Elections and Ethnic Civil War

Existing research on how democratization may influence the risk of civil war tends to consider only changes in the overall level of democracy and rarely examines explicitly the postulated mechanisms relating democratization to incentives for violence. The authors argue that typically highlighted key mechanisms imply that elections should be especially likely to affect ethnic groups’ inclination to resort to violence. Distinguishing between types of conflict and the order of competitive elections, the authors find that ethnic civil wars are more likely to erupt after competitive elections, especially after first and second elections following periods of no polling. When disaggregating to the level of individual ethnic groups and conflicts over territory or government, the authors find some support for the notion that ethno-nationalist mobilization and sore-loser effects provoke postelectoral violence. More specifically, although large groups in general are more likely to engage in governmental conflicts, they are especially likely to do so after noncompetitive elections. Competitive elections, however, strongly reduce the risk of conflict. </jats:p

Power-sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this record.Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/3DK6JAGrievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power-sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power-sharing institutions effectively prevent large-scale violence.We can improve our understanding of the effect of power-sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power-sharing institutions on peace with their indirect effect through power-sharing behavior. Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with information on power-sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal power-sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset mostly through power-sharing behavior that these institutions induce.Funding: Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No. 105511- 143213; PI: Cederman, Hug, and Wucherpfennig), the National Science Foundation (Grant No. Q2 SES-081950766b; PI: Strøom), and the Norwegian Research Council (196850/F10; PI: Gates)

Winning Peace Frames: Intra-Ethnic Outbidding in Northern Ireland and Cyprus

Ethnic outbidding in divided societies can have dire political consequences, ranging from the derailment of peace processes to inter-ethnic warfare. This article investigates the conditions contributing to successful outbidding within the framework of protracted peace negotiations by using the contrasting cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Evidence demonstrates that successful outbidders are able to exploit the fears of their communities with respect to inter-ethnic compromise while identifying appropriate strategies and opportunities for redressing these grievances. The article demonstrates that the degree of outbidding success over the long term derives from combining diagnostic and prognostic frames linked to credible political and constitutional strategies

Taxation in Colonial America

Taxation in Colonial America examines life in the thirteen original American colonies through the revealing lens of the taxes levied on and by the colonists. Spanning the turbulent years from the founding of the Jamestown settlement to the outbreak of the American Revolution, Alvin Rabushka provides the definitive history of taxation in the colonial era, and sets it against the backdrop of enormous economic, political, and social upheaval in the colonies and Europe. Rabushka shows how the colonists strove to minimize, avoid, and evade British and local taxation, and how they used tax incentives to foster settlement. He describes the systems of public finance they created to reduce taxation, and reveals how they gained control over taxes through elected representatives in colonial legislatures. Rabushka takes a comprehensive look at the external taxes imposed on the colonists by Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden, as well as internal direct taxes like poll and income taxes. He examines indirect taxes like duties and tonnage fees, as well as county and town taxes, church and education taxes, bounties, and other charges. He links the types and amounts of taxes with the means of payment--be it gold coins, agricultural commodities, wampum, or furs--and he compares tax systems and burdens among the colonies and with Britain. This book brings the colonial period to life in all its rich complexity, and shows how colonial attitudes toward taxation offer a unique window into the causes of the revolution.taxation, Colonial America, public finance, political revolution