Taxation and Decentralization

Strengthening subnational governments is high on the policy agenda of many developing countries. From an economics perspective, the most important potential benefit from decentralization is the increased efficiency (and consequent welfare gain) that comes from moving governance closer to the people. To achieve this benefit, however, close attention must be paid to the design and implementation of subnational tax systems.taxation, development, developing countries, tax policy, policy recommendations, budget, government spending, decentralization

Taxation and Development

For more than half a century, scholars and international agencies have been making recommendations about taxation in developing countries. The advice economists have offered to developing countries has changed over time, particularly regarding income and consumption taxes. Why? What do we know now about taxes and developing countries that we did not know 50 years ago? What do we still not know that we really should know? What should scholars and international agencies do if they wish to make tax policy recommendations that are economically sensible and likely to prove feasible, acceptable, and helpful in practice? This brief note offers some tentative answers to these complex questions.taxation, development, developing countries, tax policy, policy recommendations, budget, government spending, income, GDP

Decentralizing infrastructure : for good or ill?

The author examines the many faces of infrastructure decentralization: the costs and benefits, the government structure (constraint or variable?), the"polycentric"approach, and how to make decentralization work (for whom?). He proposes basic principles and guidelines for policy design, for both small projects and large. Broadly, these guidelines are summed up in a few propositions. In all countries, some critical infrastructure is provided through a decentralized political structure. Current trends make that likely to be more true in the future. Decentralization, however defined, in and of itself had no necessary implications for good or evil so far as infrastructure is concerned: its effects depend on the incentives various decisionmakers face. The key to ensuring that these incentives are conducive to"good"decisions (about design, siting, timing, finance, pricing, operation, maintenance, and use of infrastructure) is to ensure that those who made the decisions bear the financial (and political) consequences, as much as possible. Politically, this means that political leaders at all levels should be responsive and responsible to their constituents, and that those constituents are fully informed about the consequences of all decisions. Making politicians bear the consequences of their own mistakes is as close as one can get to a"hard"political budget constraint. Economically, it must be difficult for local residents to shift cost to nonresidents who do not receive benefits and to make local decisionmakers fully responsible to their citizens for the use they make of revenues collected from them (through local taxes), to users of infrastructure (local or otherwise) for the use made of the revenues they contribute (through user charges of various sorts), and to taxpayers in general for the use made of any transfers (or subsidized loans) they receive. Administratively, what such a system requires is a clear set of"framework"laws (on local budgeting, financial reporting, taxation, contracting, dispute settlement, rules to be followed in designing user charges and so on), as well as adequate institutional support for localities to operate in this environment. To the extent that these conditions are not met, the perverse incentives that too often exist because of the structure and finance of the public sector in many countries will probably be exacerbated by the current tendency to decentralize more and more decisions in the public sector.National Governance,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Economic Theory&Research

Subnational taxation in developing countries : a review of the literature

This paper reviews the literature on tax assignment in decentralized countries. Ideally, own-source revenues should be sufficient to enable at least the richest subnational governments to finance from their own resources all locally-provided services that primarily benefit local residents. Subnational taxes should also not unduly distort the allocation of resources. Most importantly, to the extent possible subnational governments should be accountable at the margin for financing the expenditures for which they are responsible. Although reality in most countries inevitably falls far short of these ideals, nonetheless there are several taxes that subnational governments in developing countries could use to help ensure that decentralization yields more of the benefits it appears to promise in theory. At the local level, such taxes include property taxes and, especially for larger cities, perhaps also a limited and well-designed local business tax. At the regional level, in addition to taxes on vehicles, governments in some countries may be able to utilize any or all of the following -- a payroll tax; a simple surcharge on the central personal income tax; and a sales tax, in some cases perhaps taking the form of a well-designed regional value-added tax. The"best"package for any particular country or subnational government is likely to be not only context-specific and path-dependent, but also highly sensitive to the balance struck between different political and economic factors and interests.Subnational Economic Development,Public Sector Economics,Taxation&Subsidies,Debt Markets,Public&Municipal Finance

Financing local government in Hungary

Hungary has undertaken a bold and far-ranging reform of its system of subnational finances. This paper outlines the changes introduced in the system of local finance as a result of the 1990 Local Self-Government Act, and the 1990 Act on Local Taxes and provides a preliminary assessment of their implications as well as the need for further reform. These Acts, together with the annual Act on the Budget, define the overall scope and authorities of Hungary's approximately 3100 new local self-governments. These Acts: (i) define the new assignment of expenditures between central and local government; (ii) define the new local revenue sources; and (iii) establish the economic foundation, property rights and entrepreneurial functions of the localities. The paper outlines the historical evolution of the system, provides international comparisons, and describes its present-day form. Drawing on this background, it suggests some revised policies that should not only both help avert the potentially undesirable outcomes of the current system but, more positively, help Hungary to achieve its goal of a smaller, more efficient government sector without unduly exacerbating social inequalities. In turn, issues and recommendations are discussed in the following areas: local finance; assignment of expenditures; assignment of taxes; design of the transfer system; role of the localities in property management; capital investment; and other requisites for sound local finance.Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,National Governance,Urban Economics,Public Sector Economics&Finance

Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental relations in transition economics : toward a systematic framework of analysis

