Speed and Accuracy of Static Image Discrimination by Rats

When discriminating dynamic noisy sensory signals, human and primate subjects achieve higher accuracy when they take more time to decide, an effect attributed to accumulation of evidence over time to overcome neural noise. We measured the speed and accuracy of twelve freely behaving rats discriminating static, high contrast photographs of real-world objects for water reward in a self-paced task. Response latency was longer in correct trials compared to error trials. Discrimination accuracy increased with response latency over the range of 500-1200ms. We used morphs between previously learned images to vary the image similarity parametrically, and thereby modulate task difficulty from ceiling to chance. Over this range we find that rats take more time before responding in trials with more similar stimuli. We conclude that rats' perceptual decisions improve with time even in the absence of temporal information in the stimulus, and that rats modulate speed in response to discrimination difficulty to balance speed and accuracy

Confidence Is the Bridge between Multi-stage Decisions

Demanding tasks often require a series of decisions to reach a goal. Recent progress in perceptual decision-making has served to unite decision accuracy, speed, and confidence in a common framework of bounded evidence accumulation, furnishing a platform for the study of such multi-stage decisions. In many instances, the strategy applied to each decision, such as the speed-accuracy trade-off, ought to depend on the accuracy of the previous decisions. However, as the accuracy of each decision is often unknown to the decision maker, we hypothesized that subjects may carry forward a level of confidence in previous decisions to affect subsequent decisions. Subjects made two perceptual decisions sequentially and were rewarded only if they made both correctly. The speed and accuracy of individual decisions were explained by noisy evidence accumulation to a terminating bound. We found that subjects adjusted their speed-accuracy setting by elevating the termination bound on the second decision in proportion to their confidence in the first. The findings reveal a novel role for confidence and a degree of flexibility, hitherto unknown, in the brain's ability to rapidly and precisely modify the mechanisms that control the termination of a decision.We thank the Wellcome Trust, the Human Frontier Science Program, the Royal Society (Noreen Murray Professorship in Neurobiology to D.M.W.), Howard Hughes Medical Institute, National Eye Institute grant EY11378 to M.N.S., a Sloan Research Fellowship to R.K., and Simons Collaboration on the Global Brain grant 323439 to R.K

Confidence Is the Bridge between Multi-stage Decisions

Demanding tasks often require a series of decisions to reach a goal. Recent progress in perceptual decision-making has served to unite decision accuracy, speed, and confidence in a common framework of bounded evidence accumulation, furnishing a platform for the study of such multi-stage decisions. In many instances, the strategy applied to each decision, such as the speed-accuracy trade-off, ought to depend on the accuracy of the previous decisions. However, as the accuracy of each decision is often unknown to the decision maker, we hypothesized that subjects may carry forward a level of confidence in previous decisions to affect subsequent decisions. Subjects made two perceptual decisions sequentially and were rewarded only if they made both correctly. The speed and accuracy of individual decisions were explained by noisy evidence accumulation to a terminating bound. We found that subjects adjusted their speed-accuracy setting by elevating the termination bound on the second decision in proportion to their confidence in the first. The findings reveal a novel role for confidence and a degree of flexibility, hitherto unknown, in the brain's ability to rapidly and precisely modify the mechanisms that control the termination of a decision.We thank the Wellcome Trust, the Human Frontier Science Program, the Royal Society (Noreen Murray Professorship in Neurobiology to D.M.W.), Howard Hughes Medical Institute, National Eye Institute grant EY11378 to M.N.S., a Sloan Research Fellowship to R.K., and Simons Collaboration on the Global Brain grant 323439 to R.K

Piercing of Consciousness as a Threshold-Crossing Operation

Many decisions arise through an accumulation of evidence to a terminating threshold. The process, termed bounded evidence accumulation (or drift diffusion), provides a unified account of decision speed and accuracy, and it is supported by neurophysiology in human and animal models. In many situations, a decision maker may not communicate a decision immediately and yet feel that at some point she had made up her mind. We hypothesized that this occurs when an accumulation of evidence reaches a termination threshold, registered, subjectively, as an “aha” moment. We asked human participants to make perceptual decisions about the net direction of dynamic random dot motion. The difficulty and viewing duration were controlled by the experimenter. After indicating their choice, participants adjusted the setting of a clock to the moment they felt they had reached a decision. The subjective decision times (tSDs) were faster on trials with stronger (easier) motion, and they were well fit by a bounded drift-diffusion model. The fits to the tSDs alone furnished parameters that fully predicted the choices (accuracy) of four of the five participants. The quality of the prediction provides compelling evidence that these subjective reports correspond to the terminating process of a decision rather than a post hoc inference or arbitrary report. Thus, conscious awareness of having reached a decision appears to arise when the brain’s representation of accumulated evidence reaches a threshold or bound. We propose that such a mechanism might play a more widespread role in the “piercing of consciousness” by non-conscious thought processes.The research was supported by the Howard Hughes Medical Institute and National Eye Institute grant R01 EY11378 to M.N.S., the Human Frontier Science Program to D.M.W. and M.N.S., the Wellcome Trust and Royal Society (Noreen Murray Professorship in Neurobiology) to D.M.W., National Eye Institute grant T32 EY013933 to Y.H.R.K., and the René and Susanne Braginsky Foundation and University of Zurich to F.H.P

Reinstated episodic context guides sampling-based decisions for reward.

