Causal role of lateral prefrontal cortex in mental effort and fatigue

Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is well‐known for its role in exerting mental work, however the contribution of DLPFC for deciding whether or not to engage in effort remains unknown. Here, we assessed the causal role of DLPFC in effort‐based decision making. We disrupted functioning of DLPFC with noninvasive brain stimulation before participants repeatedly decided whether to exert mental effort in a working memory task. We found the same DLPFC subregion involved in mental effort exertion to influence also effort‐based decisions: First, it enhanced effort discounting, suggesting that DLPFC may signal the capacity to successfully deal with effort demands. Second, a novel computational model integrating the costs of enduring effort into the effort‐based decision process revealed that DLPFC disruption reduced fatigue after accumulated effort exertion, linking DLPFC activation with fatigue. Together, our findings indicate that in effort‐based decisions DLPFC represents the capacity to exert mental effort and the updating of this information with enduring time‐on‐task, informing theoretical accounts on the role of DLPFC in the motivation to exert mental effort and the fatigue arising from it

Efficient learning mechanisms hold in the social domain and are implemented in the medial prefrontal cortex

When we are learning to associate novel cues with outcomes, learning is more efficient if we take advantage of previously learned associations and thereby avoid redundant learning. The blocking effect represents this sort of efficiency mechanism and refers to the phenomenon in which a novel stimulus is blocked from learning when it is associated with a fully predicted outcome. Although there is sufficient evidence that this effect manifests itself when individuals learn about their own rewards, it remains unclear whether it also does when they learn about others' rewards. We employed behavioral and neuroimaging methods to address this question. We demonstrate that blocking does indeed occur in the social domain and it does so to a similar degree as observed in the individual domain. On the neural level, activations in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) show a specific contribution to blocking and learning-related prediction errors in the social domain. These findings suggest that the efficiency principle that applies to reward learning in the individual domain also applies to that in the social domain, with the mPFC playing a central role in implementing i

Coding of Reward Probability and Risk by Single Neurons in Animals

Probability and risk are important factors for value-based decision making and optimal foraging. In order to survive in an unpredictable world, organisms must be able to assess the probability and risk attached to future events and use this information to generate adaptive behavior. Recent studies in non-human primates and rats have shown that both probability and risk are processed in a distributed fashion throughout the brain at the level of single neurons. Reward probability has mainly been shown to be coded by phasic increases and decreases in firing rates in neurons in the basal ganglia, midbrain, parietal, and frontal cortex. Reward variance is represented in orbitofrontal and posterior cingulate cortex and through a sustained response of dopaminergic midbrain neurons

Toward a unifying account of dopamine’s role in cost-benefit decision making

Dopamine is thought to play a crucial role in cost-benefit decision making, but so far there is no consensus on the precise role of dopamine in decision making. Here, we review the literature on dopaminergic manipulations of cost-benefit decision making in humans and evaluate how well different theoretical accounts explain the existing body of evidence. Reduced D2 stimulation tends to increase the willingness to bear delay and risk costs (i.e., wait for later rewards, take riskier options), while increased D1 and D2 receptor stimulation increases willingness to bear effort costs. We argue that the empirical findings can best be explained by combining the strengths of two theoretical accounts: in cost-benefit decision making, dopamine may play a dual role both in promoting the pursuit of psychologically close options (e.g., sooner and safer rewards) and in computing which costs are acceptable for a reward at stake. Moreover, we identify several limiting factors in the study designs of previous investigations that prevented a fuller understanding of dopamine’s role in value-based choice. Together, the proposed theoretical framework and the methodological suggestions for future studies may bring us closer to a unifying account of dopamine in healthy and impaired cost-benefit decision making

Characterizing human habits in the lab

Habits pose a fundamental puzzle for those aiming to understand human behavior. They pervade our everyday lives and dominate some forms of psychopathology but are extremely hard to elicit in the lab. In this Registered Report, we develop novel experimental paradigms grounded in computational models, which suggest that habit strength should be proportional to the frequency of behavior and, in contrast to previous research, independent of value. Specifically, we manipulate how often participants perform responses in two tasks varying action repetition without, or separately from, variations in value. Moreover, we ask how this frequency-based habitization relates to value-based operationalizations of habit and self-reported propensities for habitual behavior in real life

Comparing adaptive coding of reward in bipolar I disorder and schizophrenia

Deficits in neural processing of reward have been described in both bipolar disorder (BD) and schizophrenia (SZ), but it remains unclear to what extent these deficits are caused by similar mechanisms. Efficient reward processing relies on adaptive coding which allows representing large input spans by limited neuronal encoding ranges. Deficits in adaptive coding of reward have previously been observed across the SZ spectrum and correlated with total symptom severity. In the present work, we sought to establish whether adaptive coding is similarly affected in patients with BD. Twenty-five patients with BD, 27 patients with SZ and 25 healthy controls performed a variant of the Monetary Incentive Delay task during functional magnetic resonance imaging in two reward range conditions. Adaptive coding was impaired in the posterior part of the right caudate in BD and SZ (trend level). In contrast, BD did not show impaired adaptive coding in the anterior caudate and right precentral gyrus/insula, where SZ showed deficits compared to healthy controls. BD patients show adaptive coding deficits that are similar to those observed in SZ in the right posterior caudate. Adaptive coding in BD appeared more preserved as compared to SZ participants especially in the more anterior part of the right caudate and to a lesser extent also in the right precentral gyrus. Thus, dysfunctional adaptive coding could constitute a fundamental deficit in severe mental illnesses that extends beyond the SZ spectrum

