Robust Control and Monetary Policy Delegation.

This paper adapts in a simple static context the Rogoff's (1985) analysis of monetary policy delegation to a conservative central banker to the robust control framework. In this framework, uncertainty means that policymakers are unsure about their model, in the sense that there is a group of approximate models that they also consider as possibly true, and their objective is to choose a rule that will work under a range of di¤erent model specifications. We find that robustness reveals the emergence of a precautionary behaviour in the case of unstructured model uncertainty, reducing thus government's willingness to delegate monetary policy to a conservative central banker.Robust control, Monetary policy delegation, Central bank conservativeness.

Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union in the Presence of Uncertainty about the Central Bank Preferences

In this paper, we examine the link between political transparency of a common central bank (CCB) and decentralized supply-side fiscal policies in a monetary union. We find that the opacity of a conservative CCB has a restrictive effect on national fiscal policies since each government internalizes the influence of its actions on the common monetary policy and thus reinforces the disciplinary effect of institutional constraints such as the Stability and Growth Pact on national fiscal authorities. However, more opacity could imply higher inflation and unemployment when the union is large enough and induce higher inflation and output-gap variability. An enlargement of the union incites national governments to increase tax rate, and weakens the disciplinary effects of opacity on member countries if fiscal policymaking is relatively decentralized and the CCB quite conservative. It induces an increase in the level of inflation and unemployment, and could increase inflation and output-gap variability.central bank transparency; supply-side fiscal policy; monetary union

Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio.

This paper examines the impact of central bank independence on inflation persistence. Our theoretical analysis predicts that a higher degree of central bank independence leads to a lower inflation persistence and therefore to a higher speed of disinflation. The empirical results, provided using a 18 OECD countries sample, show that central bank independence is negatively related to the degree of inflation persistence. In addition, as there is a positive correlation between inflation persistence and the sacrifice ratio, we conclude that central bank independence, through its influence on inflation persistence, is negatively correlated to the sacrifice ratio.central bank independence, inflation persistence, speed of disinflation, sacrifice ratio.

The policy mix in a monetary union under alternative policy institutions and asymmetries

In this paper we study the monetary and fiscal policy making in a monetary union when authorities face asymmetries in the countries constructing this monetary union. We analyze this problem in an asymmetric environment using a two-country theoretical model and by introducing two alternative types of national asymmetries : asymmetric shocks and the asymmetric transmission mechanism. The central issue of the paper is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal policy institutions. In this respect, we investigate which of the two alternative types of monetary policymakers (country representatives or governors) facing to two alternative types of fiscal policy (decentralized or centralized) contributes to better resolve the problem of the trade-off between credibility and flexibility. Our results show that delegate the monetary policy to a council of union-wide governors with decentralized fiscal policies is the appropriate institutional design that would reduce the iinflation bias and stabilize better the regional idiosyncratic shocks in a monetary union in the cases of perfectly asymmetric and perfectly symmetric shocks. In addition, in the case of asymmetric transmission, the monetary union would be better off with a council of monetary policy governors and centralized fiscal policies.EMU, Policy-Mix, Asymmetric shocks, Asymmetric transmission

ANOTHER LOOK AT THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MENA COUNTRIES: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

The paper is concerned with the analysis of the main determinants of foreign direct investment in MENA countries. The estimation is run on the determinants of FDI in our sample which consist of 36 countries. 12 of these countries were in MENA countries and another 24 were the major recipients of FDI in their respective regions in developing countries. By employing a panel data methodology the study investigates whether the determinants of FDI are similar to the other FDI receiving developing countries. The study reveals that the key determinants of FDI inflows in MENA countries are the size of the host economy, the government size, natural resources and the institutional variables. The paper concludes that, countries that are receiving fewer foreign investments could make themselves more attractive to potential foreign investors. So, the policy makers in the MENA region should remove all barriers to trade, develop their financial system and build appropriate institutions.Foreign Direct Investment, Panel Data, Fixed Effects, MENA

An Empirical Investigation of the Price Linkages between Oil, Biofuels and Selected Agricultural Commodities

AbstractThis paper uses monthly data to investigate the dynamic linkages between the prices of crude oil, biofuels and selected agricultural commodities. We apply the ARDL approach to cointegration, in conjunction with Granger causality tests. The empirical evidence supports the existence of significant causal effects revealing strong interdependencies among the examined markets

Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union in the Presence of Uncertainty about the Central Bank Preferences

In this paper, we examine the link between political transparency of a common central bank (CCB) and decentralized supply-side fiscal policies in a monetary union. We find that the opacity of a conservative CCB has a restrictive effect on national fiscal policies since each government internalizes the influence of its actions on the common monetary policy and thus reinforces the disciplinary effect of institutional constraints such as the Stability and Growth Pact on national fiscal authorities. However, more opacity could imply higher inflation and unemployment when the union is large enough and induce higher inflation and output-gap variability. An enlargement of the union incites national governments to increase tax rate, and weakens the disciplinary effects of opacity on member countries if fiscal policymaking is relatively decentralized and the CCB quite conservative. It induces an increase in the level of inflation and unemployment, and could increase inflation and output-gap variability

Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union in the Presence of Uncertainty about the Central Bank Preferences

In this paper, we examine the link between political transparency of a common central bank (CCB) and decentralized supply-side fiscal policies in a monetary union. We find that the opacity of a conservative CCB has a restrictive effect on national fiscal policies since each government internalizes the influence of its actions on the common monetary policy and thus reinforces the disciplinary effect of institutional constraints such as the Stability and Growth Pact on national fiscal authorities. However, more opacity could imply higher inflation and unemployment when the union is large enough and induce higher inflation and output-gap variability. An enlargement of the union incites national governments to increase tax rate, and weakens the disciplinary effects of opacity on member countries if fiscal policymaking is relatively decentralized and the CCB quite conservative. It induces an increase in the level of inflation and unemployment, and could increase inflation and output-gap variability

Fiscal Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union with Asymmetric Shocks

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