The Weisse Wanne

Diese Arbeit untersucht ein Wasserversorgungsprojekt in Nordalbanien mit Bruno Latours ‘Actor Network Theory’ (ANT). Letzteres Projekt wurde in den Jahren 1996 bis 2008 von der Austrian Development Agency (ADA) in der Nordalbanischen Stadt Shkodra implementiert. Über 12 Jahre hinweg wurden etwa 7 Millionen Euro in die Erneuerung der lokalen Infrastruktur investiert, wodurch die Wasserversorgung der Einwohner erheblich verbessert werden konnte. Anstatt wie andere - bereits durchgeführte Evaluierungen - nach Erfolg oder Misserfolg des Projektes zu fragen, untersuche ich vielmer wie dieses Projekt ablief. Es geht darum zu verstehen, wie dieses komplizierte- vielleicht sogar komplexe- Netzwerk aus Konsulenten, Rohren, Entwicklungsexperten, Pumpen und Diplomaten funktioniert hat. Diese Aufzählung spiegelt bereits symmetrisches Interesse- sowohl an den ‘sozialen’ als auch an den ‘natürlichen’ bzw. ‘technischen’ Elementen des Projektes, wider. Um einem derartigen Interesse eine theoretische Basis zu geben, mache ich mir die in den Science and Technology Studies (STS) entwickelte ANT Theorie zu nutze. Diese Theorie - auch als antireduktionistische Heuristik bezeichnet - geht davon aus, dass eine a-priori Trennung von natürlichem und menschlichem zwischen sozialem und technischem nicht möglich ist. Geübt und erprobt in der Untersuchung von wissenschaftlichen Laboratorien und technischen Projekten, eignet sich ANT gut um die Spuren und Artefakte meiner Fallstudie ausfindig zu machen. Nach einer anfänglichen, explorativen Untersuchung des Projektes, diskutiere ich insbesondere nach der Rolle der “Weissen Wanne”; eines Österreichischen Betonstandards, der sich trotz seines erstaunlichen Namens und anscheinend uninteressanten Inhalten wirkmächtig durch das gesamte Projekt gezogen hat. Die zwei übergreifenden und zusammenhängenden Ziele meiner Arbeit sind daher folgende: a) Einerseits gilt es die Prozesse und Abläufe- mit einem Fokus auf die Rolle von Standards und Normen- im Shkodra Wasser Projekt darzustellen. b) Andererseits ist diese Arbeit ein Versuch um die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen von ANT in einem derartigen Erkenntnisprojekt auszuloten. Es ist wichtig zu unterstreichen, dass diese Arbeit keine weitere Evaluierung eines ADA Projektes darstellt. Während Erkenntnisse und Schlussfolgerungen durchaus von Interesse für Beteiligte sein können, ziele ich auf einer allgemeinere Diskussion. Für jene Leser die an technischen Infrastruktur-Projekten in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit interessiert sind, stellt diese Arbeit einer spannendes Fallbeispiel eines Wasserversorgungsprojektes dar. Aus einer STS Perspektive ist mein Vorhaben insofern interessant, als das meine Fallstudie eine Anwendung der ANT darstellt, und letztere auf ihre pragmatische Anwendungsfähigkeit in derartigen Erkenntnisprozessen testet.This paper analyzes an infrastructural development project with Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory (ANT). Through a total investment of about one million euro between 2003 until 2008 the Austrian Development Agency financed the rehabilitation of an 8000 m3 water reservoir in northern Albania. Based on collected documents, interviews and field observations, I provide an ethnographic account of this project. Applying ANT as a theoretical and epistemic guideline, I will focus on the arduous process of rebuilding the reservoir according to the Austrian “Weisse Wanne” concrete standard. The structure of this thesis is consequently shaped by two aims: • On the one hand I have arrived at this research project through an initial theoretical interest in actor network theory, which has been developed by scholars in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) when studying laboratories and technologies. Intrigued by its capacity to explore the interlinked character of technology and society, I have designed my research in order to explore the limits and possibilities of this particular theoretical approach. • On the other hand I would like to give as much space as possible to the many layered stories provided by my case study: the ‘Weisse Wanne’ water reservoir in the Albanian town of Shkodra holds not only 8000 cubic meters of water, but also is comprised of a multitude of stories that tell of its difficult and controversial construction. As a mundane technology, this standard for impermeable concrete does not appear as intriguing as gene-technology or nuclear energy. Nonetheless, the Weisse Wanne was powerful in shaping not only the concrete itself but also the lives and routines of people, thus deserving our attention

Personhood, consciousness, and god : how to be a proper pantheist

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018In this paper I develop a theory of personhood which leaves open the possibility of construing the universe as a person. If successful, it removes one bar to endorsing pantheism. I do this by examining a rising school of thought on personhood, on which persons, or selves, are understood as identical to episodes of consciousness. Through a critique of this experiential approach to personhood, I develop a theory of self as constituted of qualitative mental contents, but where these contents are also capable of unconscious existence. On this theory, though we can be conscious of our selves, consciousness turns out to be inessential to personhood. This move, I then argue, provides resources for responding to the pantheist’s problem of God’s person.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Mary's Powers of Imagination

