The emerging protocol: A quantified evaluation of the regime

Ye

Report of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop Cantacuzino Institute: Bucharest 3-5 June 1999

Ye

The CWC Verification Regime: Implications for the Biotechnological and Pharmaceutical Industry

Ye

Article X: Specific Measures to Achieve Implementation

Ye

Language, Subjectivity and the Agon: A Comparative Study of Nietzsche and Lyotard

Political Philosophy and Ethic

The Necessity for Non-Challenge Visits

YesIn the discussions that have taken place over the past six years since the establishment by the Third Review Conference1 in 1991 of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts,known as VEREX, to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint, there has been an increasing debate about the role of non-challenge visits in a regime for a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The arguments as to why on-site investigations are an essential and central element to such a strengthened regime were addressed in the Briefing Paper issued2 in July 1997. In this Briefing Paper, the necessity for non-challenge visits is addressed drawing upon the previous VEREX, Ad Hoc Group (AHG), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) experience. The advantages and disadvantages of a regime containing non-challenge visits are considered and the conclusion is reached that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages and that non-challenge visits are an important element which could contribute significantly to the effectiveness of a future legally binding instrument to strengthen the BTWC

Relevant Scientific and Technological Developments for the First CWC Review Conference: The BTWC Review Conference Experience

Ye

An Optimum Organisation

YesThe Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) have touched from time to time on the question of the organisation needed to implement the legally binding instrument being negotiated to strengthen the BTWC. Now that the work of the AHG has intensified with the fleshing out of a rolling text for the legally binding instrument, the nature of the organisation is receiving more and more attention as its size and cost are likely to influence the nature and effectiveness of the regime developed by the AHG. This Briefing Paper considers what can be learned from existing relevant organisations, notably the World Health Organisation (WHO) and its counterparts for animal and plant diseases (OIE and FAO), the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The developments thus far in the AHG deliberations are then addressed and some estimates are made for the optimum size and cost of a BTWC rganisation. It is emphasised that these estimates are necessarily broad as the actual size of the BTWC Organization will depend on the precise functions and responsibilities that it is given

Report of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop Piestany, Slovakia: 18-20 May 2000

Ye

Two Decades of Strengthening CBW Prohibitions: Priorities for the BTWC in the 21st Century

Ye