Central bank swap lines: evidence on the effects of the lender of last resort

Theory predicts that central-bank lending programs put ceilings on private domestic lending rates, reduce ex post financing risk, and encourage ex ante investment. This article shows that with global banks and integrated financial markets, but domestic central banks, then lending of last resort can be achieved using swap lines. Through them, a source central bank provides source-currency credit to recipient-country banks using the recipient central bank as the monitor and as the bearer of the credit risk. In theory, the swap lines should put a ceiling on deviations from covered interest parity, lower average ex post bank borrowing costs, and increase ex ante inflows from recipient-country banks into privately issued assets denominated in the source-country’s currency. Empirically, these three predictions are tested using variation in the terms of the swap line over time, variation in the central banks that have access to the swap line, variation in the days of the week in which the swap line is open, variation in the exposure of different securities to foreign investment, and variation in banks’ exposure to dollar funding risk. The evidence suggests that the international lender of last resort is very effective

Home values and firm behaviour

The homes of those in charge of firms are an important source of finance for ongoing businesses. We use firm level accounting data, transaction level house price data and loan level residential mortgage data from the UK to show that a £1 increase in the value of the residential real estate of a firm’s directors increases the firm’s investment and wage bill by £0.03 each. These effects run through smaller firms and are similar in booms and busts. In aggregate, the homes of firm directors are worth 80% of GDP. Using this, a back of the envelope calculation suggests that a 1% increase in real estate prices leads, through this channel, to up to a 0.28% rise in business investment and a 0.08% rise in total wages paid. We complement this with evidence on how a firm responds to changes in the value of its own corporate real estate; we find that, in aggregate, the residential real estate of directors is at least as important for activity. We use an estimated general equilibrium model to quantify the importance of both types of real estate for the propagation of shocks to the macroeconomy

The residential collateral channel

We present evidence on a new macroeconomic channel which we call the residential collateral channel. Through this channel, an increase in real estate prices expands firm activity by enabling company directors to utilise their residential property as a source of funds for their business. This channel is a key determinant of investment and job creation, with a £1 increase in the combined residential collateral of a firm’s directors estimated to increase the firm’s investment by £0.02 and total wage costs by £0.02. To show this, we use a unique combination of UK datasets including firm-level accounting data matched with transaction-level house price data and loan-level residential mortgage data. The aggregate value of residential collateral held by company directors (around 70% of GDP) suggests that this channel has important macroeconomic effects. We complement this with further evidence on the corporate collateral channel whereby an increase in real estate prices directly expands firm activity by enabling businesses to borrow more against their corporate real estate. An estimated general equilibrium model with collateral constrained firms is used to quantify the aggregate effects of both channels

Central bank swap lines

Swap lines between advanced-economy central banks are a new important part of the global financial architecture. This paper analyses their monetary policy effects from three perspectives. First, from the perspective of the central banks, it shows that the swap line mimics discount-window credit from the source central bank to the recipient-country banks using the recipient central bank as the bearer of the credit risk. Second, from the perspective of the transmission of monetary policy, it shows that the swap-line rate puts a ceiling on deviations from covered interest parity, and finds evidence for it in the data. Third, from the perspective of the macroeconomic effects of policy, it shows that the swap line ex ante encourages inflows from recipient-country banks into assets denominated in the source-country’s currency by reducing the ex post funding risk. We find support for these predictions using difference-in-difference empirical strategies that exploit the fact that only some currencies saw changes in the terms of their dollar swap line, only some bonds in banks’ investments are exposed to dollar funding risk, only some dollar bonds are significantly traded by foreign banks, and only some banks have a significant U.S. presence

Business creation during COVID-19

Using UK data, we present greater empirical detail on the puzzling firm dynamics that emerged during coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). We show that firm entry increased during the pandemic across several countries, and this contrasts with typical recessions where firm entry declines. Additionally, the rise in firm entry is driven by individual entrepreneurs creating companies for the first time, particularly in online retail. We find evidence that firm creation responded significantly to declines in retail footfall and that firms created during the pandemic are more likely to exit and less likely to post jobs. Overall, this implies that despite surging firm creation during the pandemic, the overall employment effect is limited. Finally, we find that the primary contributor to limited employment creation is the shift in ownership composition of new entrants during COVID

Employment and the collateral channel of monetary policy

This paper uses a detailed firm-level dataset to show that monetary policy propagates via asset prices through corporate debt collateralised on real estate. Our research design exploits the fact that many small and medium sized firms use the homes of the firm’s directors as a key source of collateral, and directors’ homes are typically not in the same region as their firm. This spatial separation of firms and firms’ collateral allows us to separate the propagation of monetary policy via fluctuations in collateral values from that via demand channels. We find that younger and more levered firms who have collateral values that are particularly sensitive to monetary policy show the largest employment response to monetary policy. The collateral channel explains a sizeable share of the aggregate employment response

Lending relationships and the collateral channel

This paper shows that lending relationships insulate corporate investment from shocks to collateral values. We construct a novel database covering the banking relationships of UK firms, as well as those of their board members and executives. We find that the sensitivity of corporate investment to shocks to real estate collateral value is halved when the length of the bank-firm relationship increases from the 25th to the 75th percentile. This effect is substantially reduced for firms whose executives have a personal mortgage relationship with their firm’s bank. Our findings provide support for theories where collateral and private information are substitutes in mitigating credit frictions over the cycle

Systemic sovereign risk: macroeconomic implications in the euro area

What are the macroeconomic implications of changes in sovereign risk premia? In this paper, I use a novel identification strategy coupled with a new dataset for the Euro Area to answer this question. I show that exogenous innovations in sovereign risk premia were an important driver of the economic dynamics of crisis-hit countries, explaining 30-50% of the forecast error of unemployment. I also shed light on the mechanisms through which this occurs. Fluctuations in sovereign risk premia explain 20-40% of the variance of private borrowing costs. Increases in sovereign risk result in substantial capital flight, external adjustment and import compression. In contrast, governments appear not to increase their primary balances in response to increases in sovereign risk. Identifying these causal effects involves isolating a source of fluctuations in sovereign borrowing costs exogenous to the economy in question. I address this problem by relying upon the transmission of country-specific events during the crisis in Europe to the sovereign risk premia in the remainder of the union. I construct a new dataset of critical events in foreign crisis-hit countries and I measure the impact of these events on yields in the economy of interest at an intraday frequency. An aggregation of foreign events serve as a proxy variable for structural innovations to the yield to identify shocks in a proxy SVAR. I extend this methodology into a Bayesian setting to allow for flexible panel assumptions. A counterfactual analysis is used to remove the impact of foreign events from the bond yields of crisis hit countries: I find that 40-60% of the trough-to-peak moves in bond yields in crisis-hit countries are explained by foreign events, thereby suggesting that the crisis was not purely a function of weak local economic conditions

The economics of liquidity lines between central banks

Liquidity lines between central banks are a key part of the international financial safety net. In this review article, we lay out some of the economic questions that they pose. For some of them, research has provided some answers. For others, there is still much to discover