One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis. Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature. Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red. For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experience is like simply consists in the possession of these abilities. Criticisms of the ability hypothesis tend to focus on this last claim. Such critics tend to accept that Mary gains these abilities when she leaves the room, but they deny that such abilities constitute knowledge of what an experience is like. To my mind, however, this critical strategy grants too much. Focusing specifically on imaginative ability, I argue that Mary does not gain this ability when she leaves the room for she already had the ability to imagine red while she was inside it. Moreover, despite what some have thought, the ability hypothesis cannot be easily rescued by recasting it in terms of a more restrictive imaginative ability. My purpose here is not to take sides in the debate about physicalism, i.e., my criticism of the ability hypothesis is not offered in an attempt to defend the anti-physicalist conclusion of the knowledge argument. Rather, my purpose is to redeem the imagination from the misleading picture of it that discussion of the knowledge argument has fostered

Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism

Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind that is inconsistent with physicalism. In this paper I will explore two attempts to block the inference from an epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap – the first from the phenomenal concept strategy, the second from Russellian monism – and suggest how the proponent of the knowledge argument might respond to each of these challenges. In doing so, I will draw on recent discussions of grounding and essence in the metaphysics literature

Consciousness and qualia.

This is an attempt to arrive at a philosophical understanding of (qualitative) consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, tickles, experienced colors, sounds, tastes, and odors. Consciousness is analyzed as the having of qualia. Qualia (or phenomenal properties) are problematical because nothing (neither physical nor nonphysical, neither actual nor merely possible) can bear them. This suggests qualia eliminativism; but it is argued that qualia should be retained as properties that can be exemplified though nothing bears them. Phenomenal objects are then presented as bundles of qualia. The bundle theory of phenomenal objects is complemented with a bundle theory of the conscious subject. Qualia are crucial elements of the bundle that constitutes a conscious subject. For a subject to have a quale is for this quale to be included in the bundle that is the subject. This account makes consciousness into a noncognitive phenomenon. Having a quale is not a matter of knowing anything, believing anything, or cognizing anything in any way. It is simply to feel a certain way. Two theses are singled out for particular critical attention. Concerning the nature of qualia, David Armstrong has argued that (color) qualia are complexes of primary qualities borne by the surfaces of (actual or possible) physical objects that we perceive or seem to perceive. More than other reductionists, Armstrong is concerned to ensure the phenomenologial adequacy of his reductionist theory. This phenomenological sensibility makes his theory of qualia particularly interesting and also particularly vulnerable. Concerning the question what it takes to have qualia, introspection appears to be the chosen tool of many contemporary theorists. Using John Pollock's introspectionist account of qualitative consciousness as a model, it is argued that introspection can play no part in an adequate explanation of qualitative consciousness. Throughout the investigation the methodological importance of the first-person point of view is emphasized. The primary responsibility of philosophical theory of consciousness is to insure phenomenological adequacy. Straying from the first-person point of view makes it easy to forget this

Miejsce naiwnego realizmu w Bertranda Russella zmiennych poglądach na temat percepcji