How does experience inform decisions? In episodic sampling, decisions are guided by a few episodic memories of past choices. This process can yield choice patterns similar to model-free reinforcement learning; however, samples can vary from trial to trial, causing decisions to vary. Here we show that context retrieved during episodic sampling can cause choice behavior to deviate sharply from the predictions of reinforcement learning. Specifically, we show that, when a given memory is sampled, choices (in the present) are influenced by the properties of other decisions made in the same context as the sampled event. This effect is mediated by fMRI measures of context retrieval on each trial, suggesting a mechanism whereby cues trigger retrieval of context, which then triggers retrieval of other decisions from that context. This result establishes a new avenue by which experience can guide choice and, as such, has broad implications for the study of decisions

Changes of Mind in an Attractor Network of Decision-Making

Attractor networks successfully account for psychophysical and neurophysiological data in various decision-making tasks. Especially their ability to model persistent activity, a property of many neurons involved in decision-making, distinguishes them from other approaches. Stable decision attractors are, however, counterintuitive to changes of mind. Here we demonstrate that a biophysically-realistic attractor network with spiking neurons, in its itinerant transients towards the choice attractors, can replicate changes of mind observed recently during a two-alternative random-dot motion (RDM) task. Based on the assumption that the brain continues to evaluate available evidence after the initiation of a decision, the network predicts neural activity during changes of mind and accurately simulates reaction times, performance and percentage of changes dependent on difficulty. Moreover, the model suggests a low decision threshold and high incoming activity that drives the brain region involved in the decision-making process into a dynamical regime close to a bifurcation, which up to now lacked evidence for physiological relevance. Thereby, we further affirmed the general conformance of attractor networks with higher level neural processes and offer experimental predictions to distinguish nonlinear attractor from linear diffusion models

Dynamic Integration of Reward and Stimulus Information in Perceptual Decision-Making

In perceptual decision-making, ideal decision-makers should bias their choices toward alternatives associated with larger rewards, and the extent of the bias should decrease as stimulus sensitivity increases. When responses must be made at different times after stimulus onset, stimulus sensitivity grows with time from zero to a final asymptotic level. Are decision makers able to produce responses that are more biased if they are made soon after stimulus onset, but less biased if they are made after more evidence has been accumulated? If so, how close to optimal can they come in doing this, and how might their performance be achieved mechanistically? We report an experiment in which the payoff for each alternative is indicated before stimulus onset. Processing time is controlled by a “go” cue occurring at different times post stimulus onset, requiring a response within msec. Reward bias does start high when processing time is short and decreases as sensitivity increases, leveling off at a non-zero value. However, the degree of bias is sub-optimal for shorter processing times. We present a mechanistic account of participants' performance within the framework of the leaky competing accumulator model [1], in which accumulators for each alternative accumulate noisy information subject to leakage and mutual inhibition. The leveling off of accuracy is attributed to mutual inhibition between the accumulators, allowing the accumulator that gathers the most evidence early in a trial to suppress the alternative. Three ways reward might affect decision making in this framework are considered. One of the three, in which reward affects the starting point of the evidence accumulation process, is consistent with the qualitative pattern of the observed reward bias effect, while the other two are not. Incorporating this assumption into the leaky competing accumulator model, we are able to provide close quantitative fits to individual participant data

Spike Timing and Reliability in Cortical Pyramidal Neurons: Effects of EPSC Kinetics, Input Synchronization and Background Noise on Spike Timing

In vivo studies have shown that neurons in the neocortex can generate action potentials at high temporal precision. The mechanisms controlling timing and reliability of action potential generation in neocortical neurons, however, are still poorly understood. Here we investigated the temporal precision and reliability of spike firing in cortical layer V pyramidal cells at near-threshold membrane potentials. Timing and reliability of spike responses were a function of EPSC kinetics, temporal jitter of population excitatory inputs, and of background synaptic noise. We used somatic current injection to mimic population synaptic input events and measured spike probability and spike time precision (STP), the latter defined as the time window (Δt) holding 80% of response spikes. EPSC rise and decay times were varied over the known physiological spectrum. At spike threshold level, EPSC decay time had a stronger influence on STP than rise time. Generally, STP was highest (≤2.45 ms) in response to synchronous compounds of EPSCs with fast rise and decay kinetics. Compounds with slow EPSC kinetics (decay time constants>6 ms) triggered spikes at lower temporal precision (≥6.58 ms). We found an overall linear relationship between STP and spike delay. The difference in STP between fast and slow compound EPSCs could be reduced by incrementing the amplitude of slow compound EPSCs. The introduction of a temporal jitter to compound EPSCs had a comparatively small effect on STP, with a tenfold increase in jitter resulting in only a five fold decrease in STP. In the presence of simulated synaptic background activity, precisely timed spikes could still be induced by fast EPSCs, but not by slow EPSCs

A Markovian event-based framework for stochastic spiking neural networks

In spiking neural networks, the information is conveyed by the spike times, that depend on the intrinsic dynamics of each neuron, the input they receive and on the connections between neurons. In this article we study the Markovian nature of the sequence of spike times in stochastic neural networks, and in particular the ability to deduce from a spike train the next spike time, and therefore produce a description of the network activity only based on the spike times regardless of the membrane potential process. To study this question in a rigorous manner, we introduce and study an event-based description of networks of noisy integrate-and-fire neurons, i.e. that is based on the computation of the spike times. We show that the firing times of the neurons in the networks constitute a Markov chain, whose transition probability is related to the probability distribution of the interspike interval of the neurons in the network. In the cases where the Markovian model can be developed, the transition probability is explicitly derived in such classical cases of neural networks as the linear integrate-and-fire neuron models with excitatory and inhibitory interactions, for different types of synapses, possibly featuring noisy synaptic integration, transmission delays and absolute and relative refractory period. This covers most of the cases that have been investigated in the event-based description of spiking deterministic neural networks