Substitution among capital, labor, and raw materials in upholstered furniture manufacturing

The potential for substitution among capital, labor, and raw materials Is relatively low In the U.S. upholstered household furniture Industry. In general, therefore, the industry prospers In areas where all the Input factor costs are relatively low, and efforts to attract upholstered furniture producers to specific areas must consider all the Inputs to production. Based on these results, and considering nationwide trends In demand, foreign competition, and regional comparative advantage, the upholstered furniture industry should continue as an Important source of demand for forest products In the southern United States

Antitrust, Innovation, and Product Design in Platform Markets: \u3ci\u3eMicrosoft\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eIntel\u3c/i\u3e

The Antitrust Division’s Microsoft case and the Federal Trade Commission’s Intel case both rested on claims that antitrust intervention was necessary to preserve innovation in technological platforms at the heart of the personal computer. Yet, because those very platforms support markets that are among the most innovative in the American economy, injudicious intervention might well have jeopardized the very innovation that antitrust should promote. In this article, we review the role of platforms in technological innovation and consider how antitrust standards should apply to them. We then examine how Microsoft resolved antitrust issues affecting platform design at various stages of the litigation and show how that experience informed the allegations and the settlement in Intel. We are particularly concerned with the parallel claims in the two cases that Microsoft and Intel each used its control over the design of a dominant platform to hinder innovations that might have made a complementary product a better substitute for the platform. This exercise should help guide future applications of monopolization standards to high technology platforms

Antitrust, Innovation, and Product Design in Platform Markets: \u3ci\u3eMicrosoft\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eIntel\u3c/i\u3e

The Antitrust Division’s Microsoft case and the Federal Trade Commission’s Intel case both rested on claims that antitrust intervention was necessary to preserve innovation in technological platforms at the heart of the personal computer. Yet, because those very platforms support markets that are among the most innovative in the American economy, injudicious intervention might well have jeopardized the very innovation that antitrust should promote. In this article, we review the role of platforms in technological innovation and consider how antitrust standards should apply to them. We then examine how Microsoft resolved antitrust issues affecting platform design at various stages of the litigation and show how that experience informed the allegations and the settlement in Intel. We are particularly concerned with the parallel claims in the two cases that Microsoft and Intel each used its control over the design of a dominant platform to hinder innovations that might have made a complementary product a better substitute for the platform. This exercise should help guide future applications of monopolization standards to high technology platforms

Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the \u3ci\u3eMicrosoft\u3c/i\u3e Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement

An important provision in each of the final judgments in the government\u27s Microsoft antitrust case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers the communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate natively (that is, without adding software) with Microsoft server operating systems in corporate networks or over the Internet. The short-term goal of the provision is to allow developers, as licensees of the protocols, to write applications for non-Microsoft server operating systems that interoperate with Windows client computers in the same ways that applications written for Microsoft\u27s server operating systems interoperate with Windows clients. The long-term goal is to preserve, in the network context, the platform threat to the Windows monopoly that was the focus of the government\u27s theory of monopolization. The platform threat was the possibility that middleware, like Netscape\u27s browser or Sun\u27s Java technologies, might evolve into a platform for other applications and thus erode the applications barrier to entry that protects Windows. This was the threat that the courts held Microsoft illegally thwarted by its contracts and product design. The protocol licensing provision rests on the assumption that middleware running on servers might also pose a platform threat to the Windows monopoly of client operating systems. District Judge Kollar-Kotelly, in entering the final judgments, singled out this provision as the key to assuring that the other provisions do not become irrelevant as more applications move to servers in local networks or the Internet. The provision has, however, proven to be by far the most difficult to implement. We argue in this Article that the provision has not accomplished its purpose and that courts and policymakers can draw some hard lessons from the experience

Measuring Compliance with Compulsory Licensing Remedies in the American Microsoft Case

Section III.E of the final judgments in the American Microsoft case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers certain communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate with Microsoft\u27s server operating systems. This provision has been by far the most difficult and costly to implement, primarily because of questions about the quality of Microsoft\u27s documentation of the protocols. The plaintiffs\u27 technical experts, in testing the documentation, have found numerous issues, which they have asked Microsoft to resolve. Because of accumulation of unresolved issues, the parties agreed in 2006 to extend Section III.E for up to five more years. Microsoft\u27s continuing failure to resolve the plaintiffs\u27 issues, despite its commitment of enormous resources to the project, led the district judge in January 2008 to extend the other provisions in judgments for at least two years. Paradoxically, however, there is no evidence that software developers cannot use the protocols because of the issues generated in the plaintiffs\u27 testing program. In this article, we argue that the court abandon the unresolved issues as its standard of compliance and ask instead whether Microsoft has provided documentation and technical support that meet the standards of the market and needs of real-world developers

Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement

An important provision in each of the final judgments in the government\u27s Microsoft antitrust case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers the communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate natively (that is, without adding software) with Microsoft server operating systems in corporate networks or over the Internet. The short-term goal of the provision is to allow developers, as licensees of the protocols, to write applications for non-Microsoft server operating systems that interoperate with Windows client computers in the same ways that applications written for Microsoft\u27s server operating systems interoperate with Windows clients. The long-term goal is to preserve, in the network context, the platform threat to the Windows monopoly that was the focus of the government\u27s theory of monopolization. The platform threat was the possibility that middleware, like Netscape\u27s browser or Sun\u27s Java technologies, might evolve into a platform for other applications and thus erode the applications barrier to entry that protects Windows. This was the threat that the courts held Microsoft illegally thwarted by its contracts and product design. The protocol licensing provision rests on the assumption that middleware running on servers might also pose a platform threat to the Windows monopoly of client operating systems. District Judge Kollar-Kotelly, in entering the final judgments, singled out this provision as the key to assuring that the other provisions do not become irrelevant as more applications move to servers in local networks or the Internet. The provision has, however, proven to be by far the most difficult to implement. We argue in this Article that the provision has not accomplished its purpose and that courts and policymakers can draw some hard lessons from the experience.[...] We begin our analysis by briefly describing the liability holdings and the ensuing remedial proceedings in the Microsoft litigation. In the process, we provide an overview of the final judgments and the reasoning the courts offered for upholding them and rejecting any broader relief. We then narrow our focus to the communications protocol licensing provision, explaining its history, requirements, rationale, and mechanism of enforcement. We then analyze the administration of the program from its inception in 2003 to the most recent joint status report. In the final part, we argue that the program has failed because it violates basic principles of remedial design and implementation in monopolization cases

Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement

An important provision in each of the final judgments in the government\u27s Microsoft antitrust case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers the communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate natively (that is, without adding software) with Microsoft server operating systems in corporate networks or over the Internet. The short-term goal of the provision is to allow developers, as licensees of the protocols, to write applications for non-Microsoft server operating systems that interoperate with Windows client computers in the same ways that applications written for Microsoft\u27s server operating systems interoperate with Windows clients. The long-term goal is to preserve, in the network context, the platform threat to the Windows monopoly that was the focus of the government\u27s theory of monopolization. The platform threat was the possibility that middleware, like Netscape\u27s browser or Sun\u27s Java technologies, might evolve into a platform for other applications and thus erode the applications barrier to entry that protects Windows. This was the threat that the courts held Microsoft illegally thwarted by its contracts and product design. The protocol licensing provision rests on the assumption that middleware running on servers might also pose a platform threat to the Windows monopoly of client operating systems. District Judge Kollar-Kotelly, in entering the final judgments, singled out this provision as the key to assuring that the other provisions do not become irrelevant as more applications move to servers in local networks or the Internet. The provision has, however, proven to be by far the most difficult to implement. We argue in this Article that the provision has not accomplished its purpose and that courts and policymakers can draw some hard lessons from the experience.[...] We begin our analysis by briefly describing the liability holdings and the ensuing remedial proceedings in the Microsoft litigation. In the process, we provide an overview of the final judgments and the reasoning the courts offered for upholding them and rejecting any broader relief. We then narrow our focus to the communications protocol licensing provision, explaining its history, requirements, rationale, and mechanism of enforcement. We then analyze the administration of the program from its inception in 2003 to the most recent joint status report. In the final part, we argue that the program has failed because it violates basic principles of remedial design and implementation in monopolization cases

Incorporating Policymaker Costs and Political Competition into Rent-Seeking Games

We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers\u27 resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example, if the value of the rent is sufficiently high relative to policymakers\u27 costs, an increase in the intensity of political competition will increase lobbying expenditures; otherwise, expenditures fall as competitive intensity increases. In addition, the model establishes pure-strategy equilibria with underdissipation where only mixed-strategy equilibria exist in the standard model