Comparing Canada, the European Union, and NAFTA: Comparative Capers and Constitutional Conundrums. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 3 No. 4, August 2003

(From the introduction). This is an exercise in comparative analysis. The paper examines Canada, the European Union, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Its underlying premise - that political systems are best seen in comparative context - is an article of faith for students of comparative politics. Students of the European Union who began with the study of one or more of its member-states will have little problem with this, while those who started from International Relations and European integration studies will have greater doubts. Pooling the sovereignties of fifteen or more member-states, the European Union is in some respects sui generis. Although to be sure, it can be considered a multilevel system of governance, in some respects different from the federations with which it is often compared, the European Union is different enough to make any serious student of comparative politics pause. The EU, like many federal systems has complex decision-making procedures and impinges on the decision-making and sovereignty of its member-states, and appears as a single actor in international trade negotiations, but in other respects, it is very different: unlike many settled federations, the EU unites no well-defined people, and its inability to act as a single actor in foreign affairs or defense was documented well before current splits on Iraq and the Middle East. Difference has never stopped thoughtful students of comparative politics. The old adage that you can’t compare apples and oranges is easily met by noting that both are fruits. The EU may lack many features of federations but it is a complex multilevel system that may bear closer resemblance to lesser studied entities such as leagues and confederations. Examining the EU in comparative context is worthwhile not only because it gives us a clearer sense of what the EU is and is not, and how it has changed over time, but also because such regional systems like the EU are likely to become more common in an interdependent world.1 This paper is unorthodox: it compares the EU to another large trading bloc, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and to one of its components, Canada. Comparing the EU and NAFTA is straightforward and obvious enough. The two regional systems take in almost all of the world’s largest economies but are sufficiently different in their governance and politics that comparison in most areas can do little more than highlight difference. Comparing Canada and the EU is another matter. To some, the comparison may sound absurd, and appear to compare fruit and vegetables rather than apples and oranges. Nevertheless, Canada is a federation and a state, with membership in international organizations. However, it is not a pattern state from which models and theories have been extracted and does not figure prominently in the comparative literature. Like the EU, Canada can be considered unique and sui generis. It is difficult to find another country held together by two single-track railways, two broadcasting networks, (until recently) two airlines, and one very long border. That said, Canada’s center-periphery tensions, constitutional disputes, and disintegrative tendencies make it a case about which students of comparative politics should know more. The utility of this comparison will become more obvious if we consider not only current politics, but also the construction of the Canadian confederation (the official term), which was in some respects a battle, if not against nature, against geography and the pull of easier north-south relationships. We will begin by comparing the EU and NAFTA, highlighting differences and similarities, and then develop the more complex, but in many ways more tantalizing, Canada-EU comparison, and show why it is particularly relevant at a time, when the European Union’s constitution, like Canada’s, is in discussion

Economic crisis and the variety of populist response: Evidence from Greece, Portugal, and Spain

Greece, Portugal and Spain are among the countries worst hit by the 2008 Great Recession, followed by significant electoral and political turmoil. However, one of the dimensions in which they differ is the presence and varieties of populism in parties’ political proposals. Drawing on holistic coding of party manifestos, we assess the varying presence of populist rhetoric in mainstream and challenger parties before and after the 2008 economic downturn. Our empirical findings show that populism is much higher in Greece compared to Spain and Portugal. We do not find a significant impact of the crisis as the degree of populism remains rather stable in Greece and Portugal, while it increases in Spain, mainly due to the rise of new populist forces. The study confirms that populist rhetoric is a strategy adopted mainly by challenger and ideologically radical parties. In addition, inclusionary populism is the predominant flavour of populist parties in new Southern Europe, although exclusionary populism is present to a lesser extent in the Greek case. We contend that the interaction between the national context – namely the ideological legacy of parties and the main dimensions of competition – and the strategic options of party leadership is crucial for explaining cross-country variation in the intensity of populism and the specific issues that characterise populist discourse

Lessons to Be Learned: Political Party Research and Political Party Assistance

Generally speaking, the effects of international political party assistance are viewed nega-tively, or at least controversially. This study attributes some of the shortcomings of political party aid to the poor relationship between assistance providers and political science party research. They simply operate in different worlds. Party assistance lacks clear-cut concepts and strategies in practice, which makes it difficult to adequately evaluate it. At issue is its 'standard method,' with its 'transformative' intention to change the party organization of the assistance receivers. At the same time, the scholarship on political parties can provide only limited help to assistance providers due to its own conceptual and methodological re-strictions, such as the Western European bias underlying its major concepts, the predominance of a functionalist approach, and the scant empirical research on political parties outside of Europe and the US. Taking a cue from recent political party research, we could begin to question the overarching role of political parties in the transition and consolidation proc-ess of new democracies. Other research findings emphasize the coexistence of different types of party organizations, and the possibility of different organizational developments, which might all be consistent with consolidating democracy. All this suggests the necessity of abandoning the controversial aim of the 'transformative impact' of political party aid.Die Wirksamkeit der internationalen Parteienförderung wird als wenig effektiv beurteilt - auch wenn dieses Urteil umstritten ist. Ein Grund für die Schwierigkeiten der Parteienförderung wird hier in den kaum vorhandenen Beziehungen zwischen Parteienförderern und der Parteienforschung gesehen, die weitgehend isoliert voneinander arbeiten. Der Parteienförderung fehlen klare Konzepte und Strategien, die eine angemessene Evaluierung ihrer Aktivitäten erlauben würden. Ein Grundproblem ist ihre so genannte 'Standardmethode' mit ihrem 'Transformationsziel', dem zufolge die Organisation der Empfängerpartei verändert werden soll. Zugleich kann die Parteienforschung aufgrund ihrer eigenen Wissensgrenzen bisher nur beschränkt Hilfe anbieten. Dazu zählen der westeuropäische Bias ihrer zentralen Konzepte, die Dominanz des funktionalistischen Ansatzes und die noch immer geringen empirischen Forschungsergebnisse zu Parteien außerhalb Europas und der USA. Jüngste Forschungsergebnisse lassen vermuten, dass die Rolle der Parteien im Transitions- und Konsolidierungsprozess überschätzt wurde, andere betonen die gleichzeitige Koexistenz ganz unterschiedlicher Parteitypen und die Möglichkeit unterschiedlicher Organisationsentwicklung, was letztlich zur Konsolidierung von Demokratie führen kann. All dies legt schließlich nahe, das grundlegende Transformationsziel der Parteienförderung aufzugeben