41 research outputs found
Counterfactual-seeking: The scenic overlook of the road not taken
Decision-makers faced with an opportunity to learn the outcome of a foregone
alternative must balance anticipated regret, should that information be unfavorable, with
the potential benefits of this information in reducing experienced regret. Counterfactualseeking,
the choice to learn more about foregone alternatives, may be a functional, regretregulating
strategy for individuals already experiencing regret. Counterfactual-seeking
increases in response to dissatisfying outcomes (Studies 1 & 2). Counterfactual-seeking
is generally able to reduce dissatisfaction (Study 2), regardless of whether individuals
personally chose to view this information or were randomly assigned to do so (Study 3).
Moreover, both imaginative (versus factual) thoughts about the foregone option and
upward (versus downward) counterfactual thoughts play a role in this improvement in
satisfaction (Study 4). Regret thus has a complex influence in how individuals engage
with counterfactual information.In press at Personality and Social Psychology Bulleti
Rush of regret: a longitudinal analysis of naturalistic regrets
The current research examines immediate regrets occurring at the time of a meaningful
life outcome to better understand influences on real-life regrets. This research used a
longitudinal approach to examine both initial severity and the rate of change in immediate regrets. Initial severity was associated with greater past control over the
outcome and lower levels of future ability to attain goals relevant to the regret and correct
the regretted situation. Regret decreased over time, but less so if it concerned attainable
ongoing goals. These contrasting effects of future opportunity on initial severity and
change over time support a Dynamic Opportunity Principle of regret. Furthermore, the
effects of past opportunity and of actions versus inactions on immediate regrets diverged
from past findings about retrospective regrets. Immediate regrets may fundamentally
differ from retrospective regrets, and implications for our understanding of regret are
discussed
What we regret most . . . and why
Which domains in life produce the greatest potential for regret,
and what features of those life domains explain why? Using
archival and laboratory evidence, the authors show that greater
perceived opportunity within life domains evokes more intense
regret. This pattern is consistent with previous publications demonstrating
greater regret stemming from high rather than low
opportunity or choice. A meta-analysis of 11 regret ranking studies
revealed that the top six biggest regrets in life center on (in
descending order) education, career, romance, parenting, the
self, and leisure. Study Set 2 provided new laboratory evidence
that directly linked the regret ranking to perceived opportunity.
Study Set 3 ruled out an alternative interpretation involving
framing effects. Overall, these findings show that people’s biggest
regrets are a reflection of where in life they see their largest opportunities;
that is, where they see tangible prospects for change,
growth, and renewal
Self-report measures of individual differences in regulatory focus: a cautionary note
Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between two independent structures of strategic inclination,
promotion versus prevention. However, the theory implies two potentially independent definitions
of these inclinations, the self-guide versus the reference-point definitions. Two scales (the
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire [Higgins, E. T., Friedman, R. S., Harlow, R. E., Idson, L. C.,
Ayduk, O. N., & Taylor, A. (2001). Achievement orientations from subjective histories of success:
Promotion pride versus prevention pride. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 3–23] and
the General Regulatory Focus Measure [Lockwood, P., Jordan, C. H., & Kunda, Z. (2002). Motivation
by positive and negative role models: Regulatory focus determines who will best inspire us.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 854–864]) have been widely used to measure dispositional
regulatory focus. We suggest that these two scales align respectively with the two definitions,
and find that the two scales are largely uncorrelated. Both conceptual and methodological implications
are discussed
How far to the road not taken? The effect of psychological distance on counterfactual direction.
Upward and downward counterfactuals serve the distinct motivational functions of selfimprovement
and self-enhancement, respectively. Drawing on construal level theory, which
contends that increasing psychological distance from an event leads people to focus on highlevel,
self-improvement versus low-level, self-enhancement goals, we propose that distance will
alter counterfactual direction in a way that satisfies these distinct motives. We found that people
generated more downward counterfactuals about recent versus distant past events, while they
tended to generate more upward counterfactuals about distant versus recent past events
(Experiment 1). Consistent results were obtained for social distance (Experiment 2). Experiment
3 demonstrated that distance affects the direction of open-ended counterfactual thoughts. Finally,
Experiment 4 explored a potential mechanism, demonstrating that manipulating temporal
distance produced changes in participants’ self-improvement versus self-enhancement
motivations when responding to negative events. Future directions and broader implications for
self-control, social support, empathy, and learning are discussed
Dare to compare: fact-based versus simulation-based comparison in daily life
We examined the relative frequency of social, counter factual, past-temporal, and future-temporal
comparison in daily life using an experience-sampling method, in which participants were
randomly prompted to record thought samples using palmtop computers carried for two weeks.
