Forging monetary unification through novation: the TARGET system and the politics of central banking in Europe

When the European Monetary Union became effective in January 1999, the accounting treatment for claims and obligations which the Eurosystem’s National Central Banks (NCBs) incur against each other in the ‘Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Express Transfer’ (TARGET) system remained unspecified. Only later in 1999, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) decided that these claims and obligations should be shifted to the ECB’s balance sheet as a central counterparty—a process called ‘novation’. This ex-post decision completed monetary unification by uniquely ‘stitching together’ NCBs’ balance sheets while profoundly transforming the role of the ECB’s balance sheet. First, novation centralised it at the Eurosystem’s apex, which had not been politically feasible ex ante. Secondly, novation repurposed it into a multilateral mechanism to provide automatic, unlimited funding for cross-border payment imbalances. Thirdly, novation allowed monetary technocrats to operationalise it as an autonomous ‘firefighting’ balance sheet for unconventional monetary policy

Putting ‘off-balance-sheet fiscal agencies’ under the control of the European Parliament could help democratise Eurozone governance

The Eurozone’s system of governance is often accused of lacking democratic legitimacy. Andrei Guter-Sandu and Steffen Murau write on the role of ‘off-balance-sheet fiscal agencies’, such as the European Investment Bank, European Stability Mechanism and Single Resolution Fund. They argue that the use of these institutions and mechanisms effectively constitutes a ‘fiscal ecosystem by stealth’ and that if this system were to be put under the control of the European Parliament, it could offer a channel for enhancing legitimacy

Special Funds and Security Policy: Endowing the German Energy and Climate Fund with autonomous borrowing powers

This policy brief looks at accelerated transformation towards climate neutrality that serves both ecological as well as security policy goals

The Political Economy of Private Credit Money Accommodation

Private credit money forms are debt instruments that co-exist alongside publicly provided forms of money and emerge de-centrally out of the lending activities of banks or non-bank financial institutions. In normal times, they are easily convertible into higher-ranking forms of public or commodity money. Throughout history, however, private credit money forms have repeatedly become subject to a run by investors who all at once tried to convert their private credit money balances into higher-ranking money. Such runs are an integral and unavoidable feature of the modern credit money system, which in its essence is a self-referential network of expanding, yet instable debt claims. To keep up the stability of the monetary system, governments had to react to these runs and in a range of instances decided to drag the private credit money form under the control of the state by ensuring that they do not break away from par. This study examines this process of 'accommodating' private credit money. It establishes a functionalist theory about the transformation of the modern monetary system. To understand how and why such accommodation occurred, it develops an ideal-typical model of private credit money accommodation and applies it on three cases in the respective centres of the global financial system: the 1797 Bank Restriction in England that accommodated bank notes; the 1933 Emergency Banking Act in the U.S. that accommodated bank deposits; and the realignment of policies by the Fed and the U.S. Treasury in the 2008 crisis, which accommodated overnight repurchase agreements and money market fund shares as ‘shadow money’. On the basis of those case studies, the study argues that today’s public credit money supply is made up of accommodated, formerly private, credit money forms

Forging monetary unification through novation: the TARGET system and the politics of central banking in Europe

When the European Monetary Union became effective in January 1999, the accounting treatment for claims and obligations which the Eurosystem’s National Central Banks (NCBs) incur against each other in the ‘Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Express Transfer’ (TARGET) system remained unspecified. Only later in 1999, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) decided that these claims and obligations should be shifted to the ECB’s balance sheet as a central counterparty—a process called ‘novation’. This ex-post decision completed monetary unification by uniquely ‘stitching together’ NCBs’ balance sheets while profoundly transforming the role of the ECB’s balance sheet. First, novation centralised it at the Eurosystem’s apex, which had not been politically feasible ex ante. Secondly, novation repurposed it into a multilateral mechanism to provide automatic, unlimited funding for cross-border payment imbalances. Thirdly, novation allowed monetary technocrats to operationalise it as an autonomous ‘firefighting’ balance sheet for unconventional monetary policy

The hierarchy of the offshore US-dollar system : on swap lines, the FIMA repo facility and special drawing rights

Published February 2021This study conceptualizes international monetary hierarchy by focusing on different mechanisms to supply emergency US-Dollar (USD) liquidity from the Federal Reserve (Fed) to non-US central banks. To this end, it takes on board insights of critical macrofinance and develops a model of the global financial architecture as a web of interlocking balance sheets

International monetary hierarchy through emergency US-dollar liquidity : a key currency approach

The notion that the international monetary system is hierarchical has become increasingly common, but the nature, causes, and shape of international monetary hierarchy remain vague. In this article, we develop a monetary theory of international hierarchy based on the “key currency” approach. We perceive the international monetary system as a world-spanning payment system that is inherently hierarchical because it needs central nodes for clearing and settlement. The centrality of the US-Dollar (USD) as global key currency places the US at the apex and makes the Federal Reserve (Fed) the system’s hierarchically highest institution. Other monetary jurisdictions are pushed into peripheral positions and rely on both using and creating USD-denominated credit money instruments “offshore.” Based on this approach, we explain international monetary hierarchy through different mechanisms to supply emergency USD liquidity from the Fed to non-US central banks. Currently, there are three different public mechanisms for non-US central banks to access the Fed’s balance sheet and attain emergency USD liquidity. The first-layer periphery may receive emergency USD liquidity via the Fed’s central bank swap lines. The second-layer periphery can make use of the Fed’s new repo facility for Foreign and International Monetary Authorities to access emergency USD liquidity. The residual mechanism for the third-layer periphery to access emergency USD liquidity is the Special Drawing Rights system, administered by the International Monetary Fund, in which the Exchange Stabilization Fund acts as gatekeeper for the Fed

After the allocation : what role for the special drawing rights system?

