Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibriu

Cultural Polysemy: Exploring Cultural Codes Through Digital and Non-Digital Practices

Culture is a coherent entity we use for describing our cooperative interests with others in political, social, and historical contexts. Culture is functional in that it is defined through individual and collective articulations in time and space. Its representations occur through macro categories of nations, race, habits, practices, and values as embodied in the following models: contexting (Hall, 1976); value orientation (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961); cultural dimension (Hofstede, 1996); Seven-Dimensions of culture (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997); Seven Value Types (Schwartz, 1999). Culture also gets defined in terms of its situatedness based on specificity of contexts and practices: social constructionist approach (Dohney-Farina, 1986; Porter, 1993; Mirel, 1996); discourse approach (Scollon et al., 1995). In professional and technical communication, the practice of splitting culture into macro and micro categories is influenced by the American linguistic anthropologist Kenneth L. Pike (1954) who theorized cultural distinctions through a linguistic route of tagmemics that looks at the connection between language use and sociocultural behavior (Franklin, 1996) through emic and etic approaches. Emic accounts focus on individual and relative aspects of a culture, while etic elements provide descriptive universals to enable macro comparison between cultures

Thermal Convection in a Cylindrical Annulus Filled with Porous Material

Here a study on thermal convection in a porous vertical cylindrical annulus which is heated from below is carried out. The walls are considered to be impermeable that is the velocity is 0 at the boundary walls. The cylindrical annulus is radially insulated. The governing system consists of the continuity equation, Darcy-Boussinesq equation, heat equation and the equation of state. Employing weakly non-linear approach, the basic state system and the perturbed system are derived. After obtaining the solutions to the basic state system, the pressure term in perturbed system is eliminated by taking double curl, and then eliminating the velocity, a partial differential equation in the linearized perturbed temperature is obtained. This partial differential equation is solved in terms of Bessel and trigonometric functions using separation of variables method. For axisymmetric case, the solution contains the zeroth order Bessel functions of the first and second kind. Computational results for the temperature are presented in tabular and graphical forms

MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AS A DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING CORRELATED DISTRIBUTIONS

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium

Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.correlated equilibrium distribution; implementation; monotonicity

Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions.

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium