninterference allows us to derive unconstrained attacker models, which do not necessarily either observe all public information or ignore all private information. Finally, we show how abstract domain completeness can be used for enforcing the PER model of abstract non-interference
Match It or Die: Proving Integrity by Equality
Cryptographic hash functions are commonly used as modification detection codes. The goal is to provide message integrity assurance by comparing the digest of the original message with the hash of what is thought to be the intended message. This paper generalizes this idea by applying it to general expressions instead of just digests: success of an equality test between a tainted data and a trusted one can be seen as a proof of high-integrity for the first item. Secure usage of hash functions is also studied with respect to the confidentiality of digests by extending secret-sensitive noninterference of Demange and Sands
Coeffects: Unified static analysis of context-dependence
Monadic effect systems provide a unified way of tracking effects of computations, but there is no unified mechanism for tracking how computations rely on the environment in which they are executed. This is becoming an important problem for modern software – we need to track where distributed computations run, which resources a program uses and how they use other capabilities of the environment.
We consider three examples of context-dependence analysis: liveness analysis, tracking the use of implicit parameters (similar to tracking of resource usage in distributed computation), and calculating caching requirements for dataflow programs. Informed by these cases, we present a unified calculus for tracking context dependence in functional languages together with a categorical semantics based on indexed comonads. We believe that indexed comonads are the right foundation for constructing context-aware languages and type systems and that following an approach akin to monads can lead to a widespread use of the concept
Исследование свойств композиционного материала на основе гидроксиапатита и природного полимера
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