In vitro production of bovine embryos derived from individual donors in the Corral® dish

Background: Since the identity of the embryo is of outmost importance during commercial in vitro embryo production, bovine oocytes and embryos have to be cultured strictly per donor. Due to the rather low yield of oocytes collected after ovum pick-up (OPU) per individual cow, oocyte maturation and embryo culture take place in small groups, which is often associated with inferior embryo development. The objective of this study was to improve embryonic development in small donor groups by using the Corral (R) dish. This commercial dish is designed for human embryo production. It contains two central wells that are divided into quadrants by a semi-permeable wall. In human embryo culture, one embryo is placed per quadrant, allowing individual follow-up while embryos are exposed to a common medium. In our study, small groups of oocytes and subsequently embryos of different bovine donors were placed in the Corral (R) dish, each donor group in a separate quadrant. Results: In two experiments, the Corral (R) dish was evaluated during in vitro maturation (IVM) and/or in vitro culture (IVC) by grouping oocytes and embryos of individual bovine donors per quadrant. At day 7, a significantly higher blastocyst rate was noted in the Corral (R) dish used during IVM and IVC than when only used during IVM (12.9% +/- 2.10 versus 22.8% +/- 2.67) (P < 0.05). However, no significant differences in blastocyst yield were observed anymore between treatment groups at day 8 post insemination. Conclusions: In the present study, the Corral (R) dish was used for in vitro embryo production (IVP) in cattle; allowing to allocate oocytes and/or embryos per donor. As fresh embryo transfers on day 7 have higher pregnancy outcomes, the Corral (R) dish offers an added value for commercial OPU/IVP, since a higher blastocyst development at day 7 is obtained when the Corral (R) dish is used during IVM and IVC

Reciprocity as a foundation of financial economics

This paper argues that the subsistence of the fundamental theorem of contemporary financial mathematics is the ethical concept ‘reciprocity’. The argument is based on identifying an equivalence between the contemporary, and ostensibly ‘value neutral’, Fundamental Theory of Asset Pricing with theories of mathematical probability that emerged in the seventeenth century in the context of the ethical assessment of commercial contracts in a framework of Aristotelian ethics. This observation, the main claim of the paper, is justified on the basis of results from the Ultimatum Game and is analysed within a framework of Pragmatic philosophy. The analysis leads to the explanatory hypothesis that markets are centres of communicative action with reciprocity as a rule of discourse. The purpose of the paper is to reorientate financial economics to emphasise the objectives of cooperation and social cohesion and to this end, we offer specific policy advice

Visceral Artery Aneurysms in Liver Transplant Candidates and in Patients after Liver Transplantation

There are only few reviews concerning visceral aneurysms in cirrhotics, and a small number of papers on visceral aneurysms in liver transplant patients. The present paper investigates this condition in both groups of patients in a 10-year-retrospective study

On the nature of banks

Two views exist regarding the nature of the banking business. The dominant view defines banks as financial intermediaries – institutions in the business of transferring money from savers to borrowers. An alternative view advances that banks finance borrowers via money creation. I explain the differences between these two views and argue for the superiority of the latter one as a description of modern banking. I discuss the implications for economic analysis and explain how the connection between bank lending and money creation helps us understand the effects of banking on economic activity

The economics of debt clearing mechanisms

We examine the evolution of decentralized clearinghouse mechanisms from the 13th to the 18th century; in particular, we explore the clearing of non- or limitedtradable debts like bills of exchange. We construct a theoretical model of these clearinghouse mechanisms, similar to the models in the theoretical matching literature, and show that specific decentralized multilateral clearing algorithms known as rescontre, skontrieren or virement des parties used by merchants were efficient in specific historical contexts. We can explain both the evolutionary self-organizing emergence of late medieval and early modern fairs, and its robustness during the 17th and 18th century