Genital ulcer severity score and genital health quality of life in Behçet's disease

Background: Behçet's Disease (BD) is a chronic auto-inflammatory, multisystem relapsing/remitting disorder of unknown aetiology. Oro-genital ulceration is a key feature of the disease and has a major impact on the patients' quality of life. Other clinical manifestations include ocular inflammation, rheumatologic and skin involvement, while CNS and vascular complications can lead to considerable morbidity. The availability of a valid monitoring tool for BD activity is crucial in evaluating the impact of the disease on daily life activity. The aims of this study were to validate a novel tool for monitoring genital ulceration severity in BD and to assess the impact of genital ulcers on the Genital Health Quality of Life (GHQoL). Methods: Genital Ulcer Severity Score (GUSS) was developed using six genital ulcer characteristics: number, size, duration, ulcer-free period, pain and site. A total of 207 BD patients were examined, (137 females: mean age∈±∈SD: 39.83∈±∈13.42 and 70 males: mean age∈±∈SD: 39.98∈±∈11.95) from the multidisciplinary Behçet's Centre of Excellence at Barts Health NHS Trust. GUSS was used in conjunction with Behçet's Disease Current Activity Form (BDCAF). Results: The over-all score of GUSS showed a strong correlation with all genital ulcer characteristics, and the strongest correlation was with the pain domain (r∈=∈0.936; P∈2: 0.600; P∈<∈0.0001). Conclusions: This study established the practicality of GUSS as a severity monitoring tool for BD genital ulcers and validated its use in 207 patients. Genital ulcers of BD have a considerable impact on the patients GHQoL

Games with capacity manipulation: Incentives and Nash equilibria

Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of truthful capacity revelation under the hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable rules. We then introduce generalized games of manipulation in which hospitals move first and state their capacities, and interns are subsequently assigned to hospitals using a sequential mechanism. In this setting, we first consider stable revelation mechanisms and introduce conditions guaranteeing the stability of the outcome. Next, we prove that every stable non-revelation mechanism leads to unstable allocations, unless restrictions on the preferences of the agents are introduced