Non-risk price discrimination in insurance: market outcomes and public policy

This paper considers price discrimination in insurance, defined as systematic price variations based on individual customer data but unrelated to those customers’ expected losses or other marginal costs (sometimes characterised as “price optimisation”). An analysis is given of one type of price discrimination, “inertia pricing,” where renewal prices are higher than prices for risk-equivalent new customers. The analysis suggests that the practice intensifies competition, leading to lower aggregate industry profits; customers in aggregate pay lower prices, but not all customers are better off; and the high level of switching between insurers is inefficient for society as a whole. Other forms of price discrimination may be more likely to increase aggregate industry profits. Some public policy issues relating to price discrimination in insurance are outlined, and possible policy responses by regulators are considered. It is suggested that competition will tend to lead to increased price discrimination over time, and that this may undermine public acceptance of traditional justifications for risk-related pricing

Applying simulation optimization to dynamic financial analysis for the asset-liability management of a property-casualty insurer

The Dynamic Financial Analysis (DFA) system is a useful decision-support system for the insurer, but it lacks optimization capability. This article applies a simulation optimization technique to a DFA system and use the enhanced system to search an Asset-Liability Management (ALM) solution for a Property-Casualty (P&C) insurance company. The simulation optimization technique used herein is a Genetic Algorithm (GA), and the optimization problem is a constrained, multi-period asset allocation problem that takes account of insurance liability dynamics. We find that coupling a DFA system with simulation optimization results in significant improvements over the search method currently available to the DFA system. The results were robust across random number sets. Furthermore, the resulting asset allocations changes with the asset-liability setting in a way that is consistent with the differences in the settings. Applying simulation optimization to a DFA system is therefore promising.

The Final Solvency II Framework: Will It Be Effective?

With Solvency II ready for implementation as per 2016, it is a good time to analyse the effectiveness of the framework. We build on earlier analyses of the preliminary framework dating from 2009. In the meantime many improvements have been implemented. We use 12 criteria to assess the effectiveness of Solvency II, and conclude that overall, Solvency II is effective. Not surprisingly, Solvency II is a major step ahead compared with the current supervisory framework. However, violations to some criteria remain. While some violations are because of simplifications, others are because of a lack of focus on particular risks (government bonds, inflation risk, liquidity risk). To resolve some of these violations, we propose specific prescribed and targeted stress tests through the own risk and solvency assessment and a more detailed focus on the effectiveness of governance structures

Insuring large-scale floods in the Netherlands

Without its primary flood defenses, a large part of the Netherlands would be swallowed by rivers and the sea. Floods caused by the failure of primary flood defenses are high-impact, low-probability events that are notoriously difficult to insure. Private insurance was long considered unfeasible but the Dutch government is currently studying ways to introduce a public–private insurance program. This paper offers a discussion of variables that should be taken into account in the choice for an arrangement for the financing of large-scale floods in the Netherlands. Because flood risk is highly concentrated and potential losses could be severe, a strong government role seems inevitable. But this would not necessarily be inappropriate as this could reduce the risk of underinvestment in flood protection. The Geneva Papers (2008) 33, 250–268. doi:10.1057/gpp.2008.10