What am I allowed to do here?: Online Learning of Context-Specific Norms by Pepper

Social norms support coordination and cooperation in society. With social robots becoming increasingly involved in our society, they also need to follow the social norms of the society. This paper presents a computational framework for learning contexts and the social norms present in a context in an online manner on a robot. The paper utilizes a recent state-of-the-art approach for incremental learning and adapts it for online learning of scenes (contexts). The paper further utilizes Dempster-Schafer theory to model context-specific norms. After learning the scenes (contexts), we use active learning to learn related norms. We test our approach on the Pepper robot by taking it through different scene locations. Our results show that Pepper can learn different scenes and related norms simply by communicating with a human partner in an online manner.Comment: The final authenticated publication is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62056-1_1

In the best interests of the deceased: A possible justification for organ removal without consent?

Opt-out systems of postmortem organ procurement are often supposed to be justifiable by presumed consent, but this justification turns out to depend on a mistaken mental state conception of consent. A promising alternative justification appeals to the analogical situation that occurs when an emergency decision has to be made about medical treatment for a patient who is unable to give or withhold his consent. In such cases, the decision should be made in the best interests of the patient. The analogous suggestion to be considered, then, is, if the potential donor has not registered either his willingness or his refusal to donate, the probabilities that he would or would not have preferred the removal of his organs need to be weighed. And in some actual cases the probability of the first alternative may be greater. This article considers whether the analogy to which this argument appeals is cogent, and concludes that there are important differences between the emergency and the organ removal cases, both as regards the nature of the interests involved and the nature of the right not to be treated without one’s consent. Rather, if opt-out systems are to be justified, the needs of patients with organ failure and/or the possibility of tacit consent should be considered

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well

The Intersectionality of Disasters’ Effects on Trust in Public Officials

Objective Groups defined by race and ideology are well‐known predictors of interpersonal and political trust, but gender‐based effects are undecided. I investigate whether disaster experience conditions a difference in political trust between women and men. Methods Examining the hurricane data set of U.S. public opinion, I analyze intersectionality's influence on disaster‐based political trust with a three‐way interaction between race, class, and gender. Results Among disaster survivors, black women trust less than all other race–gender groups, and white men trust the most. The difference between black and white women survivors’ political trust is attenuated by education. Education exacerbates race‐based political trust among observers. Among observers, there is not a gender‐based distinction. Conclusion Disasters create new identities based on shared experience, and offer a moment in time that illustrates how trust varies along gender–race–class–disaster dimensions. Knowing how trust differs according to intersectionality allows managers to manage critical events better

Justice and Corporate Governance: New Insights from Rawlsian Social Contract and Sen’s Capabilities Approach

By considering what we identify as a problem inherent in the ‘nature of the firm’—the risk of abuse of authority—we propound the conception of a social contract theory of the firm which is truly Rawlsian in its inspiration. Hence, we link the social contract theory of the firm (justice at firm’s level) with the general theory of justice (justice at society’s level). Through this path, we enter the debate about whether firms can be part of Rawlsian theory of justice showing that corporate governance principles enter the “basic structure.” Finally, we concur with Sen’s aim to broaden the realm of social justice beyond what he calls the ‘transcendental institutional perfectionism’ of Rawls’ theory. We maintain the contractarian approach to justice but introduce Sen’s capability concept as an element of the constitutional and post-constitutional contract model of institutions with special reference to corporate governance. Accordingly, rights over primary goods and capabilities are (constitutionally) granted by the basic institutions of society, but many capabilities have to be turned into the functionings of many stakeholders through the operation of firms understood as post-constitutional institutional domains. The constitutional contract on the distribution of primary goods and capabilities should then shape the principles of corporate governance so that at post-constitutional level anyone may achieve her/his functionings in the corporate domain by exercising such capabilities. In the absence of such a condition, post-constitutional contracts would distort the process that descends from constitutional rights and capabilities toward social outcomes