In August 2021, the IMF made a new SDR allocation to help ease pandemic-induced financial strains in the Global South. This paper assesses the potential of the SDR system to address debtrelated problems in global finance. We analyze the SDR system as a web of interlocking balance sheets whose members can use SDR holdings—the system’s tradable assets—for conversion into usable currency as a perpetual low-interest loan or to make payments to each other. Using original IMF data, we study how the system has been practically used since 1990. Though widely perceived as a solution in search of a problem in the post-Bretton Woods era, we find that the SDR system provides three mechanisms through which IMF members borrow and lend usable currency to each other, with different strings attached: first, transactions by agreement; second, the IMF’s core lending facilities for which the SDR system offers additional resources; and third, IMF-sponsored Trusts which seek to harness the SDR system for development purposes and are the basis for the current idea of ‘voluntary channeling’. Overall, given the SDR system’s idiosyncratic accounting rules, the new allocation can improve the liquidity position of a country and offer some limited avenues for sovereign debt restructuring but comes with new interest and exchange rate risks. Voluntary channeling cannot happen without a wealth transfer, neither the SDR allocation nor the use of Trusts can overcome this problem. Still, Trusts can be a useful instrument to help with debt forgiveness and to ensure that borrowed funds are used for their intended purpose

Shadow money and the public money supply: the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on the monetary system

This article explores the effects of the political reactions to the 2007–2009 financial crisis on the monetary system. It chimes in with the view that shadow banks create ‘shadow money’, i.e. private substitutes for bank deposits. The article analyses how the three main forms of shadow money – money market fund shares, overnight repurchase agreements and asset-backed commercial papers – were affected by the short-term government intervention and medium-term regulation during and after the 2007–2009 financial crisis in the United States. The analysis reveals that the measures taken between 2007 and 2014 integrated some shadow money forms in the public money supply. In the year after the Lehman collapse, the initially private shadow money supply was either publicly backstopped or de-monetised as it had broken par to bank deposits. The public backstops took on the form of emergency facilities established by the Federal Reserve and guarantees proclaimed by the Treasury. Those backstops imply that the public institutional framework to protect bank deposits was extended to some forms of shadow money during the crisis. This tendency has continued in post-crisis regulation. Accordingly, the 2007–2009 financial crisis has triggered a paradigmatic change in the monetary system, attributable to the political decisions of US authorities

Staatsverschuldung und Transformation der monetären Architektur in Preußen und dem Deutschen Kaiserreich, 1740-1914

Dieser Aufsatz zeichnet den Wandel der monetären Architektur und der damit einhergehenden Praxis der Emission von Staatsanleihen in Preußen und dem Deutschen Kaiserreich von 1740 bis 1914 nach, um die zeitgenössischen Vorstellungen über das angemessene Verhältnis zwischen dem Finanzministerium, der Zentralbank und dem privaten Bankensystem in Fragen der Emission von Staatsschulden zu beleuchten. Dazu werden drei Institutionen als "Protagonisten" diskutiert - die Preußisch Königliche Bank, die Seehandlung und die Disconto-Gesellschaft - und durch vier Phasen der preußischen und deutschen Geschichte begleitet: das feudale Preußen von Friedrich II. bis zur Niederlage gegen Napoleon (1740-1806); von den Stein-Hardenberg'schen Reformen bis zur Märzrevolution (1807-1848); das nachrevolutionäre Preußen mit dem Aufstieg Bismarcks, seinen drei Kriegen und der Gründung des Deutschen Kaiserreiches (1849-1871); und Preußen im Deutschen Kaiserreich in der ersten Ära der Globalisierung (1871-1914). Vor dem Hintergrund der monetären Architektur als konzeptionellem Rahmen ergeben sich aus der Analyse drei wesentliche Erkenntnisse. Erstens haben bilanzexterne Fiskalagenturen (off-balance-sheet fiscal agencies, OBFAs) schon eine Schlüsselrolle bei der Emission und Verwaltung von Staatsanleihen gespielt, bevor sich Zentralbanken und Finanzministerien im modernen Sinne entwickelt hatten. Dies wird an der institutionellen Rolle der Seehandlung deutlich, die während der Napoleonischen Kriege als Erste mit der Emission von preußischen Staatsanleihen begann. Zweitens haben Zentralbanken innerhalb des öffentlich-privaten Spektrums im Laufe der Zeit ihre Rolle verändert. Die staatliche Preußische Königliche Bank wurde durch die Umwandlung in die hybride Preußische Bank wesentlich funktionstüchtiger und besser zu kontrollieren. Als sie 1875 in die Reichsbank umgewandelt wurde, entschied man sich für eine vollständig private Eigentümerstruktur. Drittens führten die wirtschaftliche Liberalisierung nach 1848 und die zunehmende notwendige Nutzung privater Mittel für die Kriegsfinanzierung zum Aufkommen der Konsortialemission von Staatsanleihen. Die Disconto-Gesellschaft, die eine zentrale Rolle im Preußen-Konsortium und im Reichsanleihekonsortium spielte, war führend daran beteiligt, ein neues Verhältnis zwischen privaten Finanzinstituten und dem Staat zu etablieren