935 research outputs found

    Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction

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    In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders’ types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices

    Social Media Technologies' Use for the Competitive Information and Knowledge Sharing, and Its Effects on Industrial SMEs' Innovation

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    The effective use of technologies supporting decision making is essential to companies? survival. Recent studies analyzed social media technologies (SMT) in the context of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), contributing to the discussion on SMT benefits from the marketing perspective. This article focuses on the effects of SMT use on innovation. Our findings provide empirical evidence on the positive effects of SMT use for acquiring external information and for sharing knowledge and innovation performance

    License prices for financially constrained firms

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    It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers’ point of view

    Consumer Surplus in Online Auctions

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    Second-price auctions with private entry costs

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    We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have potentially different, commonly-known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment

    Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships

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    We derive the optimal incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms to reallocate arbitrary given ownership shares among a set of agents. These mechanisms are optimal in the sense that they maximize social surplus of the final allocation subject to the aforementioned constraints and a revenue constraint. We allow for the agents' types to be drawn from non-identical distributions and for interdependent values. Because outside options are type dependent, the critical types for which individual rationality binds must be determined simultaneously with the allocation rule. We show that optimality uniquely pins down the set of critical types, which allows us to fully characterize the optimal mechanisms. Moreover, we find that the value function is Schur-concave in ownership shares when types are identically distributed, so that more symmetric shares are better irrespective of size of the revenue constraint
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