Slightly generalized Generalized Contagion: Unifying simple models of biological and social spreading

We motivate and explore the basic features of generalized contagion, a model mechanism that unifies fundamental models of biological and social contagion. Generalized contagion builds on the elementary observation that spreading and contagion of all kinds involve some form of system memory. We discuss the three main classes of systems that generalized contagion affords, resembling: simple biological contagion; critical mass contagion of social phenomena; and an intermediate, and explosive, vanishing critical mass contagion. We also present a simple explanation of the global spreading condition in the context of a small seed of infected individuals.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures; chapter to appear in "Spreading Dynamics in Social Systems"; Eds. Sune Lehmann and Yong-Yeol Ahn, Springer Natur

A gauge invariant chiral unitary framework for kaon photo- and electroproduction on the proton

We present a gauge invariant approach to photoproduction of mesons on nucleons within a chiral unitary framework. The interaction kernel for meson-baryon scattering is derived from the chiral effective Lagrangian and iterated in a Bethe-Salpeter equation. Within the leading order approximation to the interaction kernel, data on kaon photoproduction from SAPHIR, CLAS and CBELSA/TAPS are analyzed in the threshold region. The importance of gauge invariance and the precision of various approximations in the interaction kernel utilized in earlier works are discussed.Comment: 23 pages, 13 figs, EPJ A styl

Dynamics of Transformation from Segregation to Mixed Wealth Cities

We model the dynamics of the Schelling model for agents described simply by a continuously distributed variable - wealth. Agents move to neighborhoods where their wealth is not lesser than that of some proportion of their neighbors, the threshold level. As in the case of the classic Schelling model where segregation obtains between two races, we find here that wealth-based segregation occurs and persists. However, introducing uncertainty into the decision to move - that is, with some probability, if agents are allowed to move even though the threshold level condition is contravened - we find that even for small proportions of such disallowed moves, the dynamics no longer yield segregation but instead sharply transition into a persistent mixed wealth distribution. We investigate the nature of this sharp transformation between segregated and mixed states, and find that it is because of a non-linear relationship between allowed moves and disallowed moves. For small increases in disallowed moves, there is a rapid corresponding increase in allowed moves, but this tapers off as the fraction of disallowed moves increase further and finally settles at a stable value, remaining invariant to any further increase in disallowed moves. It is the overall effect of the dynamics in the initial region (with small numbers of disallowed moves) that shifts the system away from a state of segregation rapidly to a mixed wealth state. The contravention of the tolerance condition could be interpreted as public policy interventions like minimal levels of social housing or housing benefit transfers to poorer households. Our finding therefore suggests that it might require only very limited levels of such public intervention - just sufficient to enable a small fraction of disallowed moves, because the dynamics generated by such moves could spur the transformation from a segregated to mixed equilibrium.Comment: 12 pages, 7 figure

Simulating complex social behaviour with the genetic action tree kernel

The concept of genetic action trees combines action trees with genetic algorithms. In this paper, we create a multi-agent simulation on the base of this concept and provide the interested reader with a software package to apply genetic action trees in a multi-agent simulation to simulate complex social behaviour. An example model is introduced to conduct a feasibility study with the described method. We find that our library can be used to simulate the behaviour of agents in a complex setting and observe a convergence to a global optimum in spite of the absence of stable states

Schelling Segregation with Strategic Agents

Schelling's segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant. Although the model is widely studied, no pure game-theoretic version where rational agents strategically choose their location exists. We close this gap by introducing and analyzing generalized game-theoretic models of Schelling segregation, where the agents can also have individual location preferences. For our models, we investigate the convergence behavior and the efficiency of their equilibria. In particular, we prove guaranteed convergence to an equilibrium in the version which is closest to Schelling's original model. Moreover, we provide tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy.Comment: Accepted at SAGT 2018, 19 pages, 9 figure

The Naming Game in Social Networks: Community Formation and Consensus Engineering

We study the dynamics of the Naming Game [Baronchelli et al., (2006) J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. P06014] in empirical social networks. This stylized agent-based model captures essential features of agreement dynamics in a network of autonomous agents, corresponding to the development of shared classification schemes in a network of artificial agents or opinion spreading and social dynamics in social networks. Our study focuses on the impact that communities in the underlying social graphs have on the outcome of the agreement process. We find that networks with strong community structure hinder the system from reaching global agreement; the evolution of the Naming Game in these networks maintains clusters of coexisting opinions indefinitely. Further, we investigate agent-based network strategies to facilitate convergence to global consensus.Comment: The original publication is available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/70370l311m1u0ng3

Economic tools to promote transparency and comparability in the Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement culminates a six-year transition towards an international climate policy architecture based on parties submitting national pledges every five years1. An important policy task will be to assess and compare these contributions2, 3. We use four integrated assessment models to produce metrics of Paris Agreement pledges, and show differentiated effort across countries: wealthier countries pledge to undertake greater emission reductions with higher costs. The pledges fall in the lower end of the distributions of the social cost of carbon and the cost-minimizing path to limiting warming to 2 °C, suggesting insufficient global ambition in light of leaders’ climate goals. Countries’ marginal abatement costs vary by two orders of magnitude, illustrating that large efficiency gains are available through joint mitigation efforts and/or carbon price coordination. Marginal costs rise almost proportionally with income, but full policy costs reveal more complex regional patterns due to terms of trade effects

Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process

We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that meets three basic ethical requirements and allows community members to influence, via monetary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project, participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or negative. We provide either public or private information about personal values. This produces two distinct public provision games, which are experimentally implemented and analyzed for various projects. In spite of the complex experimental task, participants do not rely on bidding their own personal values as an obvious simple heuristic whose general acceptance would result in fair and efficient outcomes. Rather, they rely on strategic underbidding. Although underbidding is affected by projects’ characteristics, the provision mechanism mostly leads to the implementation of the most efficient project

The microfoundations of territorial disputes: Evidence from a survey experiment in Japan

Although territorial disputes are one of the most fraught issues among states, how public opinion on territorial disputes varies within states and what explains the variation are often overlooked. This paper argues that citizens who prioritize economic considerations are more likely to support compromises over such disputes, while those who prioritize a country’s reputation tend to reject any compromise. Further, the paper hypothesizes that such variation in individual preferences can be explained by proximity to disputed territories. Counterintuitively, residents closer to disputes are more likely to support a compromise than those who live further away, because they are more affected by economic considerations. Those far from the disputed territory can afford to focus on its political aspects, which leads to a more hawkish stance. By using an experimental approach within Japan, this paper examines the validity of the spatial argument, and tests the relative salience of economic and political aspects of territorial disputes. The findings, based on original survey data, show that distance from disputed territories shapes individual preferences, and under some conditions, people living further away from disputed territories are more hawkish

Validation of Agent-Based Models in Economics and Finance

Since the survey by Windrum et al. (Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 10:8, 2007), research on empirical validation of agent-based models in economics has made substantial advances, thanks to a constant flow of high-quality contributions. This Chapter attempts to take stock of such recent literature to offer an updated critical review of the existing validation techniques. We sketch a simple theoretical framework that conceptualizes existing validation approaches, which we examine along three different dimensions: (i) comparison between artificial and real-world data; (ii) calibration and estimation of model parameters; and (iii) parameter space exploration. Finally, we discuss open issues in the field of ABM validation and estimation. In particular, we argue that more research efforts should be devoted toward advancing hypothesis testing in ABM, with specific emphasis on model stationarity and ergodicity