Aggregating Litigation

A comment on Judith Resnik\u27s article on the aggregation of civil cases is presented. The goals of aggregating litigation and the very circumstances in which aggregation works best in achieving those goals are discussed. The aggregation of personal injury cases is also discussed

Price-Matching Guarantees

Are price-matching guarantees anticompetitive? This paper examines the incentives for price-matching guarantees in markets where information about prices is costly. Under some conditions the conventional explanation of price-matching announcements as facilitating collusion finds support, and is even strengthened. But our model provides an additional explanation for the practice. A price-matching guarantee may be a credible and easily understood means of communicating to uninformed consumers that a firm is low-priced. The credibility of the signal to uninformed consumers is assured by the behaviour of informed consumers. We contrast the testable implications of our model with those of the anticompetitive theories and discuss supportive evidence from an illustrative sample of retailers.

Western Christianity: resource and obstacle to world missions

Now that\u27s my text, my topic and my notes. That\u27s it. Everything I say from here on is going to reflect in some way on Western Christianity as either or both a resource and an obstacle to missions

Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America

It is a safe generalization that no nation should increase thecost of raising capital except for compelling reasons. The lower thecost of capital to a nation\u27s entrepreneurs, the more that will bepurchased. When further units of capital are added to a fixednumber of units of other factors of production, the return to those other factors is increased. For example, hypothesize two complementaryfactors of production that jointly produce products. Thefirst factor is capital, domestic and foreign. We assume it to beextremely mobile. The second factor, domestic labor, we assumeto be fixed in amount. Governmental measures that reduce thecost of capital will increase the return to labor as each additionalunit of capital purchased competes for the fixed units of labor.Governmental measures that increase the cost of capital will inturn diminish the return to labor

On Protecting the Ordinary Investor

In this lecture I propose to differentiate, in a somewhat arbitrary yet analytically helpful way, between four types of investors, and then to consider various issues of corporate and securities law in light of the interests and functions of the different investors. I will style the investors the Ordinary Investor, the Speculator, the Institutional Investor, and the Entrepreneur in the Market for Management Control. These distinctions are arbitrary because overlap exists between the categories. Moreover, these definitions are not based on how particular investors behave, but on the market functions different kinds of investors perform. Thus, some who consider themselves Ordinary Investors most definitely are Speculators as defined in this lecture. I conclude that the investor least in need of more legal protection is the Ordinary Investor who holds a diversified portfolio and follows a buy-and-hold strategy, and that proposals for further regulation appear principally designed to protect either inefficient speculators or incumbent management

On Protecting the Ordinary Investor

In this lecture I propose to differentiate, in a somewhat arbitrary yet analytically helpful way, between four types of investors, and then to consider various issues of corporate and securities law in light of the interests and functions of the different investors. I will style the investors the Ordinary Investor, the Speculator, the Institutional Investor, and the Entrepreneur in the Market for Management Control. These distinctions are arbitrary because overlap exists between the categories. Moreover, these definitions are not based on how particular investors behave, but on the market functions different kinds of investors perform. Thus, some who consider themselves Ordinary Investors most definitely are Speculators as defined in this lecture. I conclude that the investor least in need of more legal protection is the Ordinary Investor who holds a diversified portfolio and follows a buy-and-hold strategy, and that proposals for further regulation appear principally designed to protect either inefficient speculators or incumbent management