Overriding Virtue

If you focus your charitable giving on global causes where it will do the most good, how should you feel about passing by the local soup kitchen? Would the ideally virtuous agent have their (local) empathy still activated, but simply overridden by the recognition that distant others are in even greater need, leaving the agent feeling torn? Or would their empathetic impulses be wholeheartedly redirected towards the greatest needs? This chapter suggests a way to revise an outdated conception of moral virtue to better meet the demands of a cosmopolitan moral outlook

Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good

Consequentialist views have traditionally taken a maximizing form, requiring agents to bring about the very best outcome that they can. But this maximizing function may be questioned. Satisficing views instead allow agents to bring about any outcome that exceeds a satisfactory threshold or qualifies as “good enough.” Scalar consequentialism, by contrast, eschews moral requirements altogether, instead evaluating acts in purely comparative terms, i.e., as better or worse than their alternatives. After surveying the main considerations for and against each of these three views, I argue that the core insights of each are not (despite appearances) in conflict. Consequentialists should be deontic pluralists and accept a maximizing account of the ought of most reason, a satisficing account of obligation, and a scalar account of the weight of reasons

Virtue and Salience

Abstract: This paper explores two ways in which evaluations of an agent's character as virtuous or vicious are properly influenced by what the agent finds salient or attention-grabbing. First, we argue that ignoring salient needs reveals a greater deficit of benevolent motivation in the agent, and hence renders the agent more blameworthy. We use this fact to help explain our ordinary intuition that failing to give to famine relief (for example) is in some sense less bad than failing to help a child who is drowning right before your eyes, in a way that's compatible with the contention that there's no principled reason to see the one life-saving act as any more or less choiceworthy than the other. Second, we argue that alleged ‘virtues of ignorance’ (modesty, believing better of friends than the evidence supports, etc.) are better understood as ‘virtues of salience’. Rather than placing demands on what we believe, these virtues place demands on what we find salient

Optimal object grasp using Tactile sensors and fuzzy logic

Robotica, Volume 17, Issue 06, Nov 1999, pp 685-693 doi

Against "Saving Lives" : Equal Concern and Differential Impact

Bioethicists often present "saving lives" as a goal distinct from, and competing with, that of extending lives by as much as possible. I argue that this usage of the term is misleading, and provides unwarranted rhetorical support for neglecting the magnitudes of the harms and benefits at stake in medical allocation decisions, often to the detriment of the young. Equal concern for all persons requires weighting equal interests equally, but not all individuals have an equal interest in "life-saving" treatmen

Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?

Are non-natural properties worth caring about? I consider two objections to metaethical non-naturalism. According to the intelligibility objection, it would be positively unintelligible to care about non-natural properties that float free from the causal fabric of the cosmos. According to the ethical idlers objection, there is no compelling motivation to posit non-natural normative properties because the natural properties suffice to provide us with reasons. In both cases, I argue, the objection stems from misunderstanding the role that non-natural properties play in the non-naturalist's understanding of normativity. The role of non-natural properties is not to be responded to, but to "mark" which natural properties it is correct for us to respond to in certain ways

Review : Zinc’s functional significance in the vertebrate retina

© The Author(s), 2014. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The definitive version was published in Molecular Vision 20 (2014): 1067-1074.This review covers a broad range of topics related to the actions of zinc on the cells of the vertebrate retina. Much of this review relies on studies in which zinc was applied exogenously, and therefore the results, albeit highly suggestive, lack physiologic significance. This view stems from the fact that the concentrations of zinc used in these studies may not be encountered under the normal circumstances of life. This caveat is due to the lack of a zinc-specific probe with which to measure the concentrations of Zn2+ that may be released from neurons or act upon them. However, a great deal of relevant information has been garnered from studies in which Zn2+ was chelated, and the effects of its removal compared with findings obtained in its presence. For a more complete discussion of the consequences of depletion or excess in the body’s trace elements, the reader is referred to a recent review by Ugarte et al. in which they provide a detailed account of the interactions, toxicity, and metabolic activity of the essential trace elements iron, zinc, and copper in retinal physiology and disease. In addition, Smart et al. have published a splendid review on the modulation by zinc of inhibitory and excitatory amino acid receptor ion channels.NSF Grant 1214162 and NIMHD/NIH Grant MD007599 (RLC