Capital Destruction, Optimal Defense and Economic Growth

The effects of capital destruction are endogenized in a neoclassical growth model where the economy can optimally allocate part of its labor force to defend capital from being destroyed. The purpose is to explain the optimal allocation of the labor force between productive and deterrence activities along the optimal growth path in response to exogenous terrorist attacks against the material wealth of the economy. The article makes special case to the recent Colombian case and sheds some light on the dramatic increase in the defense activities in Colombia as a result of the increase of terrorist attacks by rebeld groups.Capital accumulation, deterrence, capital destruction and economic growth.

Could the Colombian economy grow faster? How it would be possible?

This paper presents an economic growth model based on the positive externalities generated by the accumulations of physical and human capital. Such externalities imply, at the macroeconomic level, increasing returns to scale. The model helps to better understand the Colombian economic growth process from 2005-2019, and make conditional forecasts. One of the big obstacles in Colombia to have higher growth rates of the per capita product in the long term is everything that is slowing down a higher human capital growth rate and a greater creation of externalities derived from human capital, that is, everything that is hindering improvements in coverage and quality of the educational process

Los Ciclos Económicos Colombianos en el Siglo XX

A partir de una definición específica de "auge y depresión" que se acomoda a la economía colombiana se describen sus ciclos a lo largo del siglo XX y se interpretan con base en dos modelos de una pequeña economía abierta y algunos ejercicios econométricos para estimarlos.

Populist Policies in the Transition to Democracy

This paper develops a political economy model that provides an explanation as for why ruling elites in oligarquic societies may rely on income redistribution to the poor (the masses) in order to prevent them from attempting a revolution. We refer to this kind of redistribution as populist redistribution because, first it does not increase the poor’s productive capacity (human capital), and second it seeks to “buy” political support (peace) to perpetuate the elite’s control of political power. We examine the conditions under which ruling elites choose to deter the poor (by means of military repression and/or populist redistribution), to engage in a dispute with the poor for the control of political power, or, alternatively, to extend democracy. According to the results of the model populist redistribution (or military repression), if any, increases with initial wealth inequality and with the amount of redistribution that the poor can undertake under democracy, and decreases with the relative importance of a human capital externality in production. The model explains why in some cases the use of an apparently ine cient policy of populist redistribution turns out to be optimal for both groups (the ruling elite and the poor class) when the alternative is to use of military repression or default to conflict.Populism, oligarchy, democracy, conflict, inequality.

Cocaine production and trafficking : what do we know ?

The main purpose of this paper is to summarize the information currently available on cocaine production and trafficking. The paper starts by describing the available data on cocaine production and trade, the collection methodologies (if available) used by different sources, the main biases in the data, and the accuracy of different data sources. Next, it states some of the key empirical questions and hypotheses regarding cocaine production and trade and takes a first look at how well the data match these hypotheses. The paper states some of the main puzzles in the cocaine market and studies some of the possible explanations. These puzzles and empirical questions should guide future research on the key determinants of illicit drug production and trafficking. Finally, the paper studies the different policies that producer countries have adopted to fight against cocaine production and the role consumer countries play in the implementation of anti-drug policies.Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Crime and Society,Crops&Crop Management Systems,Economic Theory&Research

El Mercado Laboral Urbano: Empleo, Desempleo y Salario Real en Colombia entre 1985 y 1996

Se estimó un modelo neo-clásico del mercado laboral, con respuestas lentas o ajustes parciales, para el caso de la evolución del empleo, el desempleo transitorio (definido como la diferencia entre el desempleo total y el permanente) y el salario real en el conjunto de las siete principales ciudades colombianas entre 1985 y 1996. Los resultados son consistentes con el modelo supuesto y, en particular, muestran que el empleo es sensible al salario real y al desempleo transitorio, y recíprocamente. Además, tanto el empleo como el desempleo transitorio y el salario real dependen simultáneamente de las tres variables exógenas incorporadas en el modelo: el producto, el costo de uso del capital y la población en edad de trabajar. En equilibrio, al cual tiende el mercado según el modelo, el desempleo transitorio es nulo, así que la tasa desempleo se hace igual a la permanente.

Cocaine Production and Trafficking: What do we know?

The main purpose of this chapter is to summarize the information currently available on cocaine production and trafficking. The chapter starts by describing the available data on cocaine production and trade, the collection methodologies, (if available) used by different sources, the main biases in the data, and the accuracy of different data sources. Next, the chapter states some of the key empirical questions and hypotheses regarding cocaine production and trade and takes a first look at how well the data matches these hypotheses. Also, the chapter states some of the main puzzles in the cocaine market and studies some of the possible explanations. These puzzles and empirical questions should guide future research into our understanding of the key determinants of illicit drug production and trafficking. Finally, the chapter studies the different policies that producer countries have adopted to fight against cocaine production and the role consumer countries play in the implementation of anti-drug policies.Cocaine; Narcotraffic; War on Drugs. Classification JEL: K42; C81; H56.