Human Wrongs in Animal Research: A Focus on Moral Injury and Reification

Using arguments derived from the work of Axel Honneth (2006), we show that animal research involves an institutionalized failure to recognize nonhuman animals that not only reifies animals but the human persons engaged in this process, diminishing the scope of their moral agency and causing moral injury. In this chapter, we begin by briefly articulating the harms to animals in research and the more conventional harms to humans that can arise as a result of animal research, before making a case for the ethical damage wrought by the failures of recognition inherent within the system of animal research. We conclude with a brief outline of our approach as a means of effecting change in animal research

The complex case of Ellie Anderson

Ellie Anderson had always known that she wanted to have children. Her mother, Louise, was aware of this wish. Ellie was designated male at birth, but according to news sources, identified as a girl from the age of three. She was hoping to undergo gender reassignment surgery at 18, but died unexpectedly at only 16, leaving Louise grappling not only with the grief of losing her daughter, but with a complex legal problem. Ellie had had her sperm frozen before starting hormone treatment, specifically so that she would retain the chance of becoming a parent after her gender reassignment. Ellie had considered what might happen to the sperm if she died and was adamant that her children should be brought into the world. She made her mother promise to ensure that this would happen. But according to UK law, Ellie’s mother has no legal right to retain her sperm, or to use it to fulfil Ellie’s wishes. In this paper, we raise several key ethical questions on this case, namely: does a refusal to bring Ellie’s children into the world wrong her posthumously? Is Ellie’s mother morally entitled to use her daughter’s sperm as Ellie wished? Should the fact that Ellie was a minor at the time of her death or the fact that she was transgendered undermine her wish to have children? Can Ellie become a parent posthumously? We consider how these complex ethical questions could be approached

Is pregnancy a disease? A normative approach

In this paper, we identify some key features of what makes something a disease, and consider whether these apply to pregnancy. We argue that there are some compelling grounds for regarding pregnancy as a disease. Like a disease, pregnancy affects the health of the pregnant person, causing a range of symptoms from discomfort to death. Like a disease, pregnancy can be treated medically. Like a disease, pregnancy is caused by a pathogen, an external organism invading the host’s body. Like a disease, the risk of getting pregnant can be reduced by using prophylactic measures. We address the question of whether the ‘normality’ of pregnancy, its current necessity for human survival, or the value often attached to it are reasons to reject the view that pregnancy is a disease. We point out that applying theories of disease to the case of pregnancy, can in many cases illuminate inconsistencies and problems within these theories. Finally, we show that it is difficult to find one theory of disease that captures all paradigm cases of diseases, while convincingly excluding pregnancy. We conclude that there are both normative and pragmatic reasons to consider pregnancy a disease

A theorem of the Hahn-Banach type

Let Y be a linear subspace of a linear space X over the rationals and let C C X be Q-convex. Moreover, let T be a family of subsets of a linear space E over Q having the binary intersection property. Suppose that F is a Q-concave set-valued function defined on C and assuming values in T. We give some conditions under which every additive selection of the restriction of F to Y fl C can be extended to an additive selection of F