In this paper I describe the place of naive realism in Russell’s changing accounts of perception. I argue for the following conclusions: (1) The early period, 1898-1910: I am inclined to think that the naïve realism that Russell embraced so enthusiastically early on may not have been intended as a naïve realism about perception, but as a metaphysical or semantical thesis. (2) The Problems of Philosophy (1912): Russell abandons naïve realism (if, in fact, he ever held it) and presents a sense-datum version of representative realism.  (3) “On Matter” (1912): here we see Russell’s best attempt to defend something very close to the standard doctrine of naïve realism. The objects of perception—the “everyday material objects such as caterpillars and Cadillacs”—have, of course, undergone severe reconstruction. But the resulting picture does capture the spirit of the doctrine. (4) The period from 1914 to 1927: though Russell’s thinking about perception underwent some significant changes during this period—the sense datum theory is replaced by neutral monism—I try to show that the distinction between the matter of physics and the thing of common sense is a constant feature of Russell’s changing views. And I suggest that our perceptual relation the thing of common sense (as logically reconstructed by Russell) can usefully be viewed as a limited sort of naïve realism. (5) The period after 1927: the thing of common sense no longer features in Russell’s account of our perceptual access to the world. The things we perceive are percepts, located in our private spaces. The only material objects of which these percepts are parts are our brains. All other material objects are beyond our perceptual reach and are accessible only via inference. This is the end of anything resembling the traditional view of naïve realism in Russell’s account of perception.W artykule przedstawiam miejsce, jakie naiwny realizm zajmuje w zmiennym stanowisku Russella co do percepcji. Argumentuję za poniższymi tezami. (1) Twierdzę, że we wczesnym okresie (lata 1898–1910) naiwny realizm, początkowo entuzjastycznie przyjęty przez Russella, może nie być realizmem odnośnie do percepcji, ale tezą z zakresu metafizyki lub semantyki. (2) Problemy filozofii (1912): Russell porzuca naiwny realizm (jeżeli w ogóle kiedykolwiek go głosił) i przedstawia wersję realizmu reprezentacyjnego odwołującą się do danych zmysłowych. (3) On Matter (1912): dostrzec tu można najskuteczniejszą próbę obrony przez Russella stanowiska bardzo bliskiego standardowej wersji realizmu naiwnego. Przedmioty percepcji – „zdroworozsądkowe przedmioty materialne, takie jak gąsienice i Cadillaki” – przeszły rzecz jasna poważną rekonstrukcję, finalny pogląd uchwytuje jednak ducha naiwnego realizmu. (4) Okres od 1914 do 1927 roku: choć stanowisko Russella w kwestii percepcji przeszło w tych latach znaczące zmiany – teorię danych zmysłowych zastąpił monizm neutralny – staram się pokazać, że w jego poglądach występuje pewna stałość, mianowicie przywiązanie do odróżnienia materii w fizyce i w rozumieniu potocznym. Jak sugeruję, percepcyjną relację do tej ostatniej (w kształcie zaproponowanym przez Russella) można z korzyścią potraktować jako zawężoną wersję naiwnego realizmu. (5) Okres po roku 1927: w ujęciu Russella przedmioty zdrowego rozsądku stają się percepcyjnie niedostępne. Tym, co postrzegamy, są percepty usytuowane w naszych prywatnych przestrzeniach. Jedyne przedmioty materialne, których owe percepty są częścią, to nasze mózgi, wszystkie inne zaś znajdują się poza zasięgiem naszej percepcji, a dostęp do nich zapewnia wyłącznie wnioskowanie. Jest to zarazem kres czegokolwiek, co mogłoby przypominać tradycyjny naiwny realizm w Russella ujęciu percepcji

Schneeglöckchen : Polka française : für das Pianoforte : op. 87

componirt von Anna Gräfin Buttler (Zichy) StubenbergErscheinungsjahr aus dem Pflichtexemplarsdatum der UB Graz ermittelt: 1891(VLID)220966

Descriptions of Clinical Teaching Excellence in the First Two Years of Medical School: The Views of Academic and Community-Based Preceptors

The changing dynamics in patient care, along with the increasing role of early clinical experiences and community-based teaching models, can be a catalyst in furthering important research and training for clinical teaching excellence. Curricular challenges as well as limited scholarly work generate educational possibilities for study. Embracing a strong educational doctrine of teaching excellence in undergraduate medical education will help shape the future of health care and ultimately enhance patient care. This grounded theory study (a) described and explained descriptions of teaching excellence among first and second year academic and community-based preceptors in the Longitudinal Clinical Experience (LCE) program at the University of South Florida (USF), Morsani College of Medicine and (b) generated theory related to the explanation of the phenomenon of clinical teaching excellence. The single site study drew upon preceptors in the Longitudinal Clinical Experience (LCE) course who were nominated for a teaching excellence award by second, third, and fourth year medical students through a voluntary, online survey. Based on these surveys, 17 academic and 17 community-based preceptors who represented someone who had gone above the student\u27s expectations in providing an exceptional learning experience were nominated. From the list of 34, 13 eligible preceptors were invited to participate in the study and a sample of eight (four academic and four community-based preceptors) were interviewed. The semi-structured, one-hour face-to-face interviews were conducted between April and December 2012 using an interview process. All interviews were located in the preceptor\u27s academic, hospital, or practice setting except one, which took place in the preceptor\u27s private residence. Interview questions were distributed to participants in preparation of the meeting. After obtaining written informed consent by the participants, interviews were tape recorded and lasted an average of 60 minutes. Data analysis was completed using a complimentary, manual and electronic coding method to categorize and develop initial concepts and themes. Data were continuously tested with field notes, observations of the interviews and settings, and thoughts from the researcher\u27s journal, supporting the fluid and constant comparative analysis of grounded theory. The following four thematic categories, supported by preceptors\u27 reflective and reframing practices, emerged from the presentation of data for theory development: (a) preceptors have an awareness of, and adapt to, each student\u27s readiness to learn; (b) preceptors demonstrate an intrinsic commitment to teaching; (c) preceptors create supportive learning environments; and (d) preceptors utilize sound pedagogical practices. As a result of an in-depth, reciprocal analysis from the selected categories and descriptions of clinical teaching excellence, a higher-order construct (theory) was generated, and suggested transforming and implementing adult learning principles and strategies into early clinical education experiences can have a positive influence on medical education and strengthen student learning. Recommendations for practice and future research include (a) utilizing findings in curriculum planning, (b) expanding the study to increase awareness of the value of reflection and reframing in clinical teaching, (c) investigating the impact of clinical teaching excellence on patient care practices, and (d) expanding the study to compare primary care and specialty disciplines. Professional development programs should include designing activities based on preceptors\u27 instructional needs, sound pedagogical practices, and in compliance with continuing medical education requirements