The Effect of Antitrust Policy on Consumer Welfare: What Crandall and Winston Overlook

For related information, please see: Brief How to Block Cartel Formation and Price-Fixing Robert W. Crandall and Clifford Winston Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare - Assessing the Evidence Jonathan B. Baker The Case for Antitrust Enforcement

The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection for Autos and Steel

macroeconomics, trade protection, steel, autos

Federal Government Initiatives to Reduce the Price Level

macroeconomics, income policy, U.S. government, price level, federal government

Pricing Issues in Telecommunications

Over the last quarter century, significant changes have occurred in telecommunications. The breakup of AT&T and a myriad of technological innovations have sounded the death knell for the theory of telecommunications as a natural monopoly, according to Robert W. Crandall of the Brookings Institute. In the following article, Dr. Crandall assesses a variety of pricing issues that must be addressed by regulators, telecommunications firms and consumers in an increasingly competitive telecommunications market

Comentario a Sidney Weintraub

Sidney Weintraub nos presenta una reseña útil y completa de la floreciente bibliografía sobre los efectos potenciales del TLC en sectores e industrias individuales. Comparto la intranquilidad de Weintraub en cuanto al uso de estos estudios diversos para pronosticar los efectos precisos de la liberalización, pero convengo también en que los modelos cuantitativos, por imperfectos que sean, suelen ser mejores que las conjeturas informadas. Es interesante advertir que gran parte del análisis se ha concentrado en Estados Unidos en industrias donde podría haber considerables desplazamientos del empleo en contra de Estados Unidos y a favor de México. Al mismo tiempo, es lamentable que se haya prestado escasa atención a las industrias en las que Estados Unidos podría ganar empleos, como la de maquinaria, la electrónica y el tabaco.

Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age: Executive Summary

James Waldo Helen Nissenbaum Sun Microsystems, New York University Vice Chair Robert M. O'Neil Julie E. Cohen University of Virginia Georgetown University Janey Place Robert W. Crandall Digital Thinking Brookings Institution (resigned April 2006) Ronald L. Rivest Oscar Gandy, Jr. Massachusetts Institute of Technology University of Pennsylvania Teresa Schwartz James Horning George Washington University Network Associates Laboratories Lloyd N. Cutler Gary King Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr LLP, Harvard University served as co-chair until his passing in May 2005. Lin E. Knapp, Independent Consultant Ponte Vedra Beach, Florid

Charles Ferguson and the "Broadband Problem"

Charles Ferguson has published a book that advocates a major increase in government intervention in the U.S. market for high-speed, "broadband" Internet services. His proposals are based on a faulty understanding of the effects of current telecommunications regulation and unsubstantiated claims that current participants in the broadband marketplace are exercising monopoly power. His policy recommendations would not only fail to accelerate the pace of broadband diffusion in the United States, but they would surely provide a disincentive for carriers to invest in the network upgrades required to extend broadband and to provide even higher-speed Internet access for U.S. consumers.Technology and Industry, Regulatory Reform

Regulating Emissions of Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act

The authors consider whether the Environmental Protection Agency's denial of the petition to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act was reasonable in light of the global nature of greenhouse gas emissions and the likely superiority of other methods for combating greenhouse gases.Environment, Health and Safety, Regulatory Reform, Other Topics

Telecommunications Policy Reform in the United States and Canada

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 marked a fundamental departure in U.S. regulation. Monopoly market structures were officially deemed inefficient, and extensive rules were authorized to jump-start competition. Canada opened long-distance markets to entrants in 1992, and did likewise with local telephone access five years later, but employed distinct tools from those utilized by U.S. regulators. In this paper we compare and contrast the two alternative approaches to deregulation. The conventional wisdom is that telephone competition in the U.S. has lagged under the Telecommunications Act. Rates are alleged to have risen for most customers, just the reverse of what was promised by policy makers. We examine broad trends within the sector, and conclude that the Act, while flawed, actually scores well in comparison to previous reform measures. We prefer the approach taken in Canada, however, which is less regulation-intensive in the transition to competition.