The Advantage of Standing Up to Fight and the Evolution of Habitual Bipedalism in Hominins

BACKGROUND: Many quadrupedal species stand bipedally on their hindlimbs to fight. This posture may provide a performance advantage by allowing the forelimbs to strike an opponent with the range of motion that is intrinsic to high-speed running, jumping, rapid braking and turning; the range of motion over which peak force and power can be produced. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: To test the hypothesis that bipedal (i.e., orthograde) posture provides a performance advantage when striking with the forelimbs, I measured the force and energy produced when human subjects struck from "quadrupedal" (i.e., pronograde) and bipedal postures. Downward and upward directed striking energy was measured with a custom designed pendulum transducer. Side and forward strikes were measured with a punching bag instrumented with an accelerometer. When subjects struck downward from a bipedal posture the work was 43.70±12.59% (mean ± S.E.) greater than when they struck from a quadrupedal posture. Similarly, 47.49±17.95% more work was produced when subjects struck upward from a bipedal stance compared to a quadrupedal stance. Importantly, subjects did 229.69±44.19% more work in downward than upward directed strikes. During side and forward strikes the force impulses were 30.12±3.68 and 43.04±9.00% greater from a bipedal posture than a quadrupedal posture, respectively. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: These results indicate that bipedal posture does provide a performance advantage for striking with the forelimbs. The mating systems of great apes are characterized by intense male-male competition in which conflict is resolved through force or the threat of force. Great apes often fight from bipedal posture, striking with both the fore- and hindlimbs. These observations, plus the findings of this study, suggest that sexual selection contributed to the evolution of habitual bipedalism in hominins

Divergent receiver responses to components of multimodal signals in two foot-flagging frog species.

Multimodal communication of acoustic and visual signals serves a vital role in the mating system of anuran amphibians. To understand signal evolution and function in multimodal signal design it is critical to test receiver responses to unimodal signal components versus multimodal composite signals. We investigated two anuran species displaying a conspicuous foot-flagging behavior in addition to or in combination with advertisement calls while announcing their signaling sites to conspecifics. To investigate the conspicuousness of the foot-flagging signals, we measured and compared spectral reflectance of foot webbings of Micrixalus saxicola and Staurois parvus using a spectrophotometer. We performed behavioral field experiments using a model frog including an extendable leg combined with acoustic playbacks to test receiver responses to acoustic, visual and combined audio-visual stimuli. Our results indicated that the foot webbings of S. parvus achieved a 13 times higher contrast against their visual background than feet of M. saxicola. The main response to all experimental stimuli in S. parvus was foot flagging, whereas M. saxicola responded primarily with calls but never foot flagged. Together these across-species differences suggest that in S. parvus foot-flagging behavior is applied as a salient and frequently used communicative signal during agonistic behavior, whereas we propose it constitutes an evolutionary nascent state in ritualization of the current fighting behavior in M. saxicola

Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language

The “costly signaling” hypothesis proposes that animal signals are kept honest by appropriate signal costs. We show that to the contrary, signal cost is unnecessary for honest signaling even when interests conflict. We illustrate this principle by constructing examples of cost-free signaling equilibria for the two paradigmatic signaling games of Grafen (1990) and Godfray (1991). Our findings may explain why some animal signals use cost to ensure honesty whereas others do not and suggest that empirical tests of the signaling hypothesis should focus not on equilibrium cost but, rather, on the cost of deviation from equilibrium. We use these results to apply costly signaling theory to the low-cost signals that make up human language. Recent game theoretic models have shown that several key features of language could plausibly arise and be maintained by natural selection when individuals have coincident interests. In real societies, however, individuals do not have fully coincident interests. We show that coincident interests are not a prerequisite for linguistic communication, and find that many of the results derived previously can be expected also under more realistic models of society