Percussion in an electronic environment

This essay is an account of the process of making work for a new percussion/software performance environment built using Max/Msp, with an electronic drum kit as control interface. Each of the works are Audio-visual responses to a number of key stimuli - the experience of urbanness, representations and accounts of mental illness, childhood and memory, and physicality - which are recurring concerns in my work. Submitted along with the supporting text are DVD documents ofthe four main pieces of work, which are presented here as medium-specific 'versions' of the pieces- i.e. edited specifically for for DVD replay rather than as 'neutral' documentation. Also submitted are the materials needed to perform each of the pieces, including written performance instructions and the Max/Msp patches (containing the relevant media) for each piece. *[N.B.: A DVD was attached to this thesis at the time of its submission. Please refer to the author for further details.]

The Spread of Industry: Spatial Agglomeration in Economic Development

This paper describes the spread of industry from country to country as a region grows. All industrial sectors are initially agglomerated in one country, tied together by input-output links between firms. Growth expands industry more than other sectors, bidding up wages in the country in which industry is clustered. At some point some firms start to move away, and when a critical mass is reached industry expands in another country, raising wages there. We establish the circumstance sin which industry spill over, which sectors move out first, and which are more important in triggering a critical mass.

Negotiating the membership

In cooperative games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in his group or to exit and act as a singleton. We show that players, acting myopically, always reach a Nash equilibrium.Cooperative game, coalition structure, Owen value, Nash equilibrium

Implementation of the levels structure value

We implement the levels structure value (Winter, 1989) for cooperative transfer utility games with a levels structure. The mechanism is a generalization of the bidding mechanism by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).levels structure value implementation TU games

The Harsanyi paradox and the 'right to talk' in bargaining among coalitions

We introduce a non-cooperative model of bargaining when players are divided into coalitions. The model is a modification of the mechanism in Vidal-Puga (Economic Theory, 2005) so that all the players have the same chances to make proposals. This means that players maintain their own 'right to talk' when joining a coalition. We apply this model to an intriguing example presented by Krasa, Tamimi and Yannelis (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2003) and show that the Harsanyi paradox (forming a coalition may be disadvantageous) disappears.cooperative games bargaining coalition structure Harsanyi paradox

A bargaining approach to the consistent value for NTU games with coalition structure

The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for NTU games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure as well as the consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games with trivial coalition structure. Furthermore, we obtain a solution for pure bargaining problems with coalition structure which generalizes the Nash (1950) bargaining solution.NTU consistent bargaining stationary subgame perfect equilibrium

ALIOLI: Adaptive and Lucky Imaging Optics Lightweight Instrument

As a consequence of the evolution in the design and of the modularity of its components, AOLI for the William Herschel Telescope (WHT 4.2m) is much smaller and more efficient than its previous designs. This success has leaded us to plan to condense it even more to get a portable and easy to integrate system, ALIOLI (Adaptive and Lucky Imaging Optics Lightweight Instrument). It consists of a DM+WFS module with a lucky imaging science camera attached. ALIOLI is an AO instrument for the 1-2m class telescopes which will also be used as on-sky testbench for AO developments. Here we describe the setup to be installed at the 1.5m Telescopio Carlos S\'anchez (TCS) at the Spanish Observatorio del Teide (Tenerife, Canary Islands).Comment: 4 pages, 5 figures, conferenc

Nursery Cities: Urban Diversity, Process Innovation and the Life-Cycle of Products

A simple model of process innovation is proposed, where firms learn about their ideal production process by making prototypes. We build around this a dynamic general equilibrium model, and derive conditions under which diversified and specialised cities coexist. New products are developed in diversified cities, trying processes borrowed from different activities. On finding their ideal process, firms switch to mass-production and relocate to specialised cities with lower costs. When in equilibrium, this configuration welfare-dominates those with only diversified or only specialised cities. We find strong evidence of this relocation pattern in establishment relocations across French employment areas 1993û1996.Cities, diversity, specialisation, innovation, learning, life-cycle

Unemployment Clusters Across European Regions and Countries

European regions have experienced a polarisation of their unemployment rates between 1986 and 1996, as regions with intermediate rates have been driven by changes in regional employment, only partly offset by labour force changes. Regions' outcomes have closely followed those of neighbouring regions. This is only weakly explained by regions being part og the same member state, having a similar skill composition, or broad sectoral specialisation. Even more surpriisingly , foreign neighbours matter as much as domestic neighbours. All of this suggests a reorganisation of economic activities withh increasing disregard for national borders.

Agglomeration in a global Economy: A Survey

This review of recent contributions reveals common conclusions about the effects of integration on location. For high trade costs, the need to supply markets locally encourages firms to spread across different regions. Integration weakens the incentives for self-sufficiency and for intermediate values of trade costs pecuniary externalities induce firms and workers to cluster together, turning location into a self-reinforcing process. However, agglomeration raises the price of immobile local factors and goods, so far low transport costs firms may spread to regions where those prices are lower.