Can Affirmative Action be Cost-Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions

Affirmative action, auctions, experiments

Learning in Tournaments with Inter-Generational Advice

We study learning in a simulated tournament using an inter-generational framework. Here a group of subjects are recruited into the lab and play the stage game for 10 rounds. After his participation is over, each player is replaced by another player, his laboratory descendant, who then plays the game for another 10 rounds as a member of a fresh group of subjects. A particular player in generation t+1 can (1) see the history of choices by his generation t predecessor and (2) receive advice from that predecessor via free-form messages that generation t players leave for their generation t+1 successors. We find that the presence of advice makes a difference in that the experimental groups who get advice perform better – their decisions are closer to the Nash equilibrium – compared to a control group of subjects that plays the game with no recourse to such advice.Advice

Real-Time Search in the Laboratory and the Market

While widely accepted models of labor market search imply a constant reservation wage policy, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that reservation wages decline over the duration of a search spell. This paper reports the results of the first real-time search laboratory experiment. The controlled environment that subjects face is stationary, and the payoff-maximizing reservation wage is constant. Nevertheless, subjects' reservation wags decline sharply over time. We investigate two hypotheses to explain this decline: 1) searchers respond to the stock of accruing search costs, and 2) searchers experience nonstationary subjective costs of time spent searching. Our data support the latter hypothesis, and we substantiate this conclusion both experimentally and econometrically.Job Search; Reservation Wage; Experiment

On blame-freeness and reciprocity: an experimental study

The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward nice or kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question as to how to define kindness. In this paper we offer a new definition of kindness that we call blame-freeness." Put most simply, blame-freeness states that in judging whether player i has been kind or unkind to player j in a socialsituation, player j would have to put himself in the strategic position of player i, while retaining his preferences, and ask if he would have acted in a manner that was worse than i did under identical circumstances. If j would have acted in a more unkind manner than i acted, then we say that j does not blame i for his behavior. If, however, j would have been nicer than i was, then we say that "j blames i" for his actions (i´s actions were blameworthy). We consider this notion a natural, intuitive and empirically relevant way to explain the motives of people engaged in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we then test this concept in a laboratory experiment involving tournaments and find significant support for the theory."Altruism, blame, reciprocity.

Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in Public Goods Experiments

Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and punish each other (i.e., in a complete network). The architecture of social networks becomes important when individuals can only monitor and punish the other individuals to whom they are connected by the network. We study several non-trivial network architectures that give rise to their own distinctive patterns of behavior. Nevertheless, a number of simple, yet fundamental, properties in graph theory allow us to interpret the variation in the patterns of behavior that arise in the laboratory and to explain the impact of network architecture on the efficiency and dynamics of the experimental outcomes.experiment, networks, public good, monitoring, punishment

Ignorance is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs

We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the players at the equilibria are unequal, they disagree as to which equilibrium is best. We demonstrate experimentally that in such coordination games, in order to mask the asymmetry of equilibrium payoffs, it may be advantageous for a utilitarian benevolent Announcer to communicate in an ambiguous or vague manner

Language and government coordination: An experimental study of communication in the announcement game

One of the key roles of government is to coordinate the activities of citizens. One reason why governments are efficient facilitators of coordinated action, in addition to their ability to force compliance or tax, is that they are typically endowed with more information than the individuals they govern. This advantage creates a dilemma for them, however, since it forces them to decide on how they should distribute the information in their possession to the population. This paper investigates this question. We investigate the “Announcement Game” defined by the government and those it governs and focus on communication strategy that government uses to communicate private information to the citizens. This communication strategy involves (1) partitioning the state space in an attempt to mask the true state of the world and (2) choosing what type of language to use in order to communicate elements of this partition. We present evidence that the language used to execute a communication strategy does affect the efficiency of the equilibrium convergence process and also demonstrate that subjects playing the role of the government exhibit a great deal of sophistication in the communication strategies they employ and the language they use to execute them

Advice and behavior in intergenerational: Ultimatum games: An experimental approach

In the real world, when people play games, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice has a dramatic impact on the behavior of subjects. It diminishes the variance of offers made over time, lowers their mean, and causes Receivers to reject low offers with higher probability. In addition, by reading the advice offered we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the offers of Senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by Receivers

An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Real Beliefs

Belief Learning; Game Theory; Experimental Economics