The decentralization of government in Eastern Europe represents a reaction both from below (to tight central political control) and from above (to privatize the economy and relieve the central government's fiscal stress). In all transitional economies, the developing structure of intergovernmental relations is intimately related to such critical policy issues as privatization, stabilization, and the social safety net. In the fiscal sphere, tax reform, deficit control, and intergovernmental finance are a tripod. Unless each leg is set up properly, the whole structure could collapse. The present strategy of devolving expenditures downward while holding back on revenue flows and transfers to balance the central budget is unlikely to succeed for more than a year or two at best. Net spending reductions at the subnational level may be difficult to achieve. From 10 to 40 percent of outlays go to the subnational sector, and in many countries local governments provide much of the social safety that makes the pain of the economic transition politically tolerable. And, most housing and many enterprises have been shifted to local ownership, with the maintenance and subsidy cost this implies. Since the revenue sources assigned to local governments cannot finance expected levels of local activity, the result of shifting spending downward is likely to be strong demands for increased, rather than decreased, transfers. Alternatively, subnational government may look to coping mechanisms such as holding on to their enterprises (which provide vital social services), developing extrabudgetary revenues, or borrowing. These coping mechanisms threaten privatization, reduce budgetary transparency, and impede stabilization policies. The authors describe the risks to privatization, to macroeconomic stability, and to an adequate social safety net that present policies toward local government may imply. Its themes are that the subnational sector needs to be more realistically factored into national plans - and that subnational expenditures be more clearly assigned and revenue needs more realistically assessed. Such assessments are likely to acknowledge a larger sphere for subnational governments and the need for access to more robust revenue sources. Giving local government a share in the personal income tax is one possible and perhaps desirable approach to meeting these revenues needs. Careful attention needs to be paid to the design and implementation of the intergovernmental fiscal transfers likely to remain prominent features of the intergovernmental landscape for years to come. Caution is also needed on borrowing by subnational government. Consolidating and integrating extrabudgetary funds at the subnational (and national) levels is crucial to enhanced budgetary transparency and macrostability.Banks&Banking Reform,National Governance,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Municipal Financial Management,Urban Economics

Land and Property Taxation in 25 Countries: A Comparative Review

Steuer, Eigentum, Boden, Grundsteuer, Vergleich, Welt, Tax, Property, Land, Real property tax, Comparison, World

Urban Governance and Finance in India

Over 330 million people live in Indias cities; 35 cities have a population of over a million and three (Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata) of the 10 largest metropolises in the world are in India. Indias cities are large, economically important, and growing. However, neither urban infrastructure nor the level of urban public services is adequate for current needs, let alone to meet growing demands. Dealing with this problem is a formidable challenge. Not only must adequate finance for the provision of services be found but it is critical to ensure that the money spent results in desired outputs and outcomes. To do so, local governance structures also need to be reformed and strengthened. This paper attempts to point the way towards some possible solutions by analysing urban governance and finance in India in the context of lessons drawn from fiscal federalism theory and experiences of governance institutions and financing systems both in India and around the world. No one system of urban governance is likely to work equally well for all urban local bodies. However, the paper identifies some key reforms required to realise both the constitutional intent to encourage citizen participation in urban governance and the economic and politically desirable goal of ensuring greater accountability of urban governments. For example, the paper draws attention to existing ambiguities in the assignment system and underlines the need to undertake activity mapping to ensure clarity as well as to make independent agencies significantly accountable to elected governments in urban areas. The paper also discusses a variety of ways of augmenting the resources of the municipal bodies in the country including essential reforms in the property tax system and adequate exploitation of user charges and fees for various services delivered as well as ways of strengthening and improving Central and State transfers to urban local governments. With respect to financing urban infrastructure, development charges should be used more effectively. More should also be done to utilise public lands more effectively. In addition, to a considerable extent capital expenditure requirements will have to be financed through borrowing so further development of the municipal bond market is important, as is more and more effective use of public private partnerships in some areas.India, urban public finance, urban governance, intergovernmental fiscal relations, property tax, Metropolitan areas, infrastructure finance

Economic Evaluation of Positron Emission Tomography (PET) in Non Small Cell Lung Cancer (NSCLC), CHERE Working Paper 2007/6

Background: There are several perceived benefits from introducing positron emission tomography (PET) scanning into the staging of non small lung cancer (NSCLC). However, its greatest primary benefit is the role it can potential perform in reducing the number of unnecessary diagnostic examinations and futile surgeries. Objectives: To evaluate the economic impact and cost effectiveness of PET scanning in the management of potentially operable NSCLC patients using a cost-utility model. Methods: A literature review was conducted to find relevant studies and appropriate parameters to construct a decision model. Two strategies were compared. The first strategy was a conventional work up (CWU) consisting of an x-ray, a chest computer tomography (CT) scan and brochoscopy; the second strategy consisted of a CWU plus a whole body PET scan. These two strategies were applied to two sub-groups of NSCLC patients; those that had received a positive result on their CT scan and those that got a negative result on their CT scan. The cost-effectiveness of each strategy was dependent on a number of variables that were taken from a literature review. Costs were based on the Australian diagnostic related groups, a cost calculation for a chemotherapy course and values obtained from the literature. The life expectancy and utility scores were also taken from the literature and combined to create an incremental quality adjusted life year (QALY) value for PET for each of the patient groups. Results: The mean costs in CT negative and CT positive patients were lower in the CWU strategy, costing $A 20,427 and$A 23,578 per patient respectively compared to the PET strategy ($A 20,826 and$A 24,083 per patient respectively). The mean QALYs for both the CT positive and CT negative patients were higher in PET with 2.91 and 2.11 respectively compared to the CWU of 2.88 and 2.09. The incremental cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) for the CT negative strategy was $A 14,581 and$A 52,039 for the CT positive strategy. Conclusion: The PET strategy in CT negative and CT positive patients appears to be cost effective, however, there is much uncertainty surrounding this base result, particularly in CT positive patients.PET, non-small-cell lung cancer, economic evaluation