Single and Multi-Dimensional Optimal Auctions - A Network Approach

This paper highlights connections between the discrete and continuous approaches to optimal auction design with single and multi-dimensional types. We provide an interpretaion of an optimal auction design problem in terms of a linear program that is an instance of a parametric shortest path problem on a lattice. We also solve some cases explicitly in the discrete framework.Auctions, Networks, Linear Programming

Optimal auctions with financially constrained bidders

We consider an environment where potential buyers of an indivisible good have liquidity constraints, in that they cannot pay more than their `budget' regardless of their valuation. A buyer's valuation for the good as well as her budget are her private information. We derive constrained-e±cient and revenue maximizing auctions for this setting. In general, the optimal auction requires `pooling' both at the top and in the middle despite the maintained assumption of a monotone hazard rate. Further, the auctioneer will never ¯nd it desirable to subsidize bidders with low budgets

Single and multi-dimensional optimal auctions: a network approach

This paper highlights connections between the discrete and continuous approaches to optimal auction design with single and multi-dimensional types. We provide an interpretaion of an optimal auction design problem in terms of a linear program that is an instance of a parametric shortest path problem on a lattice. We also solve some cases explicitly in the discrete framework

Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget contrained bidders

We consider an environment with a single divisible good and two bidders. The valuations of the bidders are private information but one bidder has a commonly known budget constraint. For this environment we derive the revenue maximizing subsidy free incentive compatible auction. We also examine the case when the budget constraint is private information but bidders must post a bond

Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types

This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule

Optimal dynamic auctions

We consider a dynamic auction problem motivated by the traditional single-leg, multi-period revenue management problem. A seller with C units to sell faces potential buyers with unit demand who arrive and depart over the course of T time periods. The time at which a buyer arrives, her value for a unit as well as the time by which she must make the purchase are private information. In this environment, we derive the revenue maximizing Bayesian incentive compatible selling mechanism

Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types

This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule.Dominant Strategy, Farkas Lemma, Combinatorial Auctions.