Treaties, Custom, Iteration, and Public Choice

The basic question asked in this paper can be simply stated. Assume that, in attempting to effect international legal cooperation, a national government consciously chooses between using treaties and using customary law as the form in which to embody its cooperative efforts. Which form of international law should we expect it to choose? I analyze this question using two approaches that may be termed rational choice methodologies since they assume that the relevant decisionmakers rationally pursue known goals. The first approach, which I call the iterative perspective, focuses on the efforts of a rational, public-minded government to minimize the transaction costs of international cooperation. The iterative perspective implies that nation-states will choose to effect international legal cooperation through treaties. The second approach, which I call the public choice approach, examines the choices of self-interested governmental subunits. The public choice perspective predicts that national leaders will choose customary international law to effect international legal cooperation. With these divergent theoretical predictions in mind, I move to reality and argue that treaties rather than customary laws have been the favored embodiment of international legal cooperation, at least since World War II. I conclude that the evidence is thus more consistent with the iterative perspective than with the public choice approach

The Customary International Law Game

Structural realists in political science and some rationalist legal scholars argue that customary international law cannot affect state behavior: that it is “epiphenomenal.” This article develops a game theoretic model of a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma in the customary international law context that shows that it is plausible that states would comply with customary international law under certain circumstances. Our model shows that these circumstances relate to: (i) the relative value of cooperation versus defection, (ii) the number of states effectively involved, (iii) the extent to which increasing the number of states involved increases the value of cooperation or the detriments of defection, including whether the particular issue has characteristics of a commons problem, a public good, or a network good, (iv) the information available to the states involved regarding compliance and defection, (v) the relative patience of states in valuing the benefits of long-term cooperation compared to short-term defection, (vi) the expected duration of interaction, (vii) the frequency of interaction, and (viii) whether there are also bilateral relationships or other multilateral relationships between the involved states. This model shows that customary international law is plausible in the sense that it may well affect state behavior where certain conditions are met. It shows what types of contexts, including malleable institutional features, may affect the ability of states to produce and comply with customary international law. This article identifies a number of empirical strategies that may be used to test the model

Treaties, Custom, Iteration, and Public Choice

The basic question asked in this paper can be simply stated. Assume that, in attempting to effect international legal cooperation, a national government consciously chooses between using treaties and using customary law as the form in which to embody its cooperative efforts. Which form of international law should we expect it to choose? I analyze this question using two approaches that may be termed rational choice methodologies since they assume that the relevant decisionmakers rationally pursue known goals. The first approach, which I call the iterative perspective, focuses on the efforts of a rational, public-minded government to minimize the transaction costs of international cooperation. The iterative perspective implies that nation-states will choose to effect international legal cooperation through treaties. The second approach, which I call the public choice approach, examines the choices of self-interested governmental subunits. The public choice perspective predicts that national leaders will choose customary international law to effect international legal cooperation. With these divergent theoretical predictions in mind, I move to reality and argue that treaties rather than customary laws have been the favored embodiment of international legal cooperation, at least since World War II. I conclude that the evidence is thus more consistent with the iterative perspective than with the public choice approach

NAPNEA: A Cost Effective Neonatal Apnea Detection System

Sleep apnea is a prevalent and life-threatening problem, especially in infants. Napnea is a cost-effective neonatal (sleep) apnea detection system that aims to provide affordable alternative methods for continuous respiration monitoring and apnea detection. For infants diagnosed with sleep apnea, the current monitoring systems rely on sticky electrodes wired to a cardio-respiratory monitor or expensive smart devices. Napnea is a compact and affordable solution for apnea monitoring utilizing a soft, smart e-textile chest belt, integrated with a smartphone app