Poverty-reducing institutional change and PRSP processes: The Ghana case

This paper assesses the preparation of Ghana’s Poverty Reduction Strategy paper (GPRS), paying particular attention to its likely influence on the institutionalisation of anti-poverty measures in the country’s political economy. After examining contextual factors, it analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the GPRS processes, including the responses of donors and the extent to which the GPRS will result from wider consultation and participation. It also examines its monitoring and informational aspects. It concludes that the process has much potential value but has also contained serious weaknesses, including poor integration into governmental decision processes, an ownership too narrowly grounded in the central government and very weak arrangements for monitoring and implementation. – PRSP ; poverty ; Ghana ; polic

The possibilities of development planning

The starting point of this paper is a belief that development planning in practice has achieved few of the benefits that its advocates expected from it. Most reasons given for this poor performance do not get to the source of the problem, which is the naivety of the implicit model of governmental decision-making incorporated in the planning literature. More realistic views of politics and decision-making, familiar in other social sciences and even other branches of economics but largely ignored in development economics, pose the questions whether planning, as it has come to be understood, is feasible at all, and, even if feasible, whether it could be an efficient instrument of economic policy. Suggestions are made on what could be rescued from the debris

The evolving genetic landscape of telomere biology disorder dyskeratosis congenita

Dyskeratosis congenita (DC) is a rare inherited bone marrow failure syndrome, caused by genetic mutations that principally affect telomere biology. Approximately 35% of cases remain uncharacterised at the genetic level. To explore the genetic landscape, we conducted genetic studies on a large collection of clinically diagnosed cases of DC as well as cases exhibiting features resembling DC, referred to as ‘DC-like’ (DCL). This led us to identify several novel pathogenic variants within known genetic loci and in the novel X-linked gene, POLA1. In addition, we have also identified several novel variants in POT1 and ZCCHC8 in multiple cases from different families expanding the allelic series of DC and DCL phenotypes. Functional characterisation of novel POLA1 and POT1 variants, revealed pathogenic effects on protein-protein interactions with primase, CTC1-STN1-TEN1 (CST) and shelterin subunit complexes, that are critical for telomere maintenance. ZCCHC8 variants demonstrated ZCCHC8 deficiency and signs of pervasive transcription, triggering inflammation in patients’ blood. In conclusion, our studies expand the current genetic architecture and broaden our understanding of disease mechanisms underlying DC and DCL disorders

Country Concepts and the Rational Actor Trap: Limitations to Strategic Management of International NGOs

Growing criticism of inefficient development aid demanded new planning instruments of donors, including international NGOs (INGOs). A reorientation from isolated project-planning towards holistic country concepts and the increasing rationality of a result-orientated planning process were seen as answer. However, whether these country concepts - newly introduced by major INGOs too - have increased the efficiency of development cooperation is open to question. Firstly, there have been counteracting external factors, like the globalization of the aid business, that demanded structural changes in the composition of INGO portfolios towards growing short-term humanitarian aid; this was hardly compatible with the requirements of medium-term country planning. Secondly, the underlying vision of rationality as a remedy for the major ills of development aid was in itself a fallacy. A major change in the methodology of planning, closely connected with a shift of emphasis in the approach to development cooperation, away from project planning and service delivery, towards supporting the socio-cultural and political environment of the recipient communities, demands a reorientation of aid management: The most urgent change needed is by donors, away from the blinkers of result-orientated planning towards participative organizational cultures of learning.Des critiques croissantes de l'aide au développement inefficace exigent de nouveaux instruments de planification des bailleurs de fonds, y compris les ONG internationales (ONGI). Une réorientation de la planification des projets isolés vers des concepts holistiques de la planification de l’aide par pays ainsi que la rationalité croissante d'un processus de planification orientée vers les résultats ont été considérés comme réponse. Toutefois, si ces concepts de pays - nouvellement introduites par les grandes OING eux aussi - ont augmenté l'efficacité de la coopération au développement est ouvert à la question. Tout d'abord, il y a eu l’impact des facteurs externes, comme la mondialisation de l'entreprise de l'aide, qui a exigé des changements structurels dans la composition des portefeuilles des OING vers la croissance de l'aide humanitaire à court terme. Cela était difficilement compatible avec les exigences de l'aménagement du territoire à moyen terme. Deuxièmement, la vision sous-jacente de la rationalité accrue de la planification, concentré sur les resultats, comme un remède pour les grands maux de l'aide au développement était en soi une erreur. Un changement majeur dans la méthodologie de la planification, étroitement liée à un changement d'orientation dans l'approche de la coopération au développement, qui n’est pas concentrer sur planification du projet et la prestation de services, mais qui soutienne l'environnement socio-culturel et politique des communautés bénéficiaires, exige une réorientation de la gestion de l’aide: Le changement le plus urgent est un changement par les donateurs eux-mêmes, qui devrait implanter des cultures de collaboration étroit avec les partenaires et la population locale

The Evolution of Enterprise Reform in Africa: From State-Owned Enterprises to Private Participation in Infrastructure - and Back?

Many African state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly those in infrastructure, have a long history of poor performance. From the outset, SOE financial and economic performance generally failed to meet the expectations of their creators and funders. By the late 1970s, the situation was alarming, and by early 1980s, critical. The poor financial performance of SOEs became so burdensome to government budgets that it attracted the attention of the international financial institutions, or IFIs. In response, in the 1980s, the World Bank approved SOE reforms that could be summed up in the term commercialization. By the mid-1990s, however, the idea of making SOEs function efficiently and effectively under government management was largely abandoned by the IFIs and privatization and private participation in infrastructure, or PPI became the order of the day. Once more, however, the results were disappointing. PPI has not been as widely adopted as anticipated, nor has it generated the massive resources and changes hoped for, nor has it been widely accepted as beneficial by the African public. The findings of recent studies in Africa suggest that PPI should not be jettisoned, and that the more productive path is to recognize the limitations of the approach, and to work harder at creating the conditions needed to make it function effectively. This will entail, as many have recognized, an end to the view that public and private infrastructure provision is a dichotomy a case of either-or, one or the other and a better appreciation of the extent to which the performance of each is dependent on the competence of the other. In other words, for the private sector to perform well, public sector capacity must be enhanced. Moreover, proposed tactics of reform should fit more closely with the expectations and sentiments of the affected government, consumer base, and general population. This broader approach implies, probably, a reduction in the scope and, certainly, a reduction in the planned speed of operations. Improving infrastructure performance is a long-term matter