Comparative thought accounted for 12% of all thoughts, and all four comparison types occurred
with equivalent frequency. Comparisons may be either fact-based (i.e., based on actuality, as in
social and past-temporal comparison) or simulation-based (i.e., based on imagination, as in
counterfactual and future-temporal comparison). Because the latter are more “unbounded,” and
because greater perceived opportunity invites greater self-improvement, we predicted and found
that counterfactual and future-temporal comparison were more likely to be upward (vs.
downward) than social and past-temporal comparison. All comparison types focused on
approach more than avoidance motives, except for counterfactuals, which showed equivalent
focus on both. These findings reveal the prominence of comparative thought in daily life, and
underscore the value an integrative theory that describes social, counter factual, or temporal
comparison using a common theoretical platform
Functions of personal experience and of expression of regret
Although learning and preparing for future behavior are well-established functions of regret, social functions have been largely ignored. We suggest a new model of the functions of regret, the Privately Experienced versus Expressed Regret (PEER) model, in which private experience and public expression differentially serve these functions. The current research examined this model using both naturalistic and experimental approaches. In Study 1, we coded tweets about regret posted on social media to examine whether this content emphasized social relationships versus learning and preparation. Study 2 experimentally examined the hypothesized social-closeness function for expression of regrets. Study 3 further examined how privately experienced and publicly expressed regrets differ on the social-closeness and learning and preparatory functions. Studies 4 and 5 confirmed the specific social closeness function rather than global social benefits. This research suggests that the social expression of regret differs from private experience in both form and function
Multi-measure investigation of the divergence of implicit and explicit consumer evaluations
This research extends findings that implicit and explicit attitudes may diverge to a
consumer evaluation task using multiple measures of implicit evaluation: Evaluative
Movement Assessment (EMA; Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2005), and Evaluative
Priming (Fazio,Jackson, Dunton, & Williams,1995). These measures were significantly
associated with each other for both positive and negative implicit attitudes. Neither
measure predicted explicit liking of the product or explicit intention to purchase the
product. We believe this to be the first such demonstrated divergence in a naturalistic,
unconditioned consumer evaluation context. Implicit activation of the product’s
emotional benefit (e.g., “relaxation”), as assessed in a lexical decision task (LDT) was
not associated with the EMA or evaluative priming, but was significantly associated with
both explicit emotional state (e.g., relaxation) and explicit purchase intention; the latter
effect was not mediated by explicit emotion
Praise for regret: people value regret above other negative emotions
What do people think about the emotion of regret? Recent demonstrations of the psychological
benefits of regret have been framed against an assumption that most people find regret to be
aversive, both when experienced but also when recalled later. Two studies explored lay
evaluations of regret experiences, revealing them to be largely favorable rather than unfavorable.
Study 1 demonstrated that regret, but not other negative emotions, was dominated by positive
more than negative evaluations. In both Studies 1 and 2, although participants saw a great deal of
benefit from their negative emotions, regret stood out as particularly beneficial. Indeed, in Study
2, regret was seen to be the most beneficial of 12 negative emotions on all five functions of:
making sense of past experiences, facilitating approach behaviors, facilitating avoidance
behaviors, gaining insights into the self, and in preserving social harmony. Moreover, in Study 2,
individuals made self-serving ascriptions of regret, reporting greater regret experiences for
themselves than for others. In short, people value their regrets substantially more than they do
other negative emotions
Regret and behavior: comment on Zeelenberg and Pieters
Zeelenberg and Pieter's (2007) regret regulation theory 1.0 offers a synthesis that brings
together concepts spanning numerous literatures. We have no substantive disagreement with
their theory, but instead offer
3 observations to further aid regret researchers studying con-
sumer decision making. First, the overall arch of any regret theory must be situated within an
understanding of behavior regulation. Second, the distinction between regrets of action versus
inaction is best understood in terms of motivational implications, particularly with regard to
Higgin's
(1998) distinction between promotion and prevention focus. Third, the opportunity
principle offers a particularly clear means of summarizing the regulatory consequences of the
regret experience. Regret is an emotion pivotal for decision making, and its cognitive under-
pinning has and continues to be elucidated in research focusing on counter factual thinking