Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game

We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided

Probabilistic Choice in Games: Properties of Rosenthal’s t-Solutions

Quantal response equilibrium, t-solutions, Linear probability model, Bounded rationality,

Nonparametric analysis of treatment effects in ordered response models

Treatment analyses based on average outcomes do not immediately generalize to the case of ordered responses because the expectation of an ordinally measured variable does not exist. The proposed remedy in this paper is a shift in focus to distributional effects. Assuming a threshold crossing model on both the ordered potential outcomes and the binary treatment variable, and leaving the distribution of error terms and functional forms unspecified, the paper discusses how the treatment effects can be bounded. The construction of bounds is illustrated in a simulated data example