Aesthetics and morality judgments share cortical neuroarchitecture

Philosophers have predominantly regarded morality and aesthetics judgments as fundamentally different. However, whether this claim is empirically founded has remained unclear. In a novel task, we measured brain activity of participants judging the aesthetic beauty of artwork or the moral goodness of actions depicted. To control for the content of judgments, participants assessed the age of the artworks and the speed of depicted actions. Univariate analyses revealed whole-brain corrected, content-controlled common activation for aesthetics and morality judgments in frontopolar, dorsomedial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Temporoparietal cortex showed activation specific for morality judgments, occipital cortex for aesthetics judgments. Multivariate analyses revealed both common and distinct whole-brain corrected representations for morality and aesthetics judgments in temporoparietal and prefrontal regions. Overall, neural commonalities are more pronounced than predominant philosophical views would predict. They are compatible with minority accounts that stress commonalities between aesthetics and morality judgments, such as sentimentalism and a valuation framework

Adaptive coding occurs in object categorization and may not be associated with schizotypal personality traits

Processing more likely inputs with higher sensitivity (adaptive coding) enables the brain to represent the large range of inputs coming in from the world. Healthy individuals high in schizotypy show reduced adaptive coding in the reward domain but it is an open question whether these deficits extend to non-motivational domains, such as object categorization. Here, we develop a novel variant of a classic task to test range adaptation for face/house categorization in healthy participants on the psychosis spectrum. In each trial of this task, participants decide whether a presented image is a face or a house. Images vary on a face-house continuum and appear in both wide and narrow range blocks. The wide range block includes most of the face-house continuum (2.50–97.5% face), while the narrow range blocks limit inputs to a smaller section of the continuum (27.5–72.5% face). Adaptive coding corresponds to better performance for the overlapping smaller section of the continuum in the narrow range than in the wide range block. We find that participants show efficient use of the range in this task, with more accurate responses in the overlapping section for the narrow range blocks relative to the wide range blocks. However, we find little evidence that range adaptation in our object categorization task is reduced in healthy individuals scoring high on schizotypy. Thus, reduced range adaptation may not be a domain-general feature of schizotypy

Partial Adaptation of Obtained and Observed Value Signals Preserves Information about Gains and Losses.

UNLABELLED: Given that the range of rewarding and punishing outcomes of actions is large but neural coding capacity is limited, efficient processing of outcomes by the brain is necessary. One mechanism to increase efficiency is to rescale neural output to the range of outcomes expected in the current context, and process only experienced deviations from this expectation. However, this mechanism comes at the cost of not being able to discriminate between unexpectedly low losses when times are bad versus unexpectedly high gains when times are good. Thus, too much adaptation would result in disregarding information about the nature and absolute magnitude of outcomes, preventing learning about the longer-term value structure of the environment. Here we investigate the degree of adaptation in outcome coding brain regions in humans, for directly experienced outcomes and observed outcomes. We scanned participants while they performed a social learning task in gain and loss blocks. Multivariate pattern analysis showed two distinct networks of brain regions adapt to the most likely outcomes within a block. Frontostriatal areas adapted to directly experienced outcomes, whereas lateral frontal and temporoparietal regions adapted to observed social outcomes. Critically, in both cases, adaptation was incomplete and information about whether the outcomes arose in a gain block or a loss block was retained. Univariate analysis confirmed incomplete adaptive coding in these regions but also detected nonadapting outcome signals. Thus, although neural areas rescale their responses to outcomes for efficient coding, they adapt incompletely and keep track of the longer-term incentives available in the environment. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Optimal value-based choice requires that the brain precisely and efficiently represents positive and negative outcomes. One way to increase efficiency is to adapt responding to the most likely outcomes in a given context. However, too strong adaptation would result in loss of precise representation (e.g., when the avoidance of a loss in a loss-context is coded the same as receipt of a gain in a gain-context). We investigated an intermediate form of adaptation that is efficient while maintaining information about received gains and avoided losses. We found that frontostriatal areas adapted to directly experienced outcomes, whereas lateral frontal and temporoparietal regions adapted to observed social outcomes. Importantly, adaptation was intermediate, in line with influential models of reference dependence in behavioral economics.This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust, Leverhulme Trust and the Swiss National Science Foundation (PP00P1-128574 and CRSTT3-141965).This is the final version of the article. It first appeared from the Society for Neuroscience via https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0487-16.201