Mary's Powers of Imagination

One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis. Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature. Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red. For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experience is like simply consists in the possession of these abilities. Criticisms of the ability hypothesis tend to focus on this last claim. Such critics tend to accept that Mary gains these abilities when she leaves the room, but they deny that such abilities constitute knowledge of what an experience is like. To my mind, however, this critical strategy grants too much. Focusing specifically on imaginative ability, I argue that Mary does not gain this ability when she leaves the room for she already had the ability to imagine red while she was inside it. Moreover, despite what some have thought, the ability hypothesis cannot be easily rescued by recasting it in terms of a more restrictive imaginative ability. My purpose here is not to take sides in the debate about physicalism, i.e., my criticism of the ability hypothesis is not offered in an attempt to defend the anti-physicalist conclusion of the knowledge argument. Rather, my purpose is to redeem the imagination from the misleading picture of it that discussion of the knowledge argument has fostered

Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism

Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind that is inconsistent with physicalism. In this paper I will explore two attempts to block the inference from an epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap – the first from the phenomenal concept strategy, the second from Russellian monism – and suggest how the proponent of the knowledge argument might respond to each of these challenges. In doing so, I will draw on recent discussions of grounding and essence in the metaphysics literature

The Real Combination Problem : Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence

Panpsychism harbors an unresolved tension, the seriousness of which has yet to be fully appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer panpsychists advice on how to resolve it. The dilemma, briefly, is as follows. Panpsychists are committed to the perspicuous explanation of macro-mentality in terms of micro-mentality. But panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature not just mental properties, but also micro-subjects to whom these properties belong. Yet it is impossible to explain the constitution of a macro-subject (like one of us) in terms of the assembly of micro-subjects, for, I show, subjects cannot combine. Therefore the panpsychist explanatory project is derailed by the insistence that the world’s ultimate material constituents (ultimates) are subjects of experience. The panpsychist faces a choice of abandoning her explanatory project, or recanting the claim that the ultimates are subjects. This is the dilemma. I argue that the latter option is to be preferred. This needn’t constitute a wholesale abandonment of panpsychism, however, since panpsychists can maintain that the ultimates possess phenomenal qualities, despite not being subjects of those qualities. This proposal requires us to make sense of phenomenal qualities existing independently of experiencing subjects, a challenge I tackle in the penultimate section. The position eventually reached is a form of neutral monism, so another way to express the overall argument is to say that, keeping true to their philosophical motivations, panpsychists should really be neutral monists.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Preparation and characterization of avenin-enriched oat protein by chill precipitation for feeding trials in celiac disease

The safety of oats for people with celiac disease remains unresolved. While oats have attractive nutritional properties that can improve the quality and palatability of the restrictive, low fiber gluten-free diet, rigorous feeding studies to address their safety in celiac disease are needed. Assessing the oat prolamin proteins (avenins) in isolation and controlling for gluten contamination and other oat components such as fiber that can cause non-specific effects and symptoms is crucial. Further, the avenin should contain all reported immunogenic T cell epitopes, and be deliverable at a dose that enables biological responses to be correlated with clinical effects. To date, isolation of a purified food-grade avenin in sufficient quantities for feeding studies has not been feasible. Here, we report a new gluten isolation technique that enabled 2 kg of avenin to be extracted from 400 kg of wheat-free oats under rigorous gluten-free and food grade conditions. The extract consisted of 85% protein of which 96% of the protein was avenin. The concentration of starch (1.8% dry weight), β-glucan (0.2% dry weight), and free sugars (1.8% dry weight) were all low in the final avenin preparation. Other sugars including oligosaccharides, small fructans, and other complex sugars were also low at 2.8% dry weight. Liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) analysis of the proteins in these preparations showed they consisted only of oat proteins and were uncontaminated by gluten containing cereals including wheat, barley or rye. Proteomic analysis of the avenin enriched samples detected more avenin subtypes and fewer other proteins compared to samples obtained using other extraction procedures. The identified proteins represented five main groups, four containing known immune-stimulatory avenin peptides. All five groups were identified in the 50% (v/v) ethanol extract however the group harboring the epitope DQ2.5-ave-1b was less represented. The avenin-enriched protein fractions were quantitatively collected by reversed phase HPLC and analyzed by MALDI-TOF mass spectrometry. Three reverse phase HPLC peaks, representing ~40% of the protein content, were enriched in proteins containing DQ2.5-ave-1a epitope. The resultant high quality avenin will facilitate controlled and definitive feeding studies to establish the safety of oat consumption by people with celiac disease

Do we (seem to) perceive passage?

I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived of as a feature of mind-independent reality. I suggest that in fact there is no such phenomenology of passage in the first place. There is, however, a specific structural aspect of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of movement and change that can explain how one might mistakenly come to the belief that such experiences do involve a phenomenology of passage

Derivation of the human embryonic stem cell line RCe006-A (RC-2)

AbstractThe human embryonic stem cell line RCe006-A (RC-2) was derived from a frozen and thawed blastocyst voluntarily donated as surplus to fertility requirements following ethics committee approved informed consent under licence from the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. The cell line exhibits expression of expected pluripotency markers and in vitro differentiation potential to three germinal lineage representative cell populations. It has a male trisomy 12 karyotype (47XY, +12). Microsatellite DNA marker identity and HLA and blood group typing data are available

Derivation of the human embryonic stem cell line RCe007-A (RC-3)

The human embryonic stem cell line RCe007-A (RC-3) was derived from a blastocyst voluntarily donated as unsuitable and surplus to fertility requirements following ethics committee approved informed consent under licence from the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. The cell line shows normal pluripotency marker expression and differentiation to the three germ layers in vitro. It has a normal 46XX female karyotype and HLA and blood group typing data is available

Derivation of the human embryonic stem cell line RCe009-A (RC-5)

The human embryonic stem cell line RCe009-A (RC-5) was derived from a frozen and thawed Day 2 embryo voluntarily donated as unsuitable and surplus to requirement for fertility treatment following informed consent under licence from the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. RCe009-A carries the common DF508 mutation on the cystic fibrosis trans-membrane regulator gene associated with the disease cystic fibrosis. The cell line shows normal pluripotency marker expression and differentiation to the three germ layers in vitro. It has a normal 46XX female karyotype and microsatellite PCR identity, HLA and blood